Some early modern scholars believed that Scripture provided more certain knowledge than all secular authorities – even Aristotle – or investigating nature as such. In this paper, I analyse one such attempt to establish the most reliable knowledge of nature: the so-called Mosaic physics proposed by the Reformed encyclopaedist Johann Heinrich Alsted. Although in his early works on Physica Mosaica Alsted declares that his primary aim is proving the harmony that exists between various traditions of natural philosophy, namely between (...) the Mosaic and the Peripatetic approaches, and despite the fact that his biblical encyclopaedia of 1625 was intended to be based on a literal reading of the Bible, he never truly abandoned the Aristotelian framework of physics. What is more, in his mature encyclopaedia of 1630, he eventually openly preferred Aristotle to other natural-philosophical traditions. I argue, therefore, that Alsted’s bold vision of Mosaic physics remained unfulfilled and should be assessed as an unsuccessful project of early modern natural philosophy. (shrink)

Alsted was a foremost encyclopedist of the early seventeenth century. He provided both a complete presentation of all the subjects of philosophy (of which encyclopedia consisted) and a method to learn them. This method was an original synthesis of the dialectic of Petrus Ramus, the combinatorial art of memory of Raimond Lull and Giordano Bruno, and the method of presentation of philosophical disciplines of Bartholomäus Keckermann. Alsted’s encyclopedism was intended as a remedy to the postlapsarian condition of man and was (...) functional to the pedagogical reform pursued at the Academy of Herborn; this was, in turn, an essential part of the Calvinist state reform of the county of Nassau-Dillenburg. In theology, the importance of Alsted consists of having introduced millenarianism in the Reformed Europe, though his early, optimistic views on the imminent end of the world would change to pessimistic as a consequence of the Thirty Years’ War. (shrink)

Th e lecture elucidates and compares Johannes Volkelt’s and Heinrich Rickert’s positions on the problem of metaphysics. It comes to a reference of views representative of the metaphysical approach of early neo-Kantian Johannes Volkelt to representative of Baden School of late New-Kantian, Heinrich Rickert. In the lecture I would like to make the reconstruction and the analysis of philosophies of Volkelt and Rickert in the context of the problem of metaphysics. Th e object is the content, (...) premises and consequences of their philosophy in comparison to New-Kantian and other philosophy. Th e basis for the reconstruction is their expressions in their various writings. Th e purpose is the analysis of the transformation of western metaphysics and their infl uence on the contemporary thinking about the world. (shrink)

Review of two recent works on J.G.H. Feder: -/- Johann Georg Heinrich Feder. Ausgewählte Schriften. Hrgb. Von Hans-Peter Nowitzki, Udo Roth, Gideon Stiening. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2018. Werkprofile Band 9. -/- and -/- Johann Georg Heinrich Feder (1740-1821): Empirismus und Popularphilosophie Zwischen Wolff und Kant. Hrgb. Von Hans-Peter Nowitzki, Udo Roth, Gideon Stiening. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2018. Werkprofile Band 10.

The perpetual secretary of the Berlin Academy Johann Heinrich Samuel Formey is best known as a populariser of Christian Wolff’s doctrines. As of Formey’s activity in the Berlin Academy, scholars have mostly emphasized his role in the controversy over monads with Leonhard Euler, while overlooking other interesting contributions Formey presented in the “speculative philosophy” class of the Academy. In this paper, I analyse two articles Formey published in 1747 on the Mémoires de l’Académie de Berlin, namely the Preuves de (...) l’existence de Dieu, ramenées aux notions communes and the Examen de la preuve qu’on tire des fins de la nature, pour établir l’existence de Dieu. In these texts, Formey presents some of Wolff’s methodological and metaphysical ideas, in an implicit dialogue with other members of the Academy – in particular, with the president Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis – who were also interested in metaphysics and the philosophical method. Formey reworks the Wolffian arguments as to make them more accessible, in order to promote an open confrontation over core philosophical questions. Far from adopting a controversial tone, Formey’s attitude is rather conciliatory: any disagreement, as he thinks, can be easily settled once the true method for philosophizing is made available to everybody. (shrink)

In the autumn of 1667, the young Leibniz published a «new method» for the science of law. Producing a revised edition of that early work was to become his lifelong project, to the purpose of which he wrote, in the 1690s, a succession of new versions of most of its sections. The main reason for this enduring interest was probably the fact that the juridical part of the treatise was preceded with a more general one, encapsulating in a few pages (...) a systematic overview of the disciplines composing the baroque encyclopaedia, after the model of Johann Heinrich Alsted’s monumental Encyclopaedia septem tomis distincta. If Leibniz still depended on Alsted’s notion of philosophy as the «circle of disciplines», he deeply transformed that pre-Cartesian conception of knowledge by two decisive innovations: following Bacon, he defines each branch of demonstrative science as bearing on one single «quality», abstracted from the subjects in which it inheres; yet, contrary to Bacon, he no longer conceives of these qualities as the ultimate components of reality, but as those of our experience of it, marking the limit of the explanatory capacity of language. (shrink)

