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  1. Interacting mindreaders.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):841-863.
    Could interacting mindreaders be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers? This paper argues that they could. Mindreading is sometimes reciprocal: the mindreader’s target reciprocates by taking the mindreader as a target for mindreading. The paper explains how such reciprocity can significantly narrow the range of possible interpretations of behaviour where mindreaders are, or appear to be, in a position to interact. A consequence is that revisions and extensions (...)
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  • The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency vs. Joint-Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - In Axel Seemann (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments. MIT Press.
    This chapter aims at investigating the phenomenology of joint action and at gaining a better understanding of (1) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs from the sense of agency one has for individual actions and (2) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs according to the type of joint action and to the role one plays in it.
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  • Joint Interaction and Mutual Understanding in Social Robotics.Sebastian Schleidgen & Orsolya Friedrich - 2022 - Science and Engineering Ethics 28 (6):1-20.
    Social robotics aims at designing robots capable of joint interaction with humans. On a conceptual level, sufficient mutual understanding is usually said to be a necessary condition for joint interaction. Against this background, the following questions remain open: in which sense is it legitimate to speak of human–robot joint interaction? What exactly does it mean to speak of humans and robots sufficiently understanding each other to account for human–robot joint interaction? Is such joint interaction effectively possible by reference, e.g., to (...)
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  • Modest Sociality, Minimal Cooperation and Natural Intersubjectivity.Michael Wilby - 2020 - In Anika Fiebich (ed.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency. Springer. pp. 127-148.
    What is the relation between small-scale collaborative plans and the execution of those plans within interactive contexts? I argue here that joint attention has a key role in explaining how shared plans and shared intentions are executed in interactive contexts. Within singular action, attention plays the functional role of enabling intentional action to be guided by a prior intention. Within interactive joint action, it is joint attention, I argue, that plays a similar functional role of enabling the agents to act (...)
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  • What Is Minimally Cooperative Behavior?Kirk Ludwig - 2020 - In Anika Fiebich (ed.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency. Springer. pp. 9-40.
    Cooperation admits of degrees. When factory workers stage a slowdown, they do not cease to cooperate with management in the production of goods altogether, but they are not fully cooperative either. Full cooperation implies that participants in a joint action are committed to rendering appropriate contributions as needed toward their joint end so as to bring it about, consistently with the type of action and the generally agreed upon constraints within which they work, as efficiently as they can, where their (...)
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  • Shared Agency Without Shared Intention.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):665-688.
    The leading reductive approaches to shared agency model that phenomenon in terms of complexes of individual intentions, understood as plan-laden commitments. Yet not all agents have such intentions, and non-planning agents such as small children and some non-human animals are clearly capable of sophisticated social interactions. But just how robust are their social capacities? Are non-planning agents capable of shared agency? Existing theories of shared agency have little to say about these important questions. I address this lacuna by developing a (...)
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  • Telling as Joint Action: comments on Richard Moran’s The Exchange of Words. [REVIEW]Krista Lawlor - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):701-707.
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  • Joint Action: Mental Representations, Shared Information and General Mechanisms for Coordinating with Others.Cordula Vesper, Ekaterina Abramova, Judith Bütepage, Francesca Ciardo, Benjamin Crossey, Alfred Effenberg, Dayana Hristova, April Karlinsky, Luke McEllin, Sari R. R. Nijssen, Laura Schmitz & Basil Wahn - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention.Facundo M. Alonso - 2016 - Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2):271–302.
    In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychological views (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela) and normative views (Gilbert), I argue that both functional roles played by attitudes of individual participants and interpersonal obligations are factors of central and independent significance for explaining what shared intention is. It is widely agreed that shared intention (I) normally motivates participants to act, and (II) normally creates obligations between them. I argue that the view I propose (...)
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  • Animal Mental Action: Planning Among Chimpanzees.Angelica Kaufmann - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):745-760.
