Many arguments have been made against gene editing. This paper addresses the commonly invoked argument that gene editing violates human dignity and is ultimately a subversion of human nature. There are several drawbacks to this argument. Above all, the concept of what human dignity means is unclear. It is not possible to condemn a practice that violates human dignity if we do not know exactly what is being violated. The argument’s entire reasoning is thus undermined. Analyses of the arguments involved (...) in this discussion have often led to the conclusion that gene editing contravenes the principle of genetic identity (genetic immutability) thereby subverting a requisite of human dignity and ultimately threatening human nature. This paper refutes these arguments and shows that any opposition to gene editing cannot rely on the human dignity argument. (shrink)

An argument in the cognitive enhancement literature is that using stimulants in populations of healthy but socially disadvantaged individuals mistakenly attributes pathology to nonpathological individuals who experience social inequalities. As the argument goes, using stimulants as cognitive-enhancing drugs to solve the social problem of poorly educated students in inadequate schools misattributes the problem as an individual medical problem, when it is really a collective sociopolitical problem. I challenge this argument on the grounds that not all types of enhancement have to (...) be explained in medical terms, but rather at least one conception of enhancement can be explained in social terms—opportunity maintenance. Therefore, I propose that as a moral requirement we ought to explore whether stimulants could be a means of remedying underprivileged children's experiences of social inequalities that are borne from inadequate schools for the sake of increasing their chances for opportunities and well-being. (shrink)

English-speaking research on morally right decisions in a healthcare context over the past three decades has been dominated by two major perspectives, namely, the Four Principles, of which the principle of respect for autonomy has been most salient, and the ethic of care, often presented as a rival to not only a focus on autonomy but also a reliance on principles more generally. In my contribution, I present a novel ethic applicable to bioethics, particularly as it concerns human procreation, that (...) I argue is a promising alternative to these two approaches. According to this new moral theory, an act is right just insofar as it treats people’s capacity to commune with respect, where communing is a matter of identifying with others and exhibiting solidarity with them. This ethic is inspired by relational ideals of communion and harmony from the African philosophical tradition, but is shown to be attractive to a broad, indeed global, audience, with regard to its implications for the morality of reproduction. (shrink)

We ask why pharmacological cognitive enhancement (PCE) is generally deemed morally unacceptable by lay people. Our approach to this question has two core elements. First, we employ an interdisciplinary perspective, using philosophical rationales as base for generating psychological models. Second, by testing these models we investigate how different normative judgments on PCE are related to each other. Based on an analysis of the relevant philosophical literature, we derive two psychological models that can potentially explain the judgment that PCE is unacceptable: (...) the “Unfairness-Undeservingness Model” and the “Hollowness-Undeservingness Model.” The Unfairness-Undeservingness Model holds that people judge PCE to be unacceptable because they take it to produce unfairness and to undermine the degree to which PCE-users deserve reward. The Hollowness-Undeservingness Model assumes that people judge PCE to be unacceptable because they find achievements realized while using PCE hollow and undeserved. We empirically test both models against each other using a regression-based approach. When trying to predict judgments regarding the unacceptability of PCE using judgments regarding unfairness, hollowness, and undeservingness, we found that unfairness judgments were the only significant predictor of the perceived unacceptability of PCE, explaining about 36% of variance. As neither hollowness nor undeservingness had explanatory power above and beyond unfairness, the Unfairness-Undeservingness Model proved superior to the Hollowness-Undeservingness Model. This finding also has implications for the Unfairness-Undeservingness Model itself: either a more parsimonious single-factor “Fairness Model” should replace the Unfairness-Undeservingness-Model or fairness fully mediates the relationship between undeservingness and unacceptability. Both explanations imply that participants deemed PCE unacceptable because they judged it to be unfair. We conclude that concerns about unfairness play a crucial role in the subjective unacceptability of PCE and discuss the implications of our approach for the further investigation of the psychology of PCE. (shrink)

The dominant view on the ethics of cognitive enhancement (CE) is that CE is beholden to the principle of autonomy. However, this principle does not seem to reflect commonly held ethical judgments about enhancement. Is the principle of autonomy at fault, or should common judgments be adjusted? Here I argue for the first, and show how common judgments can be justified as based on a principle of service.

