This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework for explaining the subjective character of pain experience in terms of what we will call ‘embodied predictive processing’. The predictive processing (PP) theory is a family of views that take perception, action, emotion and cognition to all work together in the service of prediction error minimisation. In this paper we propose an embodied perspective on the PP theory we call the ‘embodied predictive processing (EPP) theory. The EPP theory proposes to explain pain (...) in terms of processes distributed across the whole body. The prediction error minimising system that generates pain experience comprises the immune system, the endocrine system, and the autonomic system in continuous causal interaction with pathways spread across the whole neural axis. We will argue that these systems function in a coordinated and coherent manner as a single complex adaptive system to maintain homeostasis. This system, which we refer to as the neural-endocrine-immune (NEI) system, maintains homeostasis through the process of prediction error minimisation. We go on to propose a view of the NEI ensemble as a multiscale nesting of Markov blankets that integrates the smallest scale of the cell to the largest scale of the embodied person in pain. We set out to show how the EPP theory can make sense of how pain experience could be neurobiologically constituted. We take it to be a constraint on the adequacy of a scientific explanation of subjectivity of pain experience that it makes it intelligible how pain can simultaneously be a local sensing of the body, and, at the same time, a more global, all-encompassing attitude towards the environment. Our aim in what follows is to show how the EPP theory can meet this constraint. (shrink)

The thesis brings together philosophical, psychological and neuroscientific theories of affect in developing a dual process account of emotion. Philosophers and psychologists who take a cognitivist view claim that emotions in humans and other mammalian species require intentionality, arising as the product of evaluations which bear upon our survival or wellbeing, whereas neuroscientists conclude from their research that emotion has its foundations in subcortical affect mechanisms by which behaviours may arise as spontaneous responses to valuable stimuli. Parts I and II (...) of the thesis examine these two accounts, which are construed as cognitive-evaluative and primitive emotional processes respectively. It is further proposed that both these manifestations of emotion are to be found in mammalian species. Given that cognitive-evaluative and primitive emotional states can be demonstrated to coexist and function separately in mammalian species, how do we explain cases in which the two processes seem to be non-accidentally associated? To exemplify: how does it come about that an appraisal that I have been unfairly treated is accompanied by aggressive feelings and impulses towards the object of my anger? Cognitivists accept that the somatic changes accompanying emotions are associated with appraisals but argue that such changes play no role in emotion as an evaluative process other than that of marking the appraisal as significant for our wellbeing. In contrast, a dual process model of emotion is proposed for the interaction of primitive emotions and emotional appraisals whereby the appraisal process arouses a primitive emotion through the detection of patterns within complex external contexts which have a significance for an individual’s wellbeing. The neurophysiological changes associated with the primitive emotion when so aroused, will in turn, invest the appraisal with feelings, sensations characteristic of those neurophysiologies. These feelings influence evaluation in ways which are fundamental to the successful performance of everyday mental functions. (shrink)

Although some still advance reductive accounts of emotions—according to which they fall under a more familiar type of mental state—contemporary philosophers tend to agree that emotions probably constitute their own kind of mental state. Agreeing with this claim, however, is compatible with attempting to find commonalities between emotions and better understood things. According to the advocates of the so-called ‘perceptual analogy’, thinking of emotion in terms of perception can fruitfully advance our understanding even though emotion may not be reducible to (...) ordinary perception. In this paper, I spell out and motivate a different analogy—that between emotion and action—an analogy which I think can do some important theoretical work. In particular, it constitutes a theoretically fruitful way to think about core aspects of emotions and might in fact be employed to provide a better account of certain aspects of emotions than the one based on the perceptual analogy. Emotions might not be a matter of seeing the world a certain way, but a matter of behaving internally in response to it. In a slogan form: Emotion is the inward counterpart of bodily movement. (shrink)

This article addresses the question whether skiing as a nature sport enables practitioners to develop a rapport with nature, or rather estranges and insulates them from their mountainous ambiance. To address this question, I analyse a recent skiing movie from a psychoanalytical perspective and from a neuro-scientific perspective. I conclude that Jean-Paul Sartre’s classical but egocentric account of his skiing experiences disavows the technicity involved in contemporary skiing as a sportive practice for the affluent masses, which actually represents an urbanisation (...) of the sublime, symptomatic for the current era. (shrink)

