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The Tragedy of the Risk Averse.H. Orri Stefánsson - 2020 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):351-364.details
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The Normative, the Practical, and the Deliberatively Indispensable.Andrew Stewart - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-21.details
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Reasons without principles.Herman E. Stark - 2004 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):143 – 167.details
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Anti-intellectualism, instructive representations, and the intentional action argument.Alison Ann Springle & Justin Humphreys - 2021 - Synthese (3):7919-7955.details
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A puzzle about demonstratives and semantic competence.Jeff Speaks - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):709-734.details
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On Whether we Can See Intentions.Shannon Spaulding - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2):150-170.details
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Folk concepts of intentional action in the contexts of amoral and immoral luck.Paulo Sousa & Colin Holbrook - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):351-370.details
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Diferentes tipos de decisões e um experimento sobre a geração inconsciente de decisões livres: uma análise conceitual.Beatriz Sorrentino Marques - 2015 - Filosofia Unisinos 16 (1).details
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Time-slice rationality and filling in plans.Justin Snedegar - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):595-607.details
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The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
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Playing One’s Part.Thomas H. Smith - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):213-44.details
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One dogma of philosophy of action.Matthew Noah Smith - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2249-2266.details
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Intentions: past, present, future.Matthew Noah Smith - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):1-12.details
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Consciousness in action.David Woodruff Smith - 1992 - Synthese 90 (1):119-43.details
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Active inference models do not contradict folk psychology.Ryan Smith, Maxwell J. D. Ramstead & Alex Kiefer - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-37.details
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Motor representation in acting together.Corrado Sinigaglia & Stephen A. Butterfill - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-16.details
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A logic of intentions and beliefs.Munindar P. Singh & Nicholas M. Asher - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (5):513 - 544.details
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Knowledge and reasoning.Mona Simion - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):10371-10388.details
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Resistance and Well‐being†.Daniel Silvermint - 2013 - Journal of Political Philosophy 21 (4):405-425.details
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More pain or less? Comments on Broome.H. S. Silverstein - 1998 - Analysis 58 (2):146-151.details
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Logic, planning agency and branching time.Ricardo Souza Silvestre - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 14 (3):421-438.details
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Moral and Rational Commitment.Sam Shpall - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):146-172.details
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The Calendar Paradox.Sam Shpall - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):801-825.details
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Wide and narrow scope.Sam Shpall - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.details
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Logical Theories of Intention and the Database Perspective.Yoav Shoham - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (6):633-647.details
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Evaluation and Self-Control.Naoyuki Shiono - 2008 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 41 (2):1-16.details
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Subjectivism about Future Reasons or The Guise of Caring.Yonatan Shemmer - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):630-648.details
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Promise as practice reason.Hanoch Sheinman - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (4):287-318.details
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Holding them responsible.Paul Sheehy - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):74–93.details
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Was inclusive legal positivism founded on a mistake?Scott J. Shapiro - 2009 - Ratio Juris 22 (3):326-338.details
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Two Problems for Accepting as Intending.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2018 - Ethics 128 (3):626-641.details
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The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):209-226.details
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A problem for the unity of normativity.Nicholas Shackel - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):404-411.details
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Is “Free Will” an Emergent Property of Immaterial Soul? A Critical Examination of Human Beings’ Decision-Making Process(es) Followed by Voluntary Actions and Their Moral Responsibility.Satya Sundar Sethy & M. Suresh - 2021 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 38 (3):491-505.details
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Explaining action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.details
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Against internalism.Kieran Setiya - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):266–298.details
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Valuing and caring.Jeffrey Seidman - 2009 - Theoria 75 (4):272-303.details
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The Spectrum of Responsibility Ascription for End Users of Neurotechnologies.Andreas Schönau - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (3):423-435.details
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The neuroscientific study of free will: A diagnosis of the controversy.Markus E. Schlosser - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):245-262.details
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The Difference Between Moral and Rational “Oughts”: An Expressivist Account.Peter Schulte - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):159-174.details
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Reconsidering Autotelic Play.Stephen E. Schmid - 2009 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 36 (2):238-257.details
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Propositional attitudes.Timothy Schroeder - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):65-73.details
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Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248.details
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Lucky joint action.Julius Schönherr - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (1):123-142.details
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Internalism without Luminosity.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):252-272.details
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Instrumental mythology.Mark Schroeder - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (2):1-13.details
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Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.details
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Intention, Emotion, and Action: A Neural Theory Based on Semantic Pointers.Tobias Schröder, Terrence C. Stewart & Paul Thagard - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (5):851-880.details
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Endorsement and Autonomous Agency.François Schroeter - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):633-659.details
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