We have structured our response according to five questions arising from the commentaries: (i) What is sentience? (ii) Is sentience a necessary or sufficient condition for moral standing? (iii) What methods should guide comparative cognitive research in general, and specifically in studying invertebrates? (iv) How should we balance scientific uncertainty and moral risk? (v) What practical strategies can help reduce biases and morally dismissive attitudes toward invertebrates?

The main message of Neuroethics is that neuroscience forces us to reconceptualize human agency as marvelously diverse and flexible. Free will can arise from unconscious brain processes. Individuals with mental disorders, including addiction and psychopathy, exhibit more agency than is often recognized. Brain interventions should be embraced with cautious optimism. Our moral intuitions, which arise from entangled reason and emotion, can generally be trusted. Nevertheless, we can and should safely enhance our brain chemistry, partly because motivated reasoning crops up in (...) everyday life and in the practice of neuroscience itself. Despite serious limitations, brain science can be useful in the courtroom and marketplace. Recognizing all this nuance leaves little room for anxious alarmism or overhype and urges an emphasis on neurodiversity. The result is a highly opinionated tour of neuroethics as an exciting field full of implications for philosophy, science, medicine, law, and public policy. (shrink)

Stimulant drugs, transcranial magnetic stimulation, brain-computer interfaces, and even genetic modifications are all discussed as forms of potential cognitive enhancement. Cognitive enhancement can be conceived as a benefit-seeking strategy used by healthy individuals to enhance cognitive abilities such as learning, memory, attention, or vigilance. This phenomenon is hotly debated in the public, professional, and scientific literature. Many of the statements favoring cognitive enhancement (e.g., related to greater productivity and autonomy) or opposing it (e.g., related to health-risks and social expectations) rely (...) on claims about human welfare and human flourishing. But with real-world evidence from the social and psychological sciences often missing to support (or invalidate) these claims, the debate about cognitive enhancement is stalled. In this paper, we describe a set of crucial debated questions about psychological and social aspects of cognitive enhancement (e.g., intrinsic motivation, well-being) and explain why they are of fundamental importance to address in the cognitive enhancement debate and in future research. We propose studies targeting social and psychological outcomes associated with cognitive enhancers (e.g., stigmatization, burnout, mental well-being, work motivation). We also voice a call for scientific evidence, inclusive of but not limited to biological health outcomes, to thoroughly assess the impact of enhancement. This evidence is needed to engage in empirically informed policymaking, as well as to promote the mental and physical health of users and non-users of enhancement. (shrink)

:Many critics of bioenhancement go to considerable lengths to establish the existence of reasons against pursuing bioenhancements but do little to establish the absence of reasons in favor. This suggests that they accept what Allen Buchanan has called the conclusive reasons view. According to this view, our reasons against bioenhancement are obviously decisive, so there is no need to balance them against countervailing reasons. Buchanan criticizes the CRV by showing that the reasons most commonly adduced against bioenhancement are not decisive, (...) or, at least, not obviously so.In this article, I suggest that both Buchanan and the authors to whom he is responding underestimate the strength of the case for the CRV. There are, I argue, harm-based reasons against bioenhancement that provide stronger support to the CRV than the reasons that have most often been adduced by critics of enhancement. However, I then argue that even these harm-based reasons are not obviously decisive. Thus, I ultimately agree with Buchanan about the falsity of the CRV, though I disagree with him about the reasons for its falsity. (shrink)

In moral bioenhancement (MBE) discourse, aggression has been identified as one potential target of biomedical intervention. Early suggestions that aggression might be modulated to improve moral outcomes were met with strong opposition from those claiming it is impossible to modulate aggression without harming traits of distinct social and agential value. If we are to preclude (or endorse) particular paths to moral enhancement then we ought to establish sound reasons for doing so. However, in paying due consideration to contemporary aggression studies (...) we will see that current efforts to rule out aggression as one such path are untenable. I argue that the rejection of aggression-reduction as a viable target of MBE is a mistake, and that this arises from a rudimentary view of aggression which is incompatible with current scientific consensus. Drawing on contemporary psychological views I argue that it is necessary to distinguish subtypes of aggression, and that once these distinctions are recognised there is a potential space for MBE to target the biological correlates of specific kinds of aggressive behaviour. Ultimately, I suggest that aggression remains a legitimate target of inquiry, and that mitigating deleterious manifestations may yet offer one prospect for MBE. (shrink)