This article explains Kant’s claim that sciences must take, at least as their ideal, the form of a ‘system’. I argue that Kant’s notion of systematicity can be understood against the background of de Jong & Betti’s Classical Model of Science (2010) and the writings of Georg Friedrich Meier and Johann Heinrich Lambert. According to my interpretation, Meier, Lambert, and Kant accepted an axiomatic idea of science, articulated by the Classical Model, which elucidates their conceptions of systematicity. I show (...) that Kant’s critique of the mathematical method is compatible with his adherence to this axiomatic conception of science. I further show that systematicity furthers traditionally accepted logical ideals of scientific knowledge, which explains why Meier and Kant think that sciences must be ‘systematic’. (shrink)

Over the past decades a number of scholars have identified Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld as one of the most decisive early influences on Leibniz. In particular, the impressive similarity between their conceptions of universal harmony has been stressed. Since the issue of relations is at the heart of both Bisterfeld and Leibniz’s doctrines of universal harmony, the extent of the similarity between their doctrines will depend, however, on Bisterfeld and Leibniz’s respective theories of relations, and especially on their ontologies of (...) relations. This paper attempts to determine in more detail whether Bisterfeld’s ontology of relations contains at least the germ of the defining features of the ontology of relations later developed by Leibniz. It comes to the conclusion that, although Bisterfeld’s theory of relations is not as fully developed and explicit as that of Leibniz, it does contain all the key “ingredients” of it. (shrink)

Die Psychologie hat sich im zweiten Viertel des 19. Jahrhunderts langsam zu einer autonomen Disziplin entwickelt. Im Unterschied zu den anderen Figuren in dieser Entwicklung, Johann Friedrich Herbart, Ernst Heinrich Weber und Gustav Theodor Fechner, hat Lotze in seiner Medicinische Psychologie (1852) von Anfang an die neue Disziplin, die Psychologie, konsequent in enger Verbindung mit der Philosophie entwickelt. Damit hat er die Hoffnung gebremst, die Psychologie völlig experimentellen Untersuchungen zu überlassen, die um diese Zeit schon viele gepflegt haben. Lotze (...) scheute sich jedoch, diese Disziplin „philosophische Psychologie“ zu benennen. Sie war für ihn nur physiologische Psychologie, herausarbeitet mit Hilfe der Philosophie. Sie stellt nur Tatsachen fest, untersucht wie Körper und Seele sich zueinander verhalten und dies nicht nur empirisch, sondern auch „metaphysisch“. (shrink)

Sažetak Da postoji neka malena recenzija čuvene „Kritike čistoga uma“, na koju se Kant osjećao primoran tako odgovoriti da se od početka do kraja svojih „Prolegomena za svaku buduću metafiziku“ stalno s njome razračunava, moglo bi biti poznato boljiim poznavaocima Kantovih spisa, no bit će manje poznato da je ta recenzija – Göttingenska recenzija – ujedno dala povoda da se Kant javno postavi nasuprot onodobnoj filozofiji s kojom je njegova u više važnih pogleda bila srodna, naime škotskoj filozofiji zdravoga razuma. (...) U ovome se članku istražuje u kojem se kontekstu to suočenje odvijalo. -/- Zusammenfassung Dass es eine kleine Recension der berühmten „Kritik der reinen Vernunft“ gibt, auf die Kant sich genötigt fühlte, so zu antworten, dass er seine „Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik“ hindurch stetig mit ihr auseinandersetzt, könnte den besseren Kennern der kantischen Schriften bekannt sein, aber dass diese Recension – die Göttinger Recension – zugleich veranlasst hatte, dass Kant sich der damaligen Philosophie, mit der die seinige in mehreren wichtigen Hinsichten verwandt ist, nämlich der schottischen Philosophie des Common-Sense, öffentlich gegenüberstellte, ist vielleicht weniger bekannt. In dieser Aufsatz wird untersucht, in welchem Kontext es geschah. (shrink)

When it comes to evaluating reductive hypotheses in metaphysics, supervenience arguments are the tools of the trade. Jaegwon Kim and Frank Jackson have argued, respectively, that strong and global supervenience are sufficient for reduction, and others have argued that supervenience theses stand in need of the kind of explanation that reductive hypotheses are particularly suited to provide. Simon Blackburn's arguments about what he claims are the specifically problematic features of the supervenience of the moral on the natural have also been (...) influential. But most discussions of these arguments have proceeded under the strong and restrictive assumptions of the S5 modal logic. In this paper we aim to remedy that defect, by illustrating in an accessible way what happens to these arguments under relaxed assumptions and why. The occasion is recent work by Ralph Wedgwood, who seeks to defend non-reductive accounts of moral and mental properties together with strong supervenience, but to evade both the arguments of Kim and Jackson and the explanatory challenge by accepting only the weaker, B, modal logic. In addition to drawing general lessons about what happens to supervenience arguments under relaxed assumptions, our goal is therefore to shed some light on both the virtues and costs of Wedgwood's proposal. (shrink)