In this contribution, I interrogate the historical-intellectual narrative that dominates the history of the Schachter–Singer two-factor theory of emotion. In the first part, I propose that a social influence model became generalized to a cognitive view. I argue that Schachter and Singer presented a cognitive theory of emotions in enacting inside the laboratory Schachter’s preceding “social influence” model of emotions and that Schachter’s adoption of a cognitive model of emotion was driven by and was necessary for his previous research on (...) social influence. In the second part, I argue that the Schachter–Singer theory is remarkable not because it introduced a cognitive turn in emotion, but because it presented sympathetic nervous system activation as an essential constitutive element of every emotion. (shrink)

Attachment theory ( Bowlby, 1969/1982 ) posits the existence of internal working models as a foundational feature of human bonds. Radical embodied approaches instead suggest that cognition requires no computation or representation, favoring a cognition situated in a body in an environmental context with affordances for action ( Chemero, 2009 ; Barrett, 2011 ; Wilson and Golonka, 2013 ; Casasanto and Lupyan, 2015 ). We explore whether embodied approaches to social soothing, interpersonal warmth, separation distress, and support seeking could replace (...) representational constructs such as internal working models with a view of relationship cognition anchored in the resources afforded to the individual by their brain, body, and environment in interaction. We review the neurobiological bases for social attachments and relationships and attempt to delineate how these systems overlap or don’t with more basic physiological systems in ways that support or contradict a radical embodied explanation. We suggest that many effects might be the result of the fact that relationship cognition depends on and emerges out of the action of neural systems that regulate several clearly physically grounded systems. For example, the neuropeptide oxytocin appears to be central to attachment and pair-bond behavior ( Carter and Keverne, 2002 ) and is implicated in social thermoregulation more broadly, being necessary for maintaining a warm body temperature (for a review, see IJzerman et al., 2015b ). Finally, we discuss the most challenging issues around taking a radically embodied perspective on social relationships. We find the most crucial challenge in individual differences in support seeking and responses to social contact, which have long been thought to be a function of representational structures in the mind (e.g., Baldwin, 1995 ). Together we entertain the thought to explain such individual differences without mediating representations or computations, but in the end propose a hybrid model of radical embodiment and internal representations. (shrink)

Two thing are obvious from the subjective experience of emotional states: (1) emotions have a power of their own in directing and disrupting behavioural options, thinking processes, and bodily states, all the more so if one is immature; (2) our thoughts and appraisals of events can instigate or inhibit feelings to a substantial extent, all the more so as we age and get more experienced. These common introspective observations suggest that there are reciprocal influences between emotions and cognitive processes, the (...) strength of which change as a function of developmental stages. Alternatively, these observations, especially the latter, could suggest that emotions and cognitive processes are orthogonal reflections of the same brain systems. In the preceding article, Gray advocates the siren-song attractions of the latter view-a delusional view, at least for psychobiologists, I would argue. In this commentary (invited by the editor of this special issue of Cognition and Emotion), I will reaffirm the utility of emotiodcognition distinctions in behavioural brain research, and attempt to coax Gray back to a more traditional view from which he now seems to have departed. Although Gray covers many issues with which I agree, in typical hominid fashion I will bluntly proceed to focus more on those matters with which I disagree. I thank the editor for requesting me to share this alternative view. Literature citations are used sparingly, but much of the relevant material can be accessed from the cited reviews from our laboratory. (shrink)

Emotions can be explained as specialized states, shaped by natural selection, that increase fitness in specific situations. The physiological, psychological, and behavioral characteristics of a specific emotion can be analyzed as possible design features that increase the ability to cope with the threats and opportunities present in the corresponding situation. This approach to understanding the evolutionary functions of emotions is illustrated by the correspondence between (a) the subtypes of fear and the different kinds of threat; (b) the attributes of happiness (...) and sadness and the changes that would be advantageous in propitious and unpropitious situations; and (c) the social emotions and the adaptive challenges of reciprocity relationships. In addition to addressing a core theoretical problem shared by evolutionary and cognitive psychology, explicit formulations of the evolutionary functions of specific emotions are of practical importance for understanding and treating emotional disorders. (shrink)

Moods and emotions are sometimes thought to be counterexamples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods and emotions are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods and emotions on which emotions and some moods represent intentional objects as having sui (...) generis affective properties, which happen to be uninstantiated, and at least some moods represent affective properties not bound to any objects. (shrink)