The ongoing debate about moral bioenhancement has been exceptionally stimulating, but it is defined by extreme polarization and lack of consensus about any relevant aspect of MBE. This article reviews the discussion on MBE, showing that a lack of consensus about enhancements’ desirable features and the constant development of the debate calls for a more rigorous ethical analysis. I identify a list of factors that may be of crucial importance for illuminating the matters of moral permissibility in the MBE debate (...) and which could help us move beyond the current lack of consensus. More precisely, I propose three important theoretical and normative standards that MBE should satisfy if we wish to mitigate the concerns about its utter impermissibility. Systematically assessing MBE interventions across the presented categories should provide valuable conclusions about its theoretical soundness and feasibility, its compatibility with fundamental moral norms, and its compatibility with or facilitation of socio-political goals of equality and justice. (shrink)

În acest articol încerc să argumentez opinia că, așa cum este definită eugenia, este foarte dificil de făcut o diferențiere clară între știință (medicină, ingineria genetică) și eugenie. Și de stabilit o linie peste care ingineria genetică nu ar trebui să treacă, conform unor norme morale, juridice și religioase. Atâta timp cât acceptăm ajutorul geneticii în găsirea unor modalități de combatere a cancerului, diabetului sau HIV, acceptăm în mod implicit și eugenia pozitivă, conform definiției actuale. Și atâta timp cât acceptăm (...) screening-ul genetic, și intervenții asupra fătului nenăscut, sau avortul, acceptăm în mod implicit și eugenia negativă. În plus, la nivel de guverne, deși oficial eugenia este repudiată, ea a fost legalizată în foarte multe țări până de curând, și încă mai este acceptată și legalizată, chiar dacă în forme mai subtile, și în prezent. În Introducere definesc termenul și modurile de clasificare. Urmează Istoria eugeniei pornind din perioada antică, introducerea eugeniei de Francis Galton, practica eugeniei ca politică de stat în diverse țări, și eugenia actuală (eugenia liberală). Analizez apoi diverse probleme ridicate de Etica eugeniei liberale, și am dezvoltat o secțiune aparte pentru Viitorul eugeniei, cu accent pe proiectul genomului uman. În final, în secțiunea Concluzii expun opiniile personale cu privire la practica actuală a eugeniei. Am folosit ca surse principale de investigație articolele lui Kenneth M. Ludmerer, ”American Geneticists and the Eugenics Movement: 1905-1935”, Kathy J. Cooke, ”Duty or Dream? Edwin G. Conklin's Critique of Eugenics and Support for American Individualism”, Jonathan Anomaly, ”Defending Eugenics”, John R. Harding Jr. ”Beyond Abortion: Human Genetics and the New Eugenics”, Michael Boulter, ”Bloomsbury Scientists”, Chapter Title: The rise of eugenics, 1901–14, Michael Ruse and Edward O. Wilson, ”Moral Philosophy as Applied Science” și Goering, Sara, "Eugenics". (shrink)

Human enhancement is one of the leading research topics in contemporary applied ethics. Interestingly, the widespread attention to the ethical aspects of future enhancement applications has generated misgivings. Are researchers who spend their time investigating the ethics of futuristic human enhancement scenarios acting in an ethically suboptimal manner? Are the methods they use to analyze future technological developments appropriate? Are institutions wasting resources by funding such research? In this article, I address the ethics of doing human enhancement ethics focusing on (...) two main concerns. The Methodological Problem refers to the question of how we should methodologically address the moral aspects of future enhancement applications. The Normative Problem refers to what is the normative justification for investigating and funding the research on the ethical aspects of future human enhancement. This article aims to give a satisfactory response to both meta-questions in order to ethically justify the inquiry into the ethical aspects of emerging enhancement technologies. (shrink)

The debate on moral bioenhancement—expressed in the acronym MB-is in fact influenced by the requirements of both the market and scientific research and philosophy must avoid an ideological use of its arguments. The moral phenomenon is highly complex and it does not seem likely that MB will be able to produce the desired effects without undermining human freedom, which, however, is a constitutive element of personal morality. There is the risk that MB perceives the human being as “something” to be (...) perfected to the detriment of being “someone” to respect and not to manipulate. If MB were to guarantee the exercise of freedom it would not differ from plain and simple enhancement of human capabilities, and therefore there would be no assurance that an enhanced human being might be extra good, and not, instead, extra evil. In addition there are values associated with the plurality of moral experience that risk being compromised and lost if the trust in human relations as a growth factor of moral personality were to be replaced with a trust in pharmacy and in technology, creating a new form of impersonal dependency. (shrink)