This chapter explores the ideological dimension of dehumanization in the context of National Socialism, focusing on the connection between concepts of humanity and dehumanizing images. NS regarded itself as a political revolution, realizing a new concept of humanity. Nazi ideologues undergirded the self-understanding of NS by developing racist anthropologies. I examine two major strands of Nazi ideology, focusing on their diverging strategies of dehumanization, and arguing that they were dependent on different anthropological frameworks. Richard Walther Darré held a naturalistic concept (...) of humanity and advanced biologistic forms of dehumanization. Alfred Rosenberg developed a dualistic anthropology that combined metaphysical and natural features. He dehumanized certain groups of people by reducing them to being human in a natural sense only. Moreover, I aim to show that the key motifs of these racist worldviews were prevalent in the scientific and philosophical debates on anthropology in early-twentieth-century Germany. I thus explore the general orientation of both the naturalistic and the anti-naturalistic strand in anthropological thought, unfold the animalizing tendencies of these views, and emphasize their conformity with the key motifs of Nazi ideology. The case of NS should thus exemplify the dehumanizing potential of anthropological theories. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to clarify the meaning and the use of the concept of relativism in the context of National Socialism (NS). This chapter analyzes three aspects of the connection between relativism and NS: The first part examines the critical reproach that NS is a form of relativism. I analyze and criticize the common core of this widespread argument, which is developed in varying contexts, was held in different times, and is still shared by several authors. The (...) second part investigates the ideological debate among Nazi philosophers themselves concerning whether NS is indeed a form of relativism. I focus on the epistemological consequences of Nazi anthropology and analyze both its relativistic tendencies and the strategies used to reject relativism. In contrast to the received view, I argue that Nazi philosophers attempted to overcome both absolutism and relativism. The third part investigates the academic debate on relativism during NS, using the example of the prize question on relativism that was announced by the Prussian Academy of Science in 1936. By examining the academic approaches to the problem of relativism, I also address the question of how broader philosophical debates were related to the core of Nazi ideology. Academic philosophers took the self-understanding of Nazi philosophers seriously. They saw the shared aim of overcoming relativism as an opportunity to collaborate with NS. The brief conclusion summarizes the findings of the chapter. I conclude that, in the context of NS, critics, ideologists, and academics understand and use the concept of relativism in the same way. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to clarify the use and meaning of the concept of relativism in the context of National Socialism (NS). Section 1 examines the critical reproach that NS is a form of relativism. I analyze and criticize the common core of this widespread argument which has dominated discussions about the topic up to the present. Section 2 sketches the general debates on relativism before and during NS. I show that fascist thought could be associated with both (...) relativism and anti-relativism. In contrast to the received view, I argue that Nazi intellectuals regarded relativism as problem, and presented NS as the overcoming of relativism. Subsequently I turn to two major philosophers who connected their philosophy with NS. Section 3 investigates Bruno Bauch’s (1887–1942) nationalist philosophy. I show that he linked his concept of the nation with an objectivist value theory intended to oppose all kinds of relativism. Section 4 turns to Erich Rothacker’s (1888–1965) cultural anthropology. I argue that the revision of his philosophical views in the 1930s was accompanied by a political turn towards NS and a withdrawal from relativism. The brief conclusion (Section 5) summarizes the findings of the chapter. I conclude that, in the context of NS, relativism is mostly used in a pejorative sense. (shrink)

Erich Rothacker (1888–1965) was a key figure in early-twentieth-century philosophy in Germany. In this paper, I examine the development of Rothacker’s philosophy of culture from 1907 to 1945. Rothacker began his philosophical career with a völkerpsychological dissertation on history, outlining his early biologistic conception of culture (1907–1913). In his mid-career work, he then turned to Wilhelm Dilthey’s (1833–1911) Lebensphilosophie (philosophy of life), advancing a hermeneutic approach to culture (1919–1928). In his later work (1929–1945), Rothacker developed a cultural anthropology. I shall (...) argue that Rothacker’s later theory of culture retained key motifs of his earlier works. In this way, I trace central aspects of Rothacker’s reception of both Völkerpsychologie and Lebensphilosophie. The paper focuses on two aspects of Rothacker’s philosophical development that deserve more attention than they have received to date: his reception of Völkerpsychologie and the political character of his theories of culture. Rothacker’s theoretical work was closely connected to his political conservatism, which culminated in his engagement with National Socialism. The paper unearths problematic aspects of the legacy of Völkerpsychologie and Lebensphilosophie in early twentieth-century German thought. (shrink)

The Newman problem is a fundamental problem that threatens to undermine structural assumptions and structural theories throughout philosophy and science. Here, we consider the problem in the context of consciousness science. We introduce and discuss the problem, and explain why it is detrimental not only to structuralist assumptions, but also to theories of consciousness, if left unconsidered. However, we show that if phenomenal spaces, and mathematical structures of conscious experience more generally, are understood in the right way, the Newman problem (...) does not arise. The upshot of our paper is that consciousness science needs to be careful in which definition of structure to consider, but if it is, the Newman problem disappears. (shrink)

