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Is “Free Will” an Emergent Property of Immaterial Soul? A Critical Examination of Human Beings’ Decision-Making Process(es) Followed by Voluntary Actions and Their Moral Responsibility.Satya Sundar Sethy & M. Suresh - 2021 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 38 (3):491-505.details
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Explaining action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.details
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Against internalism.Kieran Setiya - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):266–298.details
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Valuing and caring.Jeffrey Seidman - 2009 - Theoria 75 (4):272-303.details
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The Spectrum of Responsibility Ascription for End Users of Neurotechnologies.Andreas Schönau - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (3):423-435.details
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The neuroscientific study of free will: A diagnosis of the controversy.Markus E. Schlosser - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):245-262.details
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The Difference Between Moral and Rational “Oughts”: An Expressivist Account.Peter Schulte - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):159-174.details
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Reconsidering Autotelic Play.Stephen E. Schmid - 2009 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 36 (2):238-257.details
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Propositional attitudes.Timothy Schroeder - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):65-73.details
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Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248.details
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Internalism without Luminosity.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):252-272.details
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Instrumental mythology.Mark Schroeder - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (2):1-13.details
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Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.details
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Intention, Emotion, and Action: A Neural Theory Based on Semantic Pointers.Tobias Schröder, Terrence C. Stewart & Paul Thagard - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (5):851-880.details
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Endorsement and Autonomous Agency.François Schroeter - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):633-659.details
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Beyond Autotelic Play.Stephen E. Schmid - 2011 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 38 (2):149-166.details
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A framework for the foundation of the philosophy of artificial intelligence.Viola Schiaffonati - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (4):537-552.details
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Agent-causation and agential control.Markus Ernst Schlosser - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):3-21.details
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Action and Agency in The Red Shoes.Paul Schofield - 2018 - Film-Philosophy 22 (3):484-500.details
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Human-robot interaction and psychoanalysis.Franco Scalzone & Guglielmo Tamburrini - 2013 - AI and Society 28 (3):297-307.details
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Two Objections to Yaffe on the Criminalization of Attempts.Alexander Sarch - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (3):569-587.details
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Modeling intentional agency: a neo-Gricean framework.Matti Sarkia - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7003-7030.details
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Structural Injustice and Individual Responsibility.Andrea Sangiovanni - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (3):461-483.details
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ETHICA EX MACHINA. Exploring artificial moral agency or the possibility of computable ethics.Rodrigo Sanz - 2020 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 3 (2):223-239.details
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Transparency and introspective unification.Kateryna Samoilova - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).details
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Do the Standards of Rationality Depend on Resource Context?Eric Sampson - 2022 - Acta Analytica 38 (2):323-333.details
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Self-Esteem, Social Esteem, and Pride.Alessandro Salice - 2020 - Emotion Review 12 (3):193-205.details
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Aiming at the good.Amir Saemi - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):197-219.details
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Shared intentions and shared responsibility.Brook Jenkins Sadler - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):115–144.details
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Intention as action under development: why intention is not a mental state.Devlin Russell - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):742-761.details
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So why can’t you intend to drink the toxin?Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):294-311.details
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In defense of a strong persistence requirement on intention.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10289-10312.details
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A conditional theory of trying.David-Hillel Ruben - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):271-287.details
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Intentions and interactive transformations of decision problems.Olivier Roy - 2009 - Synthese 169 (2):335 - 349.details
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Interpersonal coordination and epistemic support for intentions with we-content.Olivier Roy - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (3):345-367.details
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A dynamic-epistemic hybrid logic for intentions and information changes in strategic games.O. Roy - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):291 - 320.details
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The self-referentiality of intentions.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 97 (1):11-51.details
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Shared agency and contralateral commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.details
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Prediction, Authority, and Entitlement in Shared Activity.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):626-652.details
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The silence of self-knowledge.Johannes Roessler - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):1-17.details
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III—The Epistemic Role of Intentions.Johannes Roessler - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1):41-56.details
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Social and Justified Legal Normativity: Unlocking the Mystery of the Relationship.Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco - 2012 - Ratio Juris 25 (3):409-433.details
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The limits of limited-blockage Frankfurt-style cases.Michael Robinson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):429-446.details
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Is it rational to carry out strategic intentions?Michael H. Robins - 1997 - Philosophia 25 (1-4):191-221.details
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Mental imagery and the illusion of conscious will.Paulius Rimkevičius - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4581-4600.details
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“Yes, the theory is abstemious, but...”: A Critique of Yehezkel.Regan Lance Reitsma - 2017 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 13 (1):59-79.details
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Unifying the requirements of rationality.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):243-260.details
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Intention and value.Joseph Raz - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):109-126.details
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A Disposition-Based Fraud Model: Theoretical Integration and Research Agenda.Vasant Raval - 2018 - Journal of Business Ethics 150 (3):741-763.details
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