The ‘French reading’ of Nietzsche crystallized almost 50 years ago at the 1972 conference at Cerisy-la-Salle, Nietzsche aujourd’hui. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual conference of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society, with the theme of ‘The Politics of Difference’, Newcastle University, 20–21 September 2018. Nietzsche’s fortunes have since undergone some dramatic shifts in France, but there are signs that he is once again on the ascendency, in particular the 2016 edited collection Pourquoi nous sommes Nietzschéens (a (...) direct riposte to the 1991 Pourquoi nous ne sommes pas Nietzschéens). Taking a bearing from the French readings, I want to explore the question of what ‘Nietzsche today’ might mean for us today. At Cerisy in 1972, the meaning of Nietzsche was centred on the twin critiques of humanism and capitalism. While these issues persist, several articles in the 2016 collection indicate that they are now inflected through the vast contemporary significance of technology. One of the key debates here is Nietzsche’s significance for transhumanism. For Bernard Stiegler, transhumanism is the culmination of nihilism, understood as the reign of big data and the total quantification of the self. In this regard, he alludes to a ‘hypernihilism’ of the contemporary era, characterised by the quantifying effects of information technologies, which work in conjunction with capitalism to produce an ultimate ‘averaging’ force. I will argue that Stiegler gives an essential corrective to the largely critical engagements with neonihilism of the Nietzscheans of the previous generation, but that his emphasis on the value of negentropy risks reaffirming the logic of the transhumanism he critiques. Nietzscheanism today, I will argue, requires an appreciation of the dual tendencies of nihilism – identified here as neonihilism and hypernihilism – such that we must draw on contributions from both generations of French Nietzscheans in order to think and respond to the problems of our contemporary era. (shrink)

An intellectual and cultural movement advocating a radical enhancement of human performance via technoscientific and biomedical advances, transhumanism has grown in notoriety in recent years. Grouping engineers, philosophers, sociologists, and entrepreneurs, the movement and its ideals of enhanced humans have a strong social resonance, be it doping in sport, the use of smart drugs, or the biomedical battle against aging. This article sheds theoretical and critical light on transhumanism through the lens of human perfectibility. It particularly aims to show how (...) the movement marks a significant reversal of the humanist conception of human perfectibility inherited from the Enlightenment. Far from working for the social and political emancipation of humans and the human condition, transhumanism is emblematic of a depoliticized conception of human perfectibility focused on the technoscientific adaptation of the human being. Transhumanism thus marks a major rupture with the modern democratic project of autonomy. (shrink)

Bioconservative commentators argue that parents should not take steps to modify the genetics of their children even in the name of enhancement because of the damage they predict for values, identities and relationships. Some commentators have even said that adults should not modify themselves through genetic interventions. One commentator worries that genetic modifications chosen by adults for themselves will undermine moral agency, lead to less valuable experiences and fracture people's sense of self. These worries are not justified, however, since the (...) effects of modification will not undo moral agency as such. Adults can still have valuable experiences, even if some prior choices no longer seem meaningful. Changes at the genetic level will not always, either, alienate people from their own sense of self. On the contrary, genetic modifications can help amplify choice, enrich lives and consolidate identities. Ultimately, there is no moral requirement that people value their contingent genetic endowment to the exclusion of changes important to them in their future genetic identities. Through weighing risks and benefits, adults also have the power to consent to—and assume the risks of—genetic modifications for themselves in a way not possible in prenatal genetic interventions. (shrink)

Nicholas Agar argues that we should avoid certain ‘radical’ enhancement technologies. One reason for this is that they will alienate us from current sources of value by altering our evaluative outlooks. We should avoid this, even if enhancing will provide us with novel, objectively better sources of value. After noting the parallel between Agar’s views and G. A. Cohen’s work on the ‘conservative bias’, I explore Agar’s suggestion in relation to two kinds of radical enhancement: cognitive and anti-ageing. With regard (...) to both, there are reasons to doubt Agar’s empirical predictions about the severity of the evaluative changes we will undergo. Nonetheless, there is some force to the argument as applied to cognitive enhancement; in particular, radical cognitive enhancement may endanger our current valuable relationships with our loved ones. However, even if we find this a plausible worry for radical cognitive enhancement, it is not plausible for even radical anti-ageing enhancement, because the change Agar predicts will not affect our core motivations in the way that cognitive enhancement threatens to. (shrink)

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 241-243, June 2012.