Nationalistische Ideen haben in der gegenwärtigen Politik Konjunktur. Dabei ist auch die Wiederkehr einer völkisch-traditionalistischen Ideologie zu beobachten. Der völkische Nationalismus ist in rechtsextremen Gruppen weit verbreitet. Mittlerweile wirken völkische Ideen jedoch weit in die bürgerliche Mitte hinein, nicht zuletzt aufgrund der erfolgreichen Strategien der sogenannten „Neuen Rechten“. Die Identitäre Bewegung (IB) spielt in dieser Szene eine wesentliche Rolle und wird zumeist als eine „neurechte Jugendbewegung“ (Bruns et al 2017) definiert. Diese Einschätzung möchte ich im Folgenden näher betrachten. Meine Auseinandersetzung (...) mit der Ideologie der IB umfasst drei Schritte: Im ersten Schritt wird mit dem Konzept des Ethnopluralismus, das Grundmotiv der identitären Ideologie, analysiert. Im zweiten Schritt entfalte ich eine genealogische Perspektive. Deshalb wird hier eine bestimmte Variante völkischen Denkens der 20er und 30er Jahre thematisiert. Ausgehend von einer kulturkritischen Zeitdiagnose entwickelten Philosophen wie Alfred Baeumler (1887–1968), Ernst Krieck (1882–1947) oder Erich Rothacker (1888–1965) eine identitätspolitische Antwort auf die Moderne und sahen diese im Nationalsozialismus (NS) verwirklicht. Der völkische Partikularismus war das Grundmotiv dieser politischen Anthropologie. Meine genealogische Analyse wird zeigen, dass die IB keine „neurechte Jugendbewegung“ (Bruns et al 2017; Hervorhebung J.S.) in einem inhaltlichen Sinne ist. Denn die identitäre Ideologie ist keine Erneuerung, sondern eine simple Wiederkehr völkischen Denkens, das bereits vor 1945 weit verbreitet war. Im dritten Schritt präsentiere ich eine Kritik der völkischen Ideologie, die sich auf das Modell der „ethnokulturellen Identität“ konzentriert. (shrink)

This paper examines Georg Simmel’s philosophy of culture in relation to anthropological debates, developing a historical and a systematic argument: First, I show that Simmel’s approach can be read as a response to the anthropological challenge of modernity. Second, I demonstrate that Simmel’s theory of culture can be brought to bear on current anthropological debates. Focusing on his concept of cultivation, I argue that Simmel advances a transformative concept of humanity that considers both the biological nature of humans and the (...) distinct character of human culture. (shrink)

Das Thema des vorliegenden Aufsatzes ist Georg Simmels »relativistische[s] Weltbild« , anhand dessen die Prinzipien seiner Kulturphilosophie dargelegt werden. Im ersten Teil wird die systematische Fragestellung der Philosophie des Geldes im historischen Kontext rekonstruiert. Dabei steht der philosophiegeschichtliche Zusammenhang zwischen dem Wertproblem und der Debatte um den Relativismus im Zentrum. Im zweiten Teil wird Simmels kulturphilosophische Lösung des Wertproblems, durch die das Geld zum Paradigma seines Relativismus wird, systematisch analysiert. Der dritte Teil setzt sich mit dem Prinzip der kulturellen Formung (...) auseinander. Am Beispiel der Formwelt Erkenntnis wird die Grundlage von Simmels Kulturtheorie in toto dargelegt. Der vierte Teil wendet sich der Weiterentwicklung von Simmels Kulturtheorie in seiner späten Lebensphilosophie zu. Dabei wird einerseits seine Theorie der kulturellen Formwelten analysiert, und andererseits deren Integration in eine umfassende Dialektik des Lebens nachvollzogen. Im fünften Teil wird die Frage gestellt, ob Simmel aus heutiger Sicht als ein Relativist zu bezeichnen ist. Dabei wird argumentiert, dass Simmels kulturphilosophische Position große Ähnlichkeiten mit dem konzeptuellen Relativismus hat, der gegenwärtig von Carol Rovane vertreten wird. Deshalb plädiere ich dafür Simmel in der gegenwärtigen Debatte um den Relativismus ernster zu nehmen. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the relation of genealogy and critique in Nietzsche’s late philosophy. It is argued that the late Nietzsche distinguishes between genealogy and critique. The genealogy of morality is a descriptive endeavor that shows the origin of values in processes of life. The critique of morality assesses the value of values from the perspective of life. It is argued that the concept of life is at the core of Nietzsche’s critical project and thus his fundamental standard. The paper (...) also examines the role of the genealogical method in Nietzsche’s critical project. It is shown that the genealogy of values prepares their critique. Moreover, Nietzsche regards the alleged epistemic success of his genealogies as an indirect confirmation of the superiority of his evaluative position, i.e. of his affirmation of life. (shrink)