According to the old feeling theory of emotion, an emotion is just a feeling: a conscious experience with a characteristic phenomenal character. This theory is widely dismissed in contemporary discussions of emotion as hopelessly naïve. In particular, it is thought to suffer from two fatal drawbacks: its inability to account for the cognitive dimension of emotion (which is thought to go beyond the phenomenal dimension), and its inability to accommodate unconscious emotions (which, of course, lack any phenomenal character). In this (...) paper, I argue that the old feeling theory is in reality only a pair of modifications removed from a highly plausible account of the nature of emotion that retains the essential connection between emotion and feeling. These modifications are, moreover, motivated by recent developments in work on phenomenal consciousness. The first development is the rising recognition of a phenomenal character proper to cognition—so-called cognitive phenomenology. The second is the gathering momentum behind various ‘connection principles’ that specify some connection that a given state must bear to phenomenally conscious states in order to qualify as mental. These developments make it possible to formulate a new feeling theory of emotion, which would overcome the two fatal drawbacks of the old feeling theory. According to the new feeling theory, an emotion is a mental state that bears the right connection to conscious experiences with the right phenomenal character (involving, among other elements, a cognitive phenomenology). (shrink)

Emotional disturbances are central to diverse psychopathologies. In this article, we argue that the functions of emotion are comparable for persons with and without psychopathology. However, impairment in one or more components of emotional processing disrupts the achievement of adaptive emotion functions. Adopting a theoretical conceptualisation of emotional processes that stresses activity in centrally mediated approach and withdrawal systems, we discuss the role of emotion in several forms of psychopathology, including major depression, some of the anxiety disorders, psychopathy, and schizophrenia. (...) In doing so, we highlight the nature of emotion disturbance and attendant behavioural and cognitive deficits. Finally, we discuss the merits of this approach for conceptualising emotional disturbance in psychopathology. (shrink)

This article investigates the emergence of the concept of stress in the 1930s and outlines its changing disciplinary and conceptual frames up until 1960. Originally stress was a physiological concept applied to the hormonal regulation of the body under stressful conditions. Correlated closely with chemical research into corticosteroids for more than a decade, the stress concept finally became a topic in cognitive psychology. One reason for this shift of the concept to another discipline was the fact that the hormones previously (...) linked to the stress concept were successfully transferred from laboratory to medical practice and adopted by disciplines such as rheumatology and dermatology. Thus the stress concept was dissociated from its hormonal context and became a handy formula that allowed postindustrial society to conceive of stress as a matter of individual concern. From a physiological phenomenon stress turned into an object of psychological discourse and individual coping strategies. (shrink)

Abstract: Each affective state has distinct motor-expressions, sensory perceptions, autonomic, and cognitive patterns. Panksepp (1998) proposed seven neural affective systems of which the SEEKING system, a generalized approach-seeking system, motivates organisms to pursue resources needed for survival. When an organism is presented with a novel stimulus, the dopamine (DA) in the nucleus accumbens septi (NAS) is released. The DA circuit outlines the generalized mesolimbic dopamine-centered SEEKING system and is especially responsive when there is an element of unpredictability in forthcoming rewards. (...) We propose that when the outcome of this interaction is unexpected or unanticipated then Panksepp’s “cognitive or expectancy reset” mechanism involving the cognitive dissonance would yield the subjective emotion of surprise. In order to appropriately react to the environment’s stimuli one needs fundamental processes that would enable one to distinguish between what is novel and what has been already experienced, as well as the different degrees of novelty. Novel events are those whose essential features of the representation (visceral and perceptual) are altered and being discrepant provoke more sustained attention. Novelty arises from salient and arousing events and the organism experiences surprise, as coming out of a habitual state. In this framework, we shall look at established theories of emotions and propose a different approach to their taxonomy. (shrink)

An examination of the early history of Nobel Committee deliberations, coupled with a survey of discoveries for which prizes have been awarded to date – and, equally revealing, discoveries for which prizes have not been awarded – reveals a pattern. This pattern suggests that Committee members may have internalized the received, biomedical model and conferred awards in accord with the physicalistic premises that ground this model. I consider the prospect of a paradigm change in medical science and the possible repercussions (...) of such a change on the distribution of Nobel prizes within the domain of physiology or medicine. For expository purposes, I contrast a model based on a science of pathophysiology with one based on a science of pathopsychophysiology. I propose a means whereby members might minimize the potentially blinding effects of model-dependence and come to evaluate medical discoveries from an inter-model rather than an exclusively intra-model perspective. By bringing to light questions rarely asked and proposing answers, I seek to open a dialogue and furnish a vehicle by which the putative delimiting effects of model-dependence might be overcome. (shrink)