In the last decades of the twentieth century nature writing lost some of its enchantment with the idea of wilderness. It was criticized for its remoteness, separating the natural world from human life, for being out of step with the interests of Indigenous peoples, and for holding an otherwise dynamic natural world, static. Recently, however, writers have begun to rehabilitate the idea of wilderness, and call for increased wilderness conservation. The period of critique was helpful in clarifying both the nature (...) and need for wilderness conservation, as well as for other stewardship practices. I trace some of the disagreements, particularly between the traditional conservationist and those advocating bolder stewardship practices that do not so much conserve the natural world as they remake it. I doubt that we either do or must live in an exclusively post-wild engineered world, and find a place also for natural heritage and its conservation. (shrink)

The debate over the ethics of radically, technologically altering the capacities and traditional form of the human body is rife with appeals to and dismissals of the importance of the integrity of the human species. Species-integrist arguments can be found in authors as varied as Annas, Fukuyama, Habermas, and Agar. However, the ethical salience of species integrity is widely contested by authors such as Buchanan, Daniels, Fenton, and Juengst. This article proposes a Phenomenological approach to the question of species-integrity, arguing (...) in favor of a phenomenon of species-recognition that carries an ethical pull. Building on Husserl’s Phenomenological account of empathy and the lived-body, as well as Schopenhauer’s concept of compassion as an ethical urphenomenon, I develop a “Phenomenological species concept” , which I argue has the ethical significance that biological species concepts do not. The PSC reorients the debate over human alteration and species integrity. (shrink)

Essay I explores brain machine interface technologies. These make direct communication between the brain and a machine possible by means of electrical stimuli. This essay reviews the existing and emerging technologies in this field and offers an inquiry into the ethical problems that are likely to emerge. Essay II, co-written with professor Sven-Ove Hansson, presents a novel procedure to engage the public in deliberations on the potential impacts of technology. This procedure, convergence seminar, is a form of scenario-based discussion that (...) is founded on the idea of hypothetical retrospection. The theoretical background and the results of the five seminars are presented. Essay III discusses moral bioenhancement, an instance of human enhancement that alters a person’s dispositions, emotions or behavior. Moral bioenhancement could be carried out in three different ways. The first strategy is behavioral enhancement. The second strategy, favored by prominent defenders of moral enhancement, is emotional enhancement. The third strategy is the enhancement of moral dispositions, such as empathy and inequity aversion. I argue that we ought to implement a combination of the second and third strategies. Essay IV considers the possibility and potential desirability of sensory enhancement. It is proposed that existing sensory modalities in vertebrate animals are proof of concept of what is biologically possible to create in humans. Three considerations on the normative aspects of sensory enhancement are also presented in this essay. Essay V rejects disease prioritarianism, the idea that the healthcare system ought to prioritize the treatment of diseases. Instead, an approach that focuses on what medicine can accomplish is proposed. Essay VI argues that from the idea that species have an intrinsic value and that humanity has a collective responsibility to protect animal species from extinction, the conclusion that we ought to recreate species follows. Essay VII argues that unknown existential risks have not been properly addressed. It proposes a heuristic for doing so, and a concrete strategy. This strategy consists in building refuges that could withstand a large number of catastrophic events. (shrink)