Some philosophers of fiction – most famously Jerold Levinson1 - have tried to argue that fictional narrators can never be identified with real authors. This argument relies on the claim that narration involves genuine assertion (not just the pretense of assertion that lacks truthfulness) and that real authors are not in a position to assert anything about beings on the fictional plain - given that they don’t rationally believe in their existence. This debate on the status of narrators depends on (...) the idea that fictional beings and beings in the real worlds reside, as it were, at different levels. The assumption that there is a gap separating the levels of fiction and reality serves as a rationale for the claim that real authors could not possibly be en rapport with the fictional characters that they create (e.g. entertain beliefs about them, etc.). (shrink)

Informally, structural properties of mathematical objects are usually characterized in one of two ways: either as properties expressible purely in terms of the primitive relations of mathematical theories, or as the properties that hold of all structurally similar mathematical objects. We present two formal explications corresponding to these two informal characterizations of structural properties. Based on this, we discuss the relation between the two explications. As will be shown, the two characterizations do not determine the same class of mathematical properties. (...) From this observation we draw some philosophical conclusions about the possibility of a ‘correct’ analysis of structural properties. (shrink)

This paper examines a looming reproducibility crisis in the core of the hard sciences. Namely, it concentrates on molecular modeling and simulation (MMS), a family of methods that predict properties of substances through computing interactions on a molecular level and that is widely popular in physics, chemistry, materials science, and engineering. The paper argues that in order to make quantitative predictions, sophisticated models are needed which have to be evaluated with complex simulation procedures that amalgamate theoretical, technological, and social factors (...) – leading to problems with reproducibility. Thus, for methodological reasons, the predictive success causes a reproducibility problem. (shrink)

This is part one of a two-part paper, in which we develop an axiomatic theory of the relation of partial ground. The main novelty of the paper is the of use of a binary ground predicate rather than an operator to formalize ground. This allows us to connect theories of partial ground with axiomatic theories of truth. In this part of the paper, we develop an axiomatization of the relation of partial ground over the truths of arithmetic and show that (...) the theory is a proof-theoretically conservative extension of the theory PT of positive truth. We construct models for the theory and draw some conclusions for the semantics of conceptualist ground. (shrink)

Several authors have recently questioned whether dehumanization is a psychological prerequisite of mass violence. This paper argues that the significance of dehumanization in the context of National Socialism can be understood only if its ideological dimension is taken into account. The author concentrates on Alfred Rosenberg’s racist doctrine and shows that Nazi ideology can be read as a political anthropology that grounds both the belief in the German privilege and the dehumanization of the Jews. This anthropological framework combines biological, cultural (...) and metaphysical aspects. Therefore, it cannot be reduced to biologism. This new reading of Nazi ideology supports three general conclusions: First, the author reveals a complex strategy of dehumanization which is not considered in the current psychological debate. Second, the analysis of the ideological mechanism suggests a model of dehumanization that is more plausible than other psychological models. Third, the author provides evidence that this kind of dehumanization had psychological consequences and hence was an important feature of Nazi reality. (shrink)

This article examines two questions about scientists’ search for knowledge. First, which search strategies generate discoveries effectively? Second, is it advantageous to diversify search strategies? We argue pace Weisberg and Muldoon, “Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor”, that, on the first question, a search strategy that deliberately seeks novel research approaches need not be optimal. On the second question, we argue they have not shown epistemic reasons exist for the division of cognitive labor, identifying the errors that led (...) to their conclusions. Furthermore, we generalize the epistemic landscape model, showing that one should be skeptical about the benefits of social learning in epistemically complex environments. (shrink)

This is, to the best of my knowledge, the first published attempt at a rigorous logical formalization of a passage in Leibniz's Monadology. The method we followed was suggested by Johannes Czermak.

This is part two of a two-part paper in which we develop an axiomatic theory of the relation of partial ground. The main novelty of the paper is the of use of a binary ground predicate rather than an operator to formalize ground. In this part of the paper, we extend the base theory of the first part of the paper with hierarchically typed truth-predicates and principles about the interaction of partial ground and truth. We show that our theory is (...) a proof-theoretically conservative extension of the ramified theory of positive truth up to. (shrink)

The asylum system faces problems on two fronts. States undermine it with populist politics, and migrants use it to satisfy their migration preferences. To address these problems, asylum services should be commodified. States should be able to pay other states to provide determination and protection-elsewhere. In this article, I aim to identify a way of implementing this idea that is both feasible and desirable. First, I sketch a policy proposal for a commodification of asylum services. Then, I argue that this (...) policy proposal is not only compatible with the right to asylum, but also supported by moral considerations. Despite some undesirable moral features, a market in asylum facilitates the provision of asylum to those who need it. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate with a case study from chemistry under what conditions a simulation can serve as a surrogate for an experiment. The case-study concerns a simulation of H2-formation in outer space. We find that in this case the simulation can act as a surrogate for an experiment, because there exists comprehensive theoretical background knowledge in form of quantum mechanics about the range of phenomena to which the investigated process belongs and because any particular modelling assumptions as can (...) be justified. If these requirements are met then direct empirical validation may even be dispensable. We conjecture that this is not the case in the absence of comprehensive theoretical background knowledge. (shrink)