    I offer an argument for what mental action may be like in nonhuman animals. Action planning is a type of mental action that involves a type of intention. Some intentions are the causal mental antecedents of proximal mental actions, and some intentions are the causal mental antecedents of distal mental actions. The distinction between these two types of “plan-states” is often spelled out in terms of mental content. The prominent view is that while proximal mental actions are caused by mental (...)
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  • Gricean Communication and Cognitive Development.Richard Moore - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):pqw049.
    On standard readings of Grice, Gricean communication requires (a) possession of a concept of belief, (b) the ability to make complex inferences about others’ goal-directed behaviour, and (c) the ability to entertain fourth order meta-representations. To the extent that these abilities are pre-requisites of Gricean communication they are inconsistent with the view that Gricean communication could play a role in their development. In this paper, I argue that a class of ‘minimally Gricean acts’ satisfy the intentional structure described by Grice, (...)
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  • On Commitments and Other Uncertainty Reduction Tools in Joint Action.John Michael & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2014 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):89–120.
    In this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action is to reduce various kinds of uncertainty, and that this accounts for the prevalence of commitments in joint action. While this idea is prima facie attractive, we argue that it faces two serious problems. First, commitments can only reduce uncertainty if they are credible, and accounting for the credibility of commitments proves not to be straightforward. Second, there are many other ways in which uncertainty (...)
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  • Is Collective Agency a Coherent Idea? Considerations from the Enactive Theory of Agency.Mog Stapleton & Tom Froese - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag. pp. 219-236.
    Whether collective agency is a coherent concept depends on the theory of agency that we choose to adopt. We argue that the enactive theory of agency developed by Barandiaran, Di Paolo and Rohde (2009) provides a principled way of grounding agency in biological organisms. However the importance of biological embodiment for the enactive approach might lead one to be skeptical as to whether artificial systems or collectives of individuals could instantiate genuine agency. To explore this issue we contrast the concept (...)
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  • Shared Goals and Development.Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):94-101.
    In 'Joint Action and Development', Stephen Butterfill argues that if several agents' actions are driven by what he calls a "shared goal"—a certain pattern of goal-relations and expectations—then these actions constitute a joint action. This kind of joint action is sufficiently cognitively undemanding for children to engage in, and therefore has the potential to play a part in fostering their understanding of other minds. Part of the functional role of shared goals is to enable agents to choose means that are (...)
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  • Me or we? Action-outcome learning in synchronous joint action.Maximilian Marschner, David Dignath & Günther Knoblich - 2024 - Cognition 247 (C):105785.
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  • Commitments and the sense of joint agency.Victor Fernández Castro & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2022 - Mind and Language 38 (3):889-906.
    The purpose of this article is to explore the role commitments may play in shaping our sense of joint agency. First, we propose that commitments may contribute to the generation of the sense of joint agency by stabilizing expectations and improving predictability. Second, we argue that commitments have a normative element that may bolster an agent's sense of control over the joint action and help counterbalance the potentially disruptive effects of asymmetries among agents. Finally, we discuss how commitments may contribute (...)
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  • Interactive expertise in solo and joint musical performance.Glenda Satne & Simon Høffding - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):427-445.
    The paper presents two empirical cases of expert musicians—a classical string quartet and a solo, free improvisation saxophonist—to analyze the explanatory power and reach of theories in the field of expertise studies and joint action. We argue that neither the positions stressing top-down capacities of prediction, planning or perspective-taking, nor those emphasizing bottom-up embodied processes of entrainment, motor-responses and emotional sharing can do justice to the empirical material. We then turn to hybrid theories in the expertise debate and interactionist accounts (...)
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  • Habits and Skills in the Domain of Joint Action.Judith H. Martens - 2020 - Topoi (3):1-13.
    Dichotomous thinking about mental phenomena is abundant in philosophy. One particularly tenacious dichotomy is between “automatic” and “controlled” processes. In this characterization automatic and unintelligent go hand in hand, as do non-automatic and intelligent. Accounts of skillful action have problematized this dichotomous conceptualization and moved towards a more nuanced understanding of human agency. This binary thinking is, however, still abundant in the philosophy of joint action. Habits and skills allow us agentic ways of guiding complex action routines that would otherwise (...)