With the recent advancements in scientific comprehension of genetics and the decipherment of complex techniques for editing human genomes, liberal eugenics—eugenic ideal premised on the liberal values of autonomy and pluralism that leaves reproductive choices to parents rather than anachronistic statist authoritarian interventions—has inevitably become a polarising conundrum in contemporary liberal societies as to its utility and destructiveness. Focusing on one species of liberal eugenics—namely, genome editing interventions—I contend that liberal eugenics could be harmful—harm herein construed as that which undermines (...) the salient liberal values of equality, autonomy, and pluralism—since it is itself antithetical to the bases of the liberal society. This contention is based upon three premises: first, that individuals are rather seldom rational decision-makers such that leaving all reproductive choices to the whims of individual parents would be immensely counterproductive to future offspring’s right to open future; second, that liberal eugenics—much like its authoritarian antecedent—could intersect with myriad identities, including race, class, sex, disability, and sexual orientation in ways that might exacerbate social divisions, marginalise different groups, and engender homogeneity; and third, that it undermines individual autonomy of the future person as a member of the liberal community, particularly if their capacities and abilities are tailored to fit parents’ specific life projects and putatively reasonable conceptions of the good. The underscored potential malaises of liberal eugenics should, I argue, be discursively negotiated between parents and the state via the development of robust general laws that regulate heritable genome editing interventions to ensure that the welfare of the future persons is prioritised and that the liberal commitment to autonomy is immune to antiliberal perversions. (shrink)

Nietzsche and Medicine. Especially in times of a pandemic, dealing with terms such as health, illness, healing and medicine is of particular interest. Three recently published books are devoted to the problem of medicine in Nietzsche’s work. In addition to impulses for contemporary medical-ethical debates, this review articles discusses Nietzsche’s relationship to the ancient philosophy of medical self-care, the concepts of suffering, illness and health as well as the influence of the contemporary natural sciences on Nietzsche’s understanding of medicine. Nietzsche’s (...) view of medicine has already been the subject of several other recent publications: in addition to the publications that deal directly with Nietzsche’s understanding of medicine, I will also discuss those focused on the effect of Nietzsche’s scientific reading on his work as well as publications on the topics of illness and health and on the role of ancient dietetics, therapeutics and self-care within Nietzsche’s thinking. (shrink)

Do biomedical interventions raise special moral concerns? A rising number of prominent authors claim that at least in the case of biomedical enhancement they do not. Treating biomedical enhancements different from non-biomedical ones, they claim, amounts to unjustified biomedical exceptionalism. This article vindicates the familiar thesis that biomedical enhancement raises specific concerns. Taking a close look at the argumentative strategy against biomedical exceptionalism and provides counterexamples showing that the biomedical mode of interventions raises concerns not relevant otherwise. In particular, biomedical (...) interventions throughout raise concerns of informed consent, which only rarely turn up in comparable non-biomedical interventions. (shrink)

In his book, The Case Against Perfection, Michael J. Sandel has offered several arguments against biomedical human enhancements. However, his views have been forcefully criticized by Frances M. Kamm. This paper argues that while Kamm is correct in arguing that Sandel fails to establish the moral impermissibility of enhancements, he, nevertheless, offers resources for articulating our unease with enhancements. In particular, this paper argues that being willing to enhance oneself in any way is incompatible with having an identity as a (...) person. (shrink)

Two features characterize new and emerging technosciences. The first one is the production of peculiar ontologies. The human agent is confronted with a biophysical world the contingent, indeterminate character of which does not hamper but expands the scope of purposeful action. Uncertainty is increasingly regarded as a resource for an expanding will rather than a drawback for a disoriented agent. The second feature is that ethics is increasingly considered as the core regulatory means of this messy, ever-changing world. The ambivalences (...) of the ethical government of contingent assemblages are discussed by focusing on the governmentality perspective. The latter helps to make sense of the regulatory alliance between ethics and technoscience. A reflection on Foucault’s account of ethics shows that the emancipatory role of the latter is today hampered by its embroilment with the instrumental reason it aims to govern, nor can older models of ethical commitment find any straightforward application. Mapping the issue in terms of mutual constitution of power, potentiality and possibility gives salience to a particular question: what we are able not to do. (shrink)

Discussions on diversity and disability in dialogue with special educationalists and philosophers of education are not often found in the research literature. Researchers within disability studies have been critical towards the enterprise of special education and vice versa, and the language they use is often different, as they draw on various subject fields. In this article, I bring these fields of research together and draw on research from the philosophy of education, special education and Disability Studies. My argument is that (...) a language of diversity needs to be embedded in a language about educational ends and other fundamental questions discussed in the philosophy of education, and not solely in discussions within the field of inclusive education, as is often found in the research literature relating to special education. I argue that the language of diversity related to disability should be embedded in the language of the person, being someone. In order to build my argument, I sketch out three distinctions: disability and impairment, education as cultivation versus an existential education and the distinction between being someone and being something. I argue that an understanding of diversity and the case of disability within the framework of education should preferably be: interpreted within a social relational model of disability, drawing on an adjusted capabilities approach, an existential educational paradigm and seeing the person as someone, and not as something that is associated with a series of facts that happen to relate to what we call persons. (shrink)