In this essay, Johannes Giesinger comments on the current philosophical debate on educational justice. He observes that while authors like Elizabeth Anderson and Debra Satz develop a so-called adequacy view of educational justice, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift defend an egalitarian principle. Giesinger focuses his analysis on the main objection that is formulated, from an egalitarian perspective, against the adequacy view: that it neglects the problem of securing fair opportunities in the competition for social rewards. Giesinger meets this objection (...) by expressing two basic theses: First, he argues that Brighouse and Swift themselves fail to give an adequate account of fair competition; and, second, he shows that the adequacy view provides the theoretical resources to face this problem. (shrink)

A central dispute in social ontology concerns the existence of group minds and actions. I argue that some authors in this dispute rely on rival views of existence without sufficiently acknowledging this divergence. I proceed in three steps in arguing for this claim. First, I define the phenomenon as an implicit higher-order disagreement by drawing on an analysis of verbal disputes. Second, I distinguish two theories of existence—the theory-commitments view and the truthmaker view—in both their eliminativist and their constructivist variants. (...) Third, I examine individual contributions to the dispute about the existence of group minds and actions to argue that these contributions have an implicit higher-order disagreement. This paper serves two purposes. First, it is a study to apply recent advances in meta-ontology. Second, it contributes to the debate on social ontology by illustrating how meta-ontology matters for social ontology. (shrink)

We live in times of an increasing polarization in which the margins of the political spectrum begin to dominate our social imagination again. While the neoliberal iteration of the capitalist project suggests an extreme individualism as the normative default position, the devastating impact of the globalized economy on many has reignited the pursuit of socialist alternatives. In this constellation, Simmel’s social theory of modernity can be a useful resource to undercut the return of the old battle between opposite economic systems. (...) This paper argues that two kinds of pluralism can be derived from his conceptualization of the social effects of the money economy. In contrast to one-size-fits-all concepts of freedom, Simmel embraces a social pluralism which acknowledges a plurality of cultural spheres as relevant for the self-actualization of modern individuals, attributing different combinations of independence and embeddedness to them. Moreover, he rejects the social extremes of socialism and individualism, since they fail to properly integrate individual freedom into the social whole without undermining it. Instead Simmel gives us the vision of a pluralist economy in which democratic worker’s cooperatives are combined with an overall liberal market to satisfy both the longing for community and the strive for individual distinction. (shrink)

This chapter argues for a structural injustice approach to the governance of AI. Structural injustice has an analytical and an evaluative component. The analytical component consists of structural explanations that are well-known in the social sciences. The evaluative component is a theory of justice. Structural injustice is a powerful conceptual tool that allows researchers and practitioners to identify, articulate, and perhaps even anticipate, AI biases. The chapter begins with an example of racial bias in AI that arises from structural injustice. (...) The chapter then presents the concept of structural injustice as introduced by the philosopher Iris Marion Young. The chapter moreover argues that structural injustice is well suited as an approach to the governance of AI and compares this approach to alternative approaches that start from analyses of harms and benefits or from value statements. The chapter suggests that structural injustice provides methodological and normative foundations for the values and concerns of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion. The chapter closes with an outlook onto the idea of “structure” and on responsibility. The idea of a structure is central to justice. An open theoretical research question is to what extent AI is itself part of the structure of society. Finally, the practice of responsibility is central to structural injustice. Even if they cannot be held responsible for the existence of structural injustice, every individual and every organization has some responsibility to address structural injustice going forward. (shrink)

This paper develops a taxonomy of kinds of actions that can be seen in group agency, human–machine interactions, and virtual realities. These kinds of actions are special in that they are not embodied in the ordinary sense. I begin by analysing the notion of embodiment into three separate assumptions that together comprise what I call the Embodiment View. Although this view may find support in paradigmatic cases of agency, I suggest that each of its assumptions can be relaxed. With each (...) assumption that is given up, a different kind of disembodied action becomes available. The taxonomy gives a systematic overview and suggests that disembodied actions have the same theoretical relevance as the actions of any ordinarily embodied human. (shrink)

We show that any predicational theory of partial ground that extends a standard theory of syntax and that proves some commonly accepted principles for partial ground is inconsistent. We suggest a way to obtain a consistent predicational theory of ground.