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  • Understanding others by doing things together: an enactive account.Glenda Satne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):507-528.
    Enactivists claim that social cognition is constituted by interactive processes and even more radically that there is ‘no observation without interaction’. Nevertheless, the notion of interaction at the core of the account has not yet being characterized in a way that makes good the claim that interactions actually constitute social understanding rather than merely facilitating or causally contributing to it. This paper seeks to complement the enactivist approach by offering an account of basic joint action that involves and brings with (...)
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  • Joint action without robust theory of mind.Daniel Story - 2021 - Synthese 198 (6):5009-5026.
    Intuitively, even very young children can act jointly. For instance, a child and her parent can build a simple tower together. According to developmental psychologists, young children develop theory of mind by, among other things, participating in joint actions like this. Yet many leading philosophical accounts of joint action presuppose that participants have a robust theory of mind. In this article, I examine two philosophical accounts of joint action designed to circumvent this presupposition, and then I proffer my own novel (...)
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  • Shared Intentions, Loose Groups and Pooled Knowledge.Olivier Roy & Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2019 - Synthese (5):4523-4541.
    We study shared intentions in what we call “loose groups”. These are groups that lack a codified organizational structure, and where the communication channels between group members are either unreliable or not completely open. We start by formulating two desiderata for shared intentions in such groups. We then argue that no existing account meets these two desiderata, because they assume either too strong or too weak an epistemic condition, that is, a condition on what the group members know and believe (...)
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  • Lucky joint action.Julius Schönherr - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (1):123-142.
    In this paper, I argue that joint action permits a certain degree of luck. The cases I have in mind exhibit the following structure: each participant believes that the intended ends of each robustly support the joint action. This belief turns out to be false. Due to lucky circumstances, the discordance in intention never becomes common knowledge. However, common knowledge of the relevant intentions would have undermined the joint action altogether. The analysis of such cases shows the extent to which (...)
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  • Play's the Thing: Wherein We Find How Learning Can Begin.Michael Luntley - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 52 (1):36-53.
    In this paper I outline an answer to the following question: What are the abilities that make you the sort of subject who can learn, who can acquire new concepts, new skills? There are many traits that matter in providing an answer. But I want to suggest that the ability for creative and imaginative engagement with and sustenance of the playful patterns of our aesthetic experience is core. I identify a core sense of play that fills this role. Play's the (...)
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  • We can work it out: an enactive look at cooperation.Valentina Fantasia, Hanne De Jaegher & Alessandra Fasulo - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • Intentional joint agency: shared intention lite.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency theory in terms of framing, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Practices of Reason. Fusing the Inferentialist and Scientific Image.Ronald Loeffler - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (2):174-179.
    The last three decades have seen a renaissance in Anglo-American philosophy of efforts to think of human reasoning as constitutively social and, indeed, discursive. This approach does not see reaso...
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  • The fanciest sort of intentionality: Active inference, mindshaping and linguistic content.Remi Tison - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (5):1017-1057.
    In this paper, I develop an account of linguistic content based on the active inference framework. While ecological and enactive theorists have rightly rejected the notion of content as a basis for cognitive processes, they must recognize the important role that it plays in the social regulation of linguistic interaction. According to an influential theory in philosophy of language, normative inferentialism, an utterance has the content that it has in virtue of its normative status, that is, in virtue of the (...)
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  • Reductive Views of Shared Intention.Facundo M. Alonso - 2016 - In Kirk Ludwig & Marija Jankovic (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. New York: Routledge.
    This is a survey article on reductive views of shared intention.
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  • Shared intention and the doxastic single end condition.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.
    What is required for several agents to intentionally φ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their φ-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this doxastic single end condition captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if (...)
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  • Texts: A Case Study of Joint Action.Alois Pichler & Nivedita Gangopadhyay - 2021 - SATS 22 (2):169-190.
    Our linguistic communication often takes the form of creating texts. In this paper, we propose that creating texts or ‘texting’ is a form of joint action. We examine the nature and evolution of this joint action. We argue that creating texts ushers in a special type of joint action, which, while lacking some central features of normal, everyday joint actions such as spatio-temporal collocation of agency and embodiment, nonetheless results in an authentic, strong, and unique type of joint action agency. (...)