The transhumanist movement is much more than a simple utopia, a new school of thought or a fashionable ideology; as a matter of fact, it is a scientific and philosophical project that is already underway, and defends the use of the most advanced emerging new technologies —from biogenetics to computing, from nanotechnology to cognitive sciences, to robotics and Artificial Intelligence— with the clear goal to exponentially increase the physical, cognitive, sensory, moral and emotional capabilities of human beings. Transhumanism entails a (...) change in the anthropocentric paradigm defended by humanism, and aims to break through the limits of nature, which until recently we deemed insurmountable, in order to create a new species that is more evolved than the Homo sapiens: the Homo excelsior, a posthuman species which is superior to ours, composed by exceptionally gifted beings that have been genetically selected, designed and improved and which —according to the transhumanist imaginary— will dominate the posthuman future and will be happier, more virtuous, long-lived and intelligent than us. In this article, we propose technological humanism as an intermediate formula in the doctrinal debate between bioprogressive and bioconservative legal philosophers, so as to make possible the development of scientific research and the advancement of new technologies, although without ever having to sacrifice dignity and liberty, which are inherent qualities of the human being (who has to be viewed, in Kantian terms, as an end in itself). Received: 22 May 2019 Accepted: 10 September 2019 Published online: 20 December 2019. (shrink)

Étant donné la définition de l'eugénisme, il est très difficile d'établir une distinction claire entre la science (médecine, ingénierie génétique) et l'eugénisme en tant que domaine inclus. Et pour définir une ligne sur laquelle l'ingénierie génétique ne devrait pas aller plus loin, conformément aux normes morales, juridiques et religieuses. Si nous acceptons l'aide de la génétique pour trouver des moyens de lutter contre le cancer, le diabète ou le VIH, nous acceptons également l'eugénisme positif tel qu'il est défini à présent. (...) Et si nous acceptons le dépistage génétique et les interventions sur le fœtus, ou l’avortement, nous acceptons implicitement l’eugénisme négatif. En outre, au niveau gouvernemental, bien que l'eugénisme soit officiellement refusé, il a été légalisé dans de nombreux pays jusqu'à récemment et est toujours accepté et légalisé, même sous des formes subtiles, même de nos jours. -/- TABLE: -/- Abstract Introduction 1. Histoire de l'eugénisme - 1.1 Antiquité - 1.2 Le darwinisme social - 1.3 Francis Galton - 1.4 Charles Davenport - 1.5 L'eugenisme en tant que politique d'État - - 1.5.1 L'eugenisme en États-Unis - - 1.5.2 L'eugenisme en Allemagne - 1.6 La période d'après-guerre 2. L'eugénisme actuel - 2.1 L'eugénisme libéral - 2.2 L'eugénisme en tant que politique d'État 3. L'éthique de l'eugénisme 4. L'avenir de l'eugénisme Conclusions Bibliographie -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.12520.83203 . (shrink)

Les arguments concernant la sagesse de la poursuite des expérimentations génétiques et des effets eugéniques possibles du génie génétique se retrouvent généralement dans trois domaines : l'éthique biomédicale, la moralité, et la religion et le droit. L'utilisation potentielle du génie génétique a mis en discussion l'eugénisme dans le passé dans les litiges de bioéthique. Le séquençage du génome humain peut nous aider dans l'évolution humaine. Le projet sur le génome humain peut nous aider à comprendre les maladies afin d'orienter les (...) traitements appropriés, d'identifier les mutations responsables de diverses maladies et de les corriger. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.20645.86249. (shrink)