Living organisms are exposed to numerous influencing factors. This holds also true for their infrastructures that are processing and transducing information like endocrine networks or nerval channels. Therefore, the ability to compensate for noise is crucial for survival. An efficient mechanism to neutralise disturbances is instantiated in form of parallel complementary communication channels exerting antagonistic effects at their common receivers. Different signal processing types share the ability to suppress noise, to widen the system’s regulation capacity, and to provide for variable (...) gains while leaving the transferred signal to a large extent unchanged. (shrink)

Seit wenigen Jahren erfreuen sich in den Lebenswissenschaften mehrere Theorien eines immer weitergehenden Einflusses, die unter Etikettierungen wie Systembiologie, Netzwerktheorie oder Signalomics nur scheinbar unabhängige Herangehensweisen an komplexe Zusammenhänge darstellen. Navigation ist der übergreifende Gedanke, der so unterschiedliche Gebiete wie Regelungstheorie, Entscheidungstheorie und Systemwissenschaft verbindet. Navigation als Lage- und Kursbestimmung nebst den zugehörigen Signalverarbeitungsprozessen und Steuerkommandos ist die Grundlage dessen, was lebende Organismen von der blo§en Ansammlung materieller Ingredienzien unterscheidet – von der molekularen Ebene bis zum Sozialverhalten. Denn stets stellen (...) sich Prozesse des Lebens als solche des Suchens, Kommunizierens, Disponierens und Vervollkommnens dar, ob es sich nun um die Regulation der Sauerstoffspannung im Blut oder die Organisation eines Ameisenvolkes handelt. Navigationsaufgaben sind damit schließlich auch Fragestellungen ärztlicher Entscheidungsfindung, die sich in einem komplexen Raum aus individuellen, sozialen und ethischen Anforderungen entfalten. (shrink)

Gesellschaft ist ein schwieriger, weil prinzipiell nie konkret faßbarer Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Zu diesem Problem gibt es u.a. transzendentale, phänomenologische, systemtheoretische Ansätze. Die Gegenstandsverfassung hat weitreichende forschungspraktische Konsequenzen, auch hinsichtlich sozialwissenschaftlicher Wissenschaftlichkeit. Pragmatismus und Semiotik fand, trotz Apels Peirce- und Joas’ Meadrezeption, noch nicht genügend Beachtung. Gesellschaft wird nicht als Objekt, sondern als erkenntnisdeterminierendes Ziel eines kognitiven Verhaltens eingeführt. Sie wird so kontextualisiert in einer Wahrheitstheorie, die sowohl objektive Fakten wie kognitive Allgemeinheit in sich vereint, und zwar konkret in jeder (...) Zeichenrelation. Von hier ließe sich die Systemtheorie Luhmanns debattieren, nicht in ihren attraktiven Anwendungen, sondern ihrem logischen Kern nach. (shrink)

We explore a ‘Neo-Cartesian’ account of divine ultimacy that raises the concept of God to its ultimate level of abstraction so that we can do away with even the question of his existence. Our starting point is God’s relation to the logical and metaphysical order of reality and the views of Descartes and Leibniz on this topic. While Descartes held the seemingly bizarre view that the eternal truths are freely created by God, Leibniz stands for the mainstream view that the (...) eternal truths are grounded in God’s nature. We argue that the implausibility of Descartes’ doctrine stems mainly from the assumption that there is a non-epistemic notion of absolute necessity that constitutes the ultimate court of appeal for all modal questions and that this assumption is questionable. We also question the assumption that God’s ultimacy merely requires that all reality be grounded in God in the sense of mere explanation, so that it suffices if the necessary truths are grounded in God’s nature but not in God’s will. This will lead us to a reassessment of Descartes’ position. In the final and main part of the paper, we push Descartes’ doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths to its ‘logical’ conclusion with the aim of getting to a novel conception of ‘God.’. (shrink)

The concept of life plays a crucial role in the debate on synthetic biology. The first part of this chapter outlines the controversial debate on the status of the concept of life in current science and philosophy. Against this background, synthetic biology and the discourse on its scientific and societal consequences is revealed as an exception. Here, the concept of life is not only used as buzzword but also discussed theoretically and links the ethical aspects with the epistemological prerequisites and (...) the ontological consequences of synthetic biology. The second part examines this point of intersection and analyses some of the issues which are discussed in terms of the concept of life. The third part turns to the history of the concept of life. It offers an examination of scientific and philosophical discourses on life at the turn of the 20th century and suggests a surprising result: In the light of this history, synthetic biology leads to well-known debates, arguments, notions and questions. But it is concluded that the concept of life is too ambiguous and controversial to be useful for capturing the actual practice of synthetic biology. In the fourth part I argue that with regard to the ethical evaluation of synthetic biology, the ambiguity of the concept of life is not as problematic as sometimes held because other challenges are more important. The question whether the activity of synthetic biological systems should be conceived as life or not is primarily theoretical. (shrink)

