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The autonomy of colour

In K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. Oxford University Press. pp. 191-225 (1992)

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  1. Color primitivism.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2007 - In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Status of Secondary Qualities. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 73 - 105.
    The realist preference for reductive theories of color over the last few decades is particularly striking in light of the generally anti-reductionist mood of recent philosophy of mind. The parallels between the mind-body problem and the case of color are substantial enough that the difference in trajectory is surprising. While dualism and non-.
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  • On the ways to color.Evan Thompson, Adrian Palacios & Francisco J. Varela - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):56-74.
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  • Ways of coloring: Comparative color vision as a case study for cognitive science.Evan Thompson, Adrian Palacios & Francisco J. Varela - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):1-26.
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  • Why don’t synaesthetic colours adapt away?Dave Ward - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (1):123-138.
    Synaesthetes persistently perceive certain stimuli as systematically accompanied by illusory colours, even though they know those colours to be illusory. This appears to contrast with cases where a subject’s colour vision adapts to systematic distortions caused by wearing coloured goggles. Given that each case involves longstanding systematic distortion of colour perception that the subjects recognize as such, how can a theory of colour perception explain the fact that perceptual adaptation occurs in one case but not the other? I argue that (...)
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  • Ways of coloring the ecological approach.Johan Wagemans & Charles M. M. de Weert - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):54-56.
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  • The ethnocentricity of colour.J. van Brakel - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):53-54.
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  • Ways of coloring.Evan Thompson, A. Palacios & F. J. Varela - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):1-26.
    Different explanations of color vision favor different philosophical positions: Computational vision is more compatible with objectivism (the color is in the object), psychophysics and neurophysiology with subjectivism (the color is in the head). Comparative research suggests that an explanation of color must be both experientialist (unlike objectivism) and ecological (unlike subjectivism). Computational vision's emphasis on optimally prespecified features of the environment (i.e., distal properties, independent of the sensory-motor capacities of the animal) is unsatisfactory. Conceiving of visual perception instead as the (...)
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  • Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.
    Colours and consciousness both present us with metaphysical problems. But what exactly are the problems? According to standard accounts, they are roughly the following. On the one hand, we have reason to believe, about both colour and consciousness, that they are identical with some familiar natural phenomena. But on the other hand, it is hard to see how these identities could obtain. I argue that this is an adequate characterisation of our metaphysical problem of colour, but a mischaracterisation of the (...)
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  • Wavelength processing and colour experience.Petra Stoerig & Alan Cowey - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):53-53.
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  • Confusing structure and function.Kenneth M. Steele - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):52-53.
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  • Color, Relativism, and Realism.John Spackman - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (3):251-288.
    It is plausible to think that some animals perceive the world as coloreddifferently from the way humans perceive it. I argue that the best way ofaccommodating this fact is to adopt perceiver-relativism, the view that colorpredicates express relations between objects and types of perceivers.Perceiver-relativism makes no claim as to the identity of color properties;it is compatible with both physicalism and dispositionalism. I arguehowever for a response-dependence version of it according to which an object counts as red (for a type of (...)
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  • Ecological subjectivism?Christine A. Skarda - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):51-52.
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  • What in the world determines the structure of color space?Roger N. Shepard - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):50-51.
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  • Areas of ignorance and confusion in color science.Adam Reeves - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):49-50.
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  • Looks as powers.Philip Pettit - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):221-52.
    Although they may differ on the reason why, many philosophers hold that it is a priori that an object is red if and only if it is such as to look red to normal observers in normal conditions.
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  • What it is like to see: A sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience.J. Kevin O’Regan - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):79-103.
    The paper proposes a way of bridging the gapbetween physical processes in the brain and the ''''felt''''aspect of sensory experience. The approach is based onthe idea that experience is not generated by brainprocesses themselves, but rather is constituted by theway these brain processes enable a particular form of''''give-and-take'''' between the perceiver and theenvironment. From this starting-point we are able tocharacterize the phenomenological differences betweenthe different sensory modalities in a more principledway than has been done in the past. We are also (...)
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  • How to Build a Robot that is Conscious and Feels.J. Kevin O’Regan - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):117-136.
    Following arguments put forward in my book (Why red doesn’t sound like a bell: understanding the feel of consciousness. Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2011), this article takes a pragmatic, scientist’s point of view about the concepts of consciousness and “feel”, pinning down what people generally mean when they talk about these concepts, and then investigating to what extent these capacities could be implemented in non-biological machines. Although the question of “feel”, or “phenomenal consciousness” as it is called by (...)
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  • A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...)
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  • Defending Dispositionalism of Color:色の傾向性理論を擁護する.Yasushi Ogusa - 2018 - Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 45 (1-2):1-21.
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  • On perceived colors.Christa Neumeyer - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):49-49.
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  • Colour in a Physical World: A Problem due to Visual Noise.John Morrison - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):333-373.
    I will develop a new problem for almost all realist theories of colour. The problem involves fluctuations in our colour experiences that are due to visual noise rather than changes in the objects we are looking at.
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  • Colors really are only in the head.James A. McGilvray - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):48-49.
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  • On possible perceptual worlds and how they shape their environments.Rainer J. Mausfeld, Reinhard M. Niederée & K. Dieter Heyer - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):47-48.