As eugenics is defined, it is very difficult to make a clear distinction between science (medicine, genetic engineering) and eugenics as a included field. And to set a line over which genetic engineering should not go further, according to moral, legal and religious norms. If we accept the help of genetics in finding ways to fight cancer, diabetes, or HIV, we also accept positive eugenics as they are defined now. And if we accept genetic screening, and interventions on the unborn (...) baby, or abortion, we also implicitly accept negative eugenics. In addition, at government level, although eugenics are officially denied, it has been legalized in many countries until recently, and is still accepted and legalized, albeit in subtle forms, even these days. The section Introduction defines the term and classification modes. The section History of Eugenics follows eugenics from the ancient period, the introduction of eugenics by Francis Galton, the practice of eugenics as a state policy in various countries, and the present eugenics (liberal eugenics). I then analyze various issues raised by the Ethics of Liberal Eugenics, and I have developed a special section for the Future of Eugenics, focusing on the human genome project. Finally, in the Conclusions, I express my personal views on the current practice of eugenics. -/- CONTENTS: -/- Abstract Introduction New Eugenics The Future of Eugenics Conclusions Bibliography -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.28662.45120. (shrink)

Argumentele referitoare la înțelepciunea continuării experimentării genetice și posibilele efecte eugenice ale ingineriei genetice se încadrează în general în trei domenii: etica biomedicală, moralitatea și religia și legea. Utilizarea potențială a ingineriei genetice a readus în discuții eugenia din trecut în disputele despre bioetică. Există opinii conform cărora și programele de eugenie fără caracter coercitiv ar fi în mod inerent lipsite de etică. Principiul moral central al eticii biomedicale implică o obligație de a conferi beneficii și de a elimina daunele. (...) DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.23816.16649. (shrink)

For a long time, human beings have been wishing to improve the genetic composition of their generation and clearing it of some disabilities and defects, and this concern has always been pursued in different ways in different eras. The existence of authoritarian and racist policies and discriminatory methods in the old Eugenics made it easy to rule that it was immoral, but it is somewhat difficult to judge the liberal and new Eugenics because one group, citing the scientific contexts and (...) social contexts resulting from the advances in genetics and the values of liberal societies, dictates its moralization, while the other group, despite these contexts, still retains the relevant ethical challenges.One of these important challenges is the violation of the principle of justice, albeit in a different way than in the past. Injustice in the old Eugenics was discriminatory due to the imposition of a Eugenics program on a particular class, and the manifestation of injustice in the new Eugenics is that by prescribing that its benefits belong to certain classes, it is not possible for the public to benefit from it. The author of this article believes that various ethical challenges still exist in the liberal and modern Eugenics program with a focus on the principle of justice, and the present article seeks to identify, examine and analyze them from a point of view.The findings of this paper are that some of the ethical considerations related to the application of the principle of justice to Eugenics are:Although some solutions may be effective at some level, it is not possible to provide an absolute and general solution for all cases of breeding.Bioethical issues such as Eugenics due to their multifaceted nature, need the consideration of the requirements of various principles and some contextual considerations related to cultural and social conditions and indigenous and regional situations.It is necessary to have appropriate programs to eliminate the factors that incite immoral attitudes and prejudices against the disabled.Despite the context in which it has been made, advocates of liberal Eugenics themselves admit that the challenge of discrimination remains and have an unprecedented impact on genocide and the rise of racism.The well-being of individuals in society depends on the fair distribution of the benefits and resources of Eugenics in a fair social context, and the prescription and distribution of these resources in a society with defective and unjust structures will not have the desired effect. (shrink)

Uma forma de compreender o humano é pela sua biologia, a qual pode ser vista como ambígua. Por um lado, há características biológicas correlacionadas a capacidades extremamente especializadas e complexas, as quais abrem possibilidades que lhe são particulares, distinguindo-o ‘positivamente’ dos outros seres vivos. Por outro, como todo ser vivo, há características que tornam a vida humana finita e relativamente vulnerável, as quais costumam ser ‘negativamente’ interpretadas. Em ambos os casos, há características biológicas que, em si, não são boas nem (...) más, apenas são, constituindo uma espécie biológica. No debate bioético, tem havido uma passagem direta de fatos para valores, de modo que o fato do humano ser biologicamente vulnerável justificaria uma opção valorativa pela superação de algumas características biológicas. Postulando uma tensão entre fatos e valores, nosso objetivo é mostrar a pertinência de submeter os meios biotecnocientíficos de melhoramento humano à regulação proveniente da proteção da liberdade de escolha baseada na autocompreensão existencial do indivíduo (que chamaremos de escolha hermenêutica), medida fundamental para evitar ou combater formas de opressão num contexto biopolítico. (shrink)