Emoția poate fi diferită de alte constructe similare, precum sentimentele (nu toate sentimentele includ emoția); stările sufletești (durează mult mai mult decât emoțiile, sunt mai puțin intense și adesea lipsite de stimul contextual), sau afectul (experiența sentimentului sau a emoției). Platon, în Republica, propune trei componente de bază ale minții umane: raționamentul, dorința și părțile emotive. Pentru Aristotel emoțiile au fost importante în viața morală, o componentă esențială a virtuții. Stoicii au evidențiat importanța emoțiilor în judecată (în teoriile stoice, emoțiile (...) sunt considerate o piedică pentru rațiune, și deci pentru virtute). DOI 10.13140/RG.2.2.24223.30884. (shrink)

This paper argues that God, despite his Perfection, can have faith in us. The paper includes exegesis of various Midrasihc texts, so as to understand the Rabbinic claim that God manifested faith in creating the world. After the exegesis, the paper goes on to provide philosophical motivation for thinking that the Rabbinic claim is consistent with Perfect Being Theology, and consistent with a proper analysis of the nature of faith. Finally, the paper attempts to tie the virtue that faith can (...) exhibit to the virtues associated with art, as it is understood by R. G. Collingwood. This association is particularly apt, given the Midrashic description of God as an artist. All of this is offered in response to Rabbi Moses Nachmanides who argued that Abraham’s faith, in Genesis 15:6, wasn’t worthy of particular praise. (shrink)

A fundamental property of emotional responses is a change in action tendencies that allow the individual to cope with the situation. Most basically, there are two types of behaviour one can switch to when responding emotionally: approach or withdrawal. The present study examined whether the ability to switch to approach or withdrawal depends on the type of behaviour shown before. Using familiar (Experiment 1) and unfamiliar (Experiment 2) neutral stimuli, we first show that switching from approach to withdrawal is generally (...) easier than vice versa. In Experiment 3, we demonstrate that this holds true even when participants respond to emotional stimuli that typically elicit strong approach or withdrawal tendencies. These results indicate that there is a fundamental asymmetry in the ability to switch from approach to withdrawal or vice versa. As shown in Experiment 3, this asymmetry may represent a serious confound in many previous studies examining the link between stimulus valence and associated action tendencies, suggesting that the link between positive stimuli and approach tendencies may be stronger, and the link between negative stimuli and withdrawal tendencies weaker, than previously believed. (shrink)

Aversive experiences have been thought to provoke or exacerbate clinical depression. The present review provides a brief survey of the stress-depression literature and suggests that the effects of stressful experiences on affective state may be related to depletion of several neurotransmitters, including norepinephrine, dopamine, and serotonin. A major element in determining the neurochemical changes is the organism's ability to cope with the aversive stimuli through behavioral means. Aversive experiences give rise to behavioral attempts to cope with the stressor, coupled with (...) increased utilization and synthesis of brain amines to contend with environmental demands. When behavioral coping is possible, neurochemical systems are not overly taxed, and behavioral pathology will not ensue. However, when there can be no behavioral control over the stressful stimuli, or when the aversive experience is perceived as uncontrollable, increased emphasis is placed on coping through endogenous neurochemical mechanisms. Amine utilization increases appreciably and may exceed synthesis, resulting in a net reduction of amine stores, which in turn promotes or exacerbates affective disorder. The processes governing the depletions may be subject to sensitization or conditioning, such that exposure to traumatic experiences may have long-term repercussions when the organism subsequently encounters related stressful stimuli. With continued uncontrollable stimulation, adaptation occurs in the form of increased activity of synthetic enzymes, and levels of amines approach basal values. It is suggested that either the initial amine depletion provoked by aversive experiences or a dysfunction of the adaptive processes, resulting in persistent amine depletion, contributes to behavioral depression. Aside from the contribution of behavioral coping, several organismic, experiential, and environmental variables will influence the effects of aversive experiences on neurochemical activity, and may thus influence vulnerability to depression. (shrink)

In this essay I shall examine the representation of aggression and its issues in the model animal, the Fruit Fly, Drosophila melanogaster. The Fruit Fly is the model animal for genetics and more recently neuroscience. On the basis of its behaviour conclusions are being drawn that will help in the development of new treatments for clinical entities like aggression and anxiety disorders—the author questions those findings and asks whether more should be done to focus on the actual biology and behaviour—the (...) Umwelt, instead of trying to bridge the gulf between invertebrate and human behaviours. (shrink)

In the target article, Juslin & Vll (J&V) contend that neural mechanisms not unique to music are critical to its capability to convey emotion. The work reviewed here provides a broader context for this proposal. Human abilities to signal emotion through sound could have been essential to human evolution, and may have contributed vital foundations for music. Future learning experiments are needed to further clarify engagement underlying musical and broader emotional signaling.