Das Dissertationsprojekt soll eine Verbindung zwischen zwei augenscheinlich separaten Debattensträngen in der kontemporären Wissenschaftstheorie erforschen. Das ist zum einen die Debatte um die humesche Doktrin, der zufolge es keine de-re notwendigen Verbindungen respektive modale Fakten in der natürlichen Welt gibt. Diese Debatte betrifft die Grundlagen der Naturwissenschaften sowie der Natur selbst. Und das ist zum anderen die Debatte um die materiale Theorie der Induktion, welche auf John D. Norton zurückgeht und die Grundlagen der Rationalität und Logik betrifft. Nach dieser Theorie (...) werden induktive Schlüsse qua relevanter, lokaler Hintergrundfakten zuverlässig. Norton bringt viele - in meinen Augen überzeugende - Beispiele für diese Theorie, lässt uns aber im Unklaren darüber, wie diese Hintergrundfakten induktive Schlüsse lizensieren können. Ich werde argumentieren, dass es sich bei diesen relevanten Fakten zumindest in einigen paradigmatischen Fällen um irreduzibel-modale oder modal grundierte Fakten handeln muss, ansonsten können diese die ihnen zugedachte Funktion nicht erfüllen. Infolgedessen steht der Humeanismus vor einer materialen Form des Induktionsproblems. -/- Meine Forschungshypothese lautet, dass es sich bei dem materialen Induktionsproblem um das eigentliche und zentrale Problem des Humeanismus handelt. Zum einen werden viele altbekannte Probleme des Humeanismus durch das materiale Induktionsproblem motiviert und bestärkt. Zum anderen begründet das materiale Induktionsproblem ein neues und tiefgreifendes Problem des Humeanismus. Es stellt sich darin, dass der Humeanismus den empirischen Erfolg unserer verfügbaren wissenschaftlichen und alltäglichen Gesetzesannahmen nicht zirkelfrei erklären kann. Darauf aufbauend formuliere ich ein Super-Wunderargument, das im Kern in einer Inferenz von den bisherigen empirischen Erfolgen unserer verfügbaren Gesetzesannahmen auf die Wahrheit des Anti-Humeanismus besteht. Dieses Argument steht im Zentrum meiner Arbeit. Alles Weitere wird im Kontext dieses Argumentes diskutiert und illustriert. Zu diesen Untersuchungen gehören die schrittweise Motivation des Argumentes durch das materiale Induktionsproblem, die Unterscheidung und Diskussion verschiedener logischer Formen des Argumentes, das Herausarbeiten der Vorteile sowie die Antizipation von möglichen Einwänden gegen das Argument. (shrink)

The question of what the function of human remembering might be has entered the contemporary philosophical discourse only relatively recently. In this debate, two main views have emerged: preservatism and simulationism. According to preservatism, the function of remembering is to preserve information from/about the past. In contrast, simulationism holds that the function of remembering is to enable reliable thought about the future. Here, I employ form to function reasoning to evaluate both of these views. I argue that both perservatism and (...) simulationism fail to account for the entire representational structure of episodic remembering. As an alternative, I then propose my own account: that the function of remembering is to track when we have epistemic authority about the past. (shrink)

This essay is an introduction to a lecture course "Elements of Descriptive Psychology" delivered by Anton Marty in around 1903/04. Marty offered courses on descriptive psychology at regular intervals in the course of his career at the University of Prague. The content of these courses follows closely the ideas of Marty’s teacher Franz Brentano, though with some interesting divergences and extrapolations. The present work is a historical and systematic introduction to an extract from notes taken of Marty’s lecture, with some (...) discussion of the work of Dilthey on similar topics, and of Marty’s influence on Franz Kafka and on the Gestalt psychologist Max Wertheimer. (shrink)

I argue how Filipino philosophy is an illusion we have taken as a belief, and that we need to remember again its illusory – but necessary – status for it to flourish. The normativity of this illusion impelled the discourse: what is philosophy? For new directions, the language of Filipino philosophy must be negative that pathologies in thinking be realized; it is a necessary illusion remembered once more: a nihilistic stance for new values to be created. I raise the question (...) of the non-identical character of language, of how nature is far larger than concepts, which makes misrepresentation possible (something evident in society—leaders to population, praxis to theory, philosophy to culture). The non-identicality reifies the illusion into belief which necessitates a decadent type of rationality. The illusory status of the nomenclature (‘Filipino philosophy’) must be remembered again for the dialectic to continue. In seeking new directions for Filipino philosophy, it is not enough that a new breed of thinkers merely accepts the value ascribed to it – along with the numerous errors and nuisances inherited along the way – but to create new value. With a critical stance, I present 5 assumptions that probe into some essential characteristics of the immanent pathologies of Filipino philosophy’s language that occasions the need for such struggle branded as assumptions. (shrink)

The term ‘identity politics’ is used to refer to a wide range of political movements. In this paper, we look at the theoretical ideas underpinning two strongly, mutually opposed forms of identity politics, and identify some crucial differences between them. We critically compare the identitarian ideology of the New Right with feminist standpoint theory, focusing on two issues: relativism and essentialism. In carrying out this critical comparison we illuminate under-theorized aspects of both new right identitarianism and standpoint theory; demonstrate how (...) the two are distinct; reveal the depth and pervasiveness of the new right ideology’s flaws; and show what a coherent left-wing identity politics could look like. (shrink)