- Collective Understanding — A conceptual defense for when groups should be regarded as epistemic agents with understanding.Sven Delarivière - forthcoming - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2).details
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Review of Shared and Institutional Agency, by Michael E. Bratman.Abraham Roth - 2023 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.details
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The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Joint Action.Facundo M. Alonso - 2024 - Philosophical Studies:1-19.details
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Common Knowledge and Hinge Epistemology.Michael Wilby - 2024 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 32 (1).details
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Drawn together: When motor representations ground joint actions.Francesco Della Gatta, Francesca Garbarini, Marco Rabuffetti, Luca Viganò, Stephen A. Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2017 - Cognition 165 (C):53-60.details
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Collective moral agency and self-induced moral incapacity.Niels de Haan - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (1):1-22.details
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Responsibility of AI Systems.Mehdi Dastani & Vahid Yazdanpanah - 2023 - AI and Society 38 (2):843-852.details
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Social glue and norms of sociality.David Copp - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3387-3397.details
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We the People: Is the Polity the State?Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (1):78-97.details
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Abilities and Obligations: Lessons from Non-agentive Groups.Stephanie Collins - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (8):3375-3396.details
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The language faculty that wasn't: a usage-based account of natural language recursion.Morten H. Christiansen & Nick Chater - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:150920.details
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Breaking the right way: a closer look at how we dissolve commitments.Matthew Chennells & John Michael - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.details
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Reply to Further Defenses of Incentivization.William Butchard & Robert D’Amico - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (6):463-471.details
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Agents necessitating effects in newtonian time and space: from power and opportunity to effectivity.Jan Broersen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):31-68.details
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Contested Institutional Facts.Johan Brännmark - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):1047-1064.details
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Précis of planning, time, and self-governance.Michael E. Bratman - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (9):883-891.details
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Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.details
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Shared intention and the doxastic single end condition.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.details
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Intentional cooperation and acting as part of a single body.Olle Blomberg - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (2):264-284.details
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Common Knowledge and Reductionism about Shared Agency.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):315-326.details
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Joint know-how.Jonathan Birch - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3329–3352.details
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Group Agents and the Phenomenology of Joint Action.Jordan Baker & Michael Ebling - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-25.details
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Forgiveness and the Multiple Functions of Anger.Antony G. Aumann & Zac Cogley - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):44-71.details
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Review Essay: Chant, Sara Rachel, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer, Editors. From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 240. [REVIEW]Caroline T. Arruda - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (3):318–331.details
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A frame of analysis for collective free improvisation on the bridge between Husserl’s phenomenology of time and some recent readings of the predictive coding model.Lucia Angelino - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (2):349-369.details
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Even When No One Is Watching: The Moral Psychology of Corporate Reputation.Miguel Alzola - 2019 - Business and Society 58 (6):1267-1301.details
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Mixed motives in the equilibrium view of joint intention.Nicholas Almendares & Dimitri Landa - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):733-755.details
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Social Ontology.Brian Epstein - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Problem of the First Belief : Group Agents and Responsibility.Onni Hirvonen - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology 6 (1):1-20.details
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Knowledge Norms and Conversation.J. Adam Carter - forthcoming - In Waldomiro Silva Filho (ed.), Epistemology of Conversation. Springer.details
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Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.details
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Understanding What We Ought and Shall Do: A Hyperstate Semantics for Descriptive, Prescriptive, and Intentional Sentences.Preston Stovall - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 215-238.details
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The Social Construction of Legal Norms.Kirk Ludwig - 2020 - In Rachael Mellin, Raimo Tuomela & Miguel Garcia-Godinez (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 179-208.details
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Group Responsibility.Christian List - 2022 - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Intending, Settling, and Relying.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74.details
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What is a mode account of collective intentionality?Michael Schmitz - 2016 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality: Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with his Responses. Cham: Springer. pp. 37-70.details
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Is Collective Agency a Coherent Idea? Considerations from the Enactive Theory of Agency.Mog Stapleton & Tom Froese - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag. pp. 219-236.details
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Sozial erweiterte Kognition und geteilte Intentionalität.Holger Lyre - 2015 - In Jan G. Michel, Kim J. Boström & Michael Pohl (eds.), Ist der Geist im Kopf? Beiträge zur These des erweiterten Geistes. Brill/mentis. pp. 187-212.details
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Agent‐Switching, Plight Inescapability, and Corporate Agency.Olof Leffler - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2017.Vincent C. Müller (ed.) - 2017 - Berlin: Springer.details
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When and why Conventions cannot Be Social Institutions.Vojtěch Zachník - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1235-1254.details
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Publicity and Common Commitment to Believe.J. R. G. Williams - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1059-1080.details
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Intercorporeity and the first-person plural in Merleau-Ponty.Philip J. Walsh - 2019 - Continental Philosophy Review 53 (1):21-47.details
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What is it like to be a chimpanzee?Michael Tomasello - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-24.details
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What’s the Matter with cognition? A ‘Vygotskian’ perspective on material engagement theory.Georg Theiner & Chris Drain - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (5):837-862.details
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Representing collective agency.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3379-3386.details
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Introduction: Empathy and Collective Intentionality—The Social Philosophy of Edith Stein.Thomas Szanto & Dermot Moran - 2015 - Human Studies 38 (4):445-461.details
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Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation.Thomas Szanto - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7:1-17.details
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The Metaphysics of Practical Rationality: Intentional and Deontic Cognition.Preston Stovall - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (4):549-568.details
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The First-Person Plural and Immunity to Error.Joel Smith - 2018 - Disputatio 10 (49):141-167.details
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