Emotions signal flaws in the person’s anticipation systems, or in other words, in aspects of models of how the world works. As these models are essentially shared in society, emotional challenges e...

Dynamic intra-individual variability (IIV) in cardiac vagal control across multiple situations is believed to contribute to adaptive cognition under stress; however, a dearth of research has empirically tested this notion. To this end, we examined 25 U.S. Army Soldiers (all male, Mean Age= 30.73, SD = 7.71) whose high-frequency heart rate variability (HF-HRV) was measured during a resting baseline and during three conditions of a shooting task (training, low stress, high stress). Response inhibition was measured as the correct rejection of (...) friendly targets during the low and high stress conditions. We tested the association between the standard deviation of HF-HRV across all four task conditions (IIV in vagal control) and changes in response inhibition between low and high stress. Greater differences in vagal control between conditions (larger IIV) were associated with higher tonic vagal control during rest, and stronger stress-related decreases in response inhibition. These results suggest that flexibility in vagal control is supported by tonic vagal control, but this flexibility also uniquely relates to adaptive cognition under stress. Findings are consistent with neurobehavioral and dynamical systems theories of vagal function. (shrink)

Recent work in cognitive and computational neuroscience depicts the human cortex as a multi-level prediction engine. This ‘predictive processing’ framework shows great promise as a means of both understanding and integrating the core information processing strategies underlying perception, reasoning, and action. But how, if at all, do emotions and sub-cortical contributions fit into this emerging picture? The fit, we shall argue, is both profound and potentially transformative. In the picture we develop, online cognitive function cannot be assigned to either the (...) cortical or the sub-cortical component, but instead emerges from their tight co-ordination. This tight co-ordination involves processes of continuous reciprocal causation that weave together bodily information and ‘top-down’ predictions, generating a unified sense of what’s out there and why it matters. The upshot is a more truly ‘embodied’ vision of the predictive brain in action. (shrink)

Although anger as a negative emotion is associated with unpleasantness, recent research on anger highlights its motivational effect. The present study tested whether individuals experience both, an unpleasant and an activating affect, after real-life provocations. Results revealed that an anger situation evoked not only typical subjective and cardiovascular anger reactions but also a sense of strength, which is a positive affect. A comparison of participants with low versus high anger disposition according to the STAXI-2 at baseline, treatment, and recovery showed (...) that participants with high trait anger consistently scored higher in subjective ratings of feeling strong than their counterparts did. Moreover, we found a larger and longer lasting effect of feeling strong than feeling angry after an anger treatment. Thus, differences in anger disposition influence the positive correlation between trait anger and positive affect. (shrink)

Existence of similarities of overall brain activation, specifically during emotional and other common psychological operations (discussed by Lindquist et al.), supports a proposal that emotion participates continuously in dynamic adjustment of behavior. The proposed participation can clarify the relationship of emotion to musical experience. Music, in turn, can help explore such participation.

The implications of Warren McCulloch's 1945 concept of heterarchy are analyzed in terms of human value and motivational systems. The results demonstrate the near-impossibility of predicting behavior on the basis of any hierarchical scheme, or even which among a set of hierarchical schemes will be selected as the basis of a behavioral choice. Thus, for example, people regularly say one thing and do another.

This article investigates the emergence of the concept of stress in the 1930s and outlines its changing disciplinary and conceptual frames up until 1960. Originally stress was a physiological concept applied to the hormonal regulation of the body under stressful conditions. Correlated closely with chemical research into corticosteroids for more than a decade, the stress concept finally became a topic in cognitive psychology. One reason for this shift of the concept to another discipline was the fact that the hormones previously (...) linked to the stress concept were successfully transferred from laboratory to medical practice and adopted by disciplines such as rheumatology and dermatology. Thus the stress concept was dissociated from its hormonal context and became a handy formula that allowed postindustrial society to conceive of stress as a matter of individual concern. From a physiological phenomenon stress turned into an object of psychological discourse and individual coping strategies. (shrink)