- Agentive awareness is not sensory awareness.Myrto I. Mylopoulos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):761-780.details
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Jaspers' Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Alexandre Billon & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 29-54.details
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Perceiving Intentions.Joelle Proust - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The comparator account on thought insertion, alien voices and inner speech: some open questions.Agustin Vicente - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):335-353.details
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Out of nowhere: Thought insertion, ownership and context-integration.Jean-Remy Martin & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):111-122.details
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Delusions as Forensically Disturbing Perceptual Inferences.Jakob Hohwy & Vivek Rajan - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):5-11.details
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Grounding Procedural and Declarative Knowledge in Sensorimotor Anticipation.Giovanni Pezzulo - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (1):78-114.details
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Technology and the Body: the (Im)Possibilities of Re-embodiment. [REVIEW]Helena De Preester - 2011 - Foundations of Science 16 (2-3):119-137.details
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Thought insertion and self-knowledge.Jordi Fernández - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (1):66-88.details
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Beyond the comparator model: A multi-factorial two-step account of agency.Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.details
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Fractured phenomenologies: Thought insertion, inner speech, and the puzzle of extraneity.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):369-401.details
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On thought insertion.Christoph Hoerl - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):189-200.details
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Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the 'alien' in alien control?Elisabeth Pacherie, Melissa Green & Tim Bayne - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.details
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Delusional beliefs and reason giving.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew R. Broome - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.details
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Delusion, dissociation and identity.Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):31-49.details
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Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference.Thomas Metzinger - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393.details
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Thinking of oneself as the same.Joëlle Proust - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):495-509.details
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Understanding Delusions: Evidence, Reason, and Experience.Chenwei Nie - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Warwickdetails
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Questions of Reference and the Reflexivity of First-Person Thought.Michele Palmira - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):628-640.details
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¿Hemos respondido la pregunta "¿Puede pensar una máquina?"?Gonzalez Rodrigo - 2019 - In Discusiones Fundamentales en Filosofía de la Mente: Voces Locales. Valparaíso: Universidad de Valparaíso. pp. 71-95.details
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Perspectival self-consciousness and ego-dissolution.Miguel Angel Sebastian - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-27.details
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Guarantee and Reflexivity.Santiago Echeverri - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (9):473-500.details
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Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.details
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The First-Person Plural and Immunity to Error.Joel Smith - 2018 - Disputatio 10 (49):141-167.details
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Combining Minds: A Defence of the Possibility of Experiential Combination.Luke Roelofs - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Torontodetails
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(2 other versions)Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.Shaun Gallagher & Francisco J. Varela - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1):93-132.details
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Failing to Self-Ascribe Thought and Motion: Towards a Three-Factor Account of Passivity Symptoms in Schizophrenia.David Miguel Gray - 2014 - Schizophrenia Research 152 (1):28-32.details
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For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not.Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel - 2016 - In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of mind and phenomenology. New York: Routledge. pp. 36-53.details
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Embodied savoir-faire: knowledge-how requires motor representations.Neil Levy - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2).details
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Thinking, Inner Speech, and Self-Awareness.Johannes Roessler - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):541-557.details
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Don't Ask, Look! Linguistic Corpora as a Tool for Conceptual Analysis.Roland Bluhm - 2013 - In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico. pp. 7-15.details
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(1 other version)Self-knowledge, agency and inner voices.L. O'Brien - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):93-108.details
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Criticial Review of: When self-consciousness breaks, by G. Lynn Stephens & G. Graham.Joëlle Proust - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):543-550.details
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Grounding Action Representations.Arne M. Weber & Gottfried Vosgerau - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):53-69.details
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Thoughts, motor actions, and the self.Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):22–43.details
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In defence of the doxastic conception of delusions.Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.details
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Madness, virtue, and ecology: A classical Indian approach to psychiatric disturbance.Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad - 2022 - History of the Human Sciences 35 (1):3-31.details
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Bodily Ownership, Psychological Ownership, and Psychopathology.José Luis Bermúdez - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):263-280.details
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Can “I” prevent you from entering my mind?Marc Champagne - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):145-162.details
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(1 other version)Reply to Rey. [REVIEW]John Campbell - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (1):155 - 162.details
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Inner Speech, Imagined Speech, and Auditory Verbal Hallucinations.Daniel Gregory - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):653-673.details
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Schizophrenia and the Place of Egodystonic States in the Aetiology of Thought Insertion.Pablo López-Silva - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):577-594.details
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Atribuciones de agencia mental Y el desafío desde la psicopatología.Pablo López-Silva - 2020 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 61 (147):835-850.details
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(1 other version)Bayes and the first person: consciousness of thoughts, inner speech and probabilistic inference.Franz Knappik - 2017 - Synthese:1-28.details
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The Role of Emotions in Delusion Formation.Adrianna Smurzyńska - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 48 (1):253-263.details
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Schizophrenia and the Epistemology of Self-Knowledge.Hanna Pickard - 2010 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (1):55 - 74.details
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Consciousness, the self and bodily location.David M. Rosenthal - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):270-276.details
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Which “key to all mythologies”* about the self?—A note on where the illusions of transcendence come from and how to resist them.Annalisa Coliva - 2012 - In Simon Prosser Francois Recanati (ed.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.details
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What can self-disorders in schizophrenia tell us about the nature of subjectivity? A psychopathological investigation.Helene Stephensen & Josef Parnas - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):629-642.details
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The nature of delusion: An analysis of the contemporary philosophical debates.Paredes Aline Aurora Maya - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Central Lancashiredetails
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