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  • Color vision: Content versus experience.Mohan Matthen - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):46-47.
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  • A mathematical framework for biological color vision.Laurence T. Maloney - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):45-46.
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  • In search of common features of animals' color vision systems and the constraints of environment.Erhard Maier & Dietrich Burkhardt - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):44-45.
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  • Metaphysics of Color 2: Non‐Physicalist Theories of Color.Heather Logue - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):220-231.
    This entry outlines relationalism, primitivism, and eliminativism about color and considers objections to each theory.
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  • Ontogeny and ontology: Ontophyletics and enactive focal vision.Barry Lia - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):43-44.
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  • Objectivism-subjectivim: A false dilemma?Joseph Levine - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):42-43.
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  • Ethological and ecological aspects of color vision.Sergei L. Kondrashev - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):42-42.
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  • Color enactivism: A return to Kant?Paul R. Kinnear - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):41-41.
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  • Metamerism, constancy, and knowing which.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):549-585.
    When Norm perceives a red tomato in his garden, Norm perceives the tomato and its sensible qualities.
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  • Color pluralism.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):563-601.
    Colors are sensible qualities. They are qualities that objects are perceived to have. Thus, when Norm, a normal perceiver, perceives a blue bead, the bead is perceived have a certain quality, perceived blueness. `Quality', here, is no mere synonym for property; rather, a quality is a kind of property a qualitative, as opposed to quan• titative, property. (The quantitative is a way of contrasting with the qualitative perhaps not the only way.).
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  • Colors as Properties of the Special Sciences.Kent Johnson & Wayne Wright - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (2):139 - 168.
    We examine the pros and cons of color realism, exposing some desiderata on a theory of color: the theory should render colors as scientifically legitimate and correctly individuated, and it should explain how we have veridical color experiences. We then show that these desiderata can by met by treating colors as properties of the special sciences. According to our view, some of the major as properties of the special sciences. According to our view, some of the major disputes in the (...)
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  • Data and interpretation in comparative color vision.Gerald H. Jacobs - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):40-41.
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  • The view of a computational animal.Anya Hurlbert - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):39-40.
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  • Comparative color vision and the objectivity of color.David Hilbert - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):38-39.
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  • Color for pigeons and philosophers.C. L. Hardin - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):37-38.
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  • Multivariant color vision.Peter Gouras - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):37-37.
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  • Color constancy and dispositionalism.Joshua Gert - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):183-200.
    This article attempts to do two things. The first is to make it plausible that any adequate dispositional view of color will have to associate colors with complex functions from a wide range of normal circumstances to a wide range of (simultaneously) incompatible color appearances, so that there will be no uniquely veridical appearance of any given color. The second is to show that once this move is made, dispositionalism is in a position to provide interesting answers to some of (...)
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  • Die Natur der Farben.Fabian Dorsch - 2009 - De Gruyter.
    Farben sind für uns sowohl objektive, als auch phänomenale Eigenschaften. In seinem Buch argumentiert Fabian Dorsch, daß keine ontologische Theorie der Farben diesen beiden Seiten unseres Farbbegriffes gerecht werden k ann. Statt dessen sollten wir akzeptieren, daß letzterer sich auf zwei verschiedene Arten von Eigenschaften bezieht: die repräsentierten Reflektanzeigenschaften von Gegenständen und die qualitativen Eigenschaften unserer Farbwahrnehmungen, die als sinnliche Gegebenheitsweisen ersterer fungieren. Die Natur der Farben gibt einen detaillierten Überblick über die zeitgenössischen philosophischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Theorien der Farben und (...)
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  • Psychophysical modeling: The link between objectivism and subjectivism.Marcia A. Finkelstein - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):36-37.
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  • Enactivist vision.Jerome A. Feldman - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):35-36.
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  • Hitting the nail on the head.Daniel C. Dennett - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):35-35.
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  • What is a colour space?Jules Davidoff - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):34-35.
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  • Color is as color does.James L. Dannemiller - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):33-34.
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  • Barry Stroud, the Quest for reality: Subjectivism and the metaphysics of colour.Jonathan Cohen - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):537-554.
    In The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour [Stroud, 2000], Barry Stroud carries out an ambitious attack on various forms of irrealism and subjectivism about color. The views he targets - those that would deny a place in objective reality to the colors - have a venerable history in philosophy. Versions of them have been defended by Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, Locke, and Hume; more recently, forms of these positions have been articulated by Williams, Smart, Mackie, Ryle, and (...)
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  • True theories, false colors.Austen Clark - 1996 - Philosophy of Science (Supplement) 63 (3):143-50.
    University of Connecticut Storrs, CT 06279-2054. Recent versions of objectivism can reply to the argument from metamers. The deeper rift between subjectivists and objectivists lies in the question of how to explain the structure of qualitative similarities among the colors. Subjectivism grounded in this fashion can answer the circularity objection raised by Dedrick. It endorses skepticism about the claim that there is some one property of objects that it is the function of color vision to detect. Color vision may enable (...)
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  • Reductionism and subjectivism defined and defended.Austen Clark - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):32-33.
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  • A Theory of Sentience.Austen Clark (ed.) - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Drawing on the findings of neuroscience, this text proposes and defends the hypothesis that the various modalities of sensation share a generic form that the author, Austen Clark, calls feature-placing.
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