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  • Shared Intentionality in Nonhuman Great Apes: a Normative Model.Dennis Papadopoulos - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1125-1145.
    Michael Tomasello ( 2016 ) prominently defends the view that there are uniquely human capacities required for shared intentions, therefore great apes do not share intentions. I show that these uniquely human capacities for abstraction are not necessary for shared intentionality. Excluding great apes from shared intentions because they lack certain capacities for abstraction assumes a specific interpretation of shared intentionality, which I call the Roleplaying Model. I undermine the necessity of abstraction for shared intentionality by presenting an alternative model (...)
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  • (1 other version)Joint Improvisation, Minimalism and Pluralism about Joint action.Saint-Germier Pierre, Paternotte Cédric & Canonne Clément - 2021 - Journal of Social Ontology 7 (1):97-118.
    This paper introduces freely improvised joint actions, a class of joint actions characterized by highly unspecific goals and the unavailability of shared plans. For example, walking together just for the sake of walking together with no specific destination or path in mind provides an ordinary example of FIJAs, along with examples in the arts, e.g., collective free improvisation in music, improv theater, or contact improvisation in dance. We argue that classic philosophical accounts of joint action such as Bratman’s rule them (...)
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  • An Account of Boeschian Cooperative Behaviour.Olle Blomberg - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag.
    Philosophical accounts of joint action are often prefaced by the observation that there are two different senses in which several agents can intentionally perform an action Φ, such as go for a walk or capture the prey. The agents might intentionally Φ together, as a collective, or they might intentionally Φ in parallel, where Φ is distributively assigned to the agents, considered as a set of individuals. The accounts are supposed to characterise what is distinctive about activities in which several (...)
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  • Editorial: Joint Action: What Is Shared? [REVIEW]Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Natalie Sebanz - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):137-146.
    Editorial: Joint Action: What Is Shared? Content Type Journal Article Pages 137-146 DOI 10.1007/s13164-011-0062-3 Authors Stephen A. Butterfill, Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK Natalie Sebanz, Centre for Cognition, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, & Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands Journal Review of Philosophy and Psychology Online ISSN 1878-5166 Print ISSN 1878-5158 Journal Volume Volume 2 Journal Issue Volume 2, Number 2.
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  • (1 other version)Sartre on the responsibility of the individual in violent groups.Jennifer Mei Sze Ang - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
    This paper examines the tools used to mediate intersubjectivity as a central element in Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenological theory of ensembles. It first presents a brief account of ordinary individuals acting in and through violent groups from the viewpoints of psychology and phenomenology. Next, using Sartre’s ontology of consciousness, the paper establishes the phenomenological structure of consciousness and intersubjectivity to explain, with recent psychological findings, how individual agents in violent groups come to deny their moral responsibility for the group’s ideology and (...)
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  • Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2020 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.
    This paper disputes the widespread assumption that beliefs and desires may be attributed as theoretical entities in the service of the explanation and predic- tion of human behavior. The literature contains no clear account of how beliefs and desires might generate actions, and there is good reason to deny that principles of rationality generate a choice on the basis of an agent’s beliefs and desires. An alter- native conception of beliefs and desires is here introduced, according to which an attribution (...)
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  • When and why Conventions cannot Be Social Institutions.Vojtěch Zachník - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1235-1254.
    The paper focuses on the issue of compatibility of social institution and convention. At first, it introduces the modest account of conventionality building on five distinctive features – interdependence, arbitrariness, mind-independence, spontaneity, and normative-neutrality – which constitute conventional behaviour, then it presents the two major theories of social institutions that explain them in terms of rules, or equilibria. The argument is that conventions cover a wide-ranging area and cannot be identified with the category of institutions because it would be too (...)
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  • Investing in commitment: Persistence in a joint action is enhanced by the perception of a partner’s effort.Marcell Székely & John Michael - 2018 - Cognition 174 (C):37-42.
