- (1 other version)Welfarist Pluralism: A Theory of the Foundations of a Pluralist Account of Reasons for Belief [Chapter 1 of A New Theory of Reasons for Belief: Pragmatic Foundations and Pluralistic Reasons (Under Contract with OUP).Andrew Reisner - manuscriptdetails
|
|
The pragmatic foundations of non-derivative pluralism about reasons for belief.Andrew Reisner - manuscriptdetails
|
|
The possibility of wildly unrealistic justice and the principle/proposal distinction.Nicholas Southwood - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2403-2423.details
|
|
Knowledge of Perception.Daniel Stoljar - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. , US: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Feasibility as a Constraint on ‘Ought All-Things-Considered’, But not on ‘Ought as a Matter of Justice’?Nicholas Southwood - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):598-616.details
|
|
Contrary-to-Duty Scenarios, Deontic Dilemmas, and Transmission Principles.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - Ethics 129 (1):98-115.details
|
|
On the Scope, Jurisdiction, and Application of Rationality and the Law.Daniel Fogal - 2018 - Problema 12:21-57.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Property of Rationality: A Guide to What Rationality Requires?Julian Fink - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):117-140.details
|
|
Two Thesis about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 221-240.details
|
|
Sources, reasons, and requirements.Bruno Guindon - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1253-1268.details
|
|
Rationality in Flux–Formal Representations of Methodological Change.Jonas Nilsson & Sten Lindström - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 347--356.details
|
|
Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Evan Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes From the Philosophy of John Broome. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
Is rationality normative?John Broome - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (23):1–18.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
|
|
A Constitutive Account of 'Rationality Requires'.Julian Fink - 2014 - Erkenntnis (4):909-941.details
|
|
Are there process-requirements of rationality?Julian Fink - 2011 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (4):475-488.details
|
|
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.details
|
|
(1 other version)A logical typology of normative systems.Berislav Žarnić - 2010 - Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy 2 (1):30-40.details
|
|
The Normativity of Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1057-1068.details
|
|
Unifying the requirements of rationality.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):243-260.details
|
|
Wide or narrow scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.details
|
|
(1 other version)Welfarist Pluralism: Pluralistic Reasons for Belief and the Value of Truth.Andrew Reisner - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.details
|
|
The symmetry of rational requirements.Jonathan Way - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):227-239.details
|
|
Introspection and Necessity.Daniel Stoljar - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):389-410.details
|
|
Changing minds about climate change: Belief revision, coherence, and emotion.Paul Thagard & Scott Findlay - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 329--345.details
|
|
Inscrutability and ontological commitment.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):21 - 42.details
|
|
Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia.Edward S. Hinchman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.details
|
|
Rationality has its reasons, of which reason knows not: A vindication of the normativity of rationality.Bruno Guindon - unknowndetails
|
|