    Can the perception that one’s partner is investing effort generate a sense of commitment to a joint action? To test this, we developed a 2-player version of the classic snake game which became increasingly boring over the course of each round. This enabled us to operationalize commitment in terms of how long participants persisted before pressing a ‘finish’ button to conclude each round. Our results from three experiments reveal that participants persisted longer when they perceived what they believed to be (...)
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  • Varieties of collective action: a multidimensional and paradigmatic methodology for their study.Glenda Satne - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
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  • Group identification, joint attention, and preferences: a cluster of minimal pre-conditions for joint actions.Alessandro Salice - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    An important thesis discussed in the literature on shared agency is that group identification motivates pre-school children to act together. This paper aims at further illuminating this thesis by clarifying what triggers the process of group identification in young children. It is argued that joint attention, among other functions in supporting joint actions, can reveal to the co-attenders that they share some preferences. Since sharing preferences has been established by the literature to be a reliable motivation of group identification and (...)
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  • Being one of us. Group identification, joint actions, and collective intentionality.Alessandro Salice & Kengo Miyazono - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (1):42-63.
    Within social psychology, group identification refers to a mental process that leads an individual to conceive of herself as a group member. This phenomenon has recently attracted a great deal of attention in the debate about shared agency. In this debate, group identification is appealing to many because it appears to explain important forms of intentionally shared actions in a cognitively unsophisticated way. This paper argues that, unless important issues about group identification are not illuminated, the heuristic function ascribed to (...)
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  • (1 other version)Joint Improvisation, Minimalism and Pluralism about Joint action.Pierre Saint-Germier, Cédric Paternotte & Clément Canonne - 2021 - Journal of Social Ontology 7 (1):97-118.
    This paper introduces freely improvised joint actions, a class of joint actions characterized by highly unspecific goals and the unavailability of shared plans. For example, walking together just for the sake of walking together with no specific destination or path in mind provides an ordinary example of FIJAs, along with examples in the arts, e.g., collective free improvisation in music, improv theater, or contact improvisation in dance. We argue that classic philosophical accounts of joint action such as Bratman’s rule them (...)
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  • Social cues to joint actions: the role of shared goals.Lucia M. Sacheli, Salvatore M. Aglioti & Matteo Candidi - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • The Role of Second-Person Information in the Development of Social Understanding.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • The Sense of Commitment: A Minimal Approach.John Michael, Natalie Sebanz & Günther Knoblich - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • The Developmental Origins of Commitment.John Michael & Marcell Székely - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):106-123.
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  • Observing joint action: Coordination creates commitment.John Michael, Natalie Sebanz & Günther Knoblich - 2016 - Cognition 157 (C):106-113.
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  • (1 other version)Practices of Reason. Fusing the Inferentialist and Scientific Image: by Ladislav Koreň, New York, USA, Routledge, 2021, x + 246 pp., £96.00 (hardback); £29.59 (eBook), ISBN 978-0-367-70221-2.Ronald Loeffler - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (2):174-179.
    The last three decades have seen a renaissance in Anglo-American philosophy of efforts to think of human reasoning as constitutively social and, indeed, discursive. This approach does not see reaso...
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  • Joint attention without recursive mindreading: On the role of second-person engagement.Felipe León - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):550-580.
    On a widely held characterization, triadic joint attention is the capacity to perceptually attend to an object or event together with another subject. In the last four decades, research in developmental psychology has provided increasing evidence of the crucial role that this capacity plays in socio-cognitive development, early language acquisition, and the development of perspective-taking. Yet, there is a striking discrepancy between the general agreement that joint attention is critical in various domains, and the lack of theoretical consensus on how (...)
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  • Minimalism and Maximalism in the Study of Shared Intentional Action.Matti Heinonen - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (2):168-188.
    I distinguish two kinds of contribution that have been made by recent minimalist accounts of joint action in philosophy and cognitive science relative to established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. The “complementarists” seek to analyze a functionally different kind of joint action from the kind of joint action that is analyzed by established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. The “constitutionalists” seek to expose mechanisms that make performing joint actions possible, without taking a definite stance on which functional characterization (...)
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