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  1. A Kantian Account of Emotions as Feelings1.Alix Cohen - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):429-460.
    The aim of this paper is to extract from Kant's writings an account of the nature of the emotions and their function – and to do so despite the fact that Kant neither uses the term ‘emotion’ nor offers a systematic treatment of it. Kant's position, as I interpret it, challenges the contemporary trends that define emotions in terms of other mental states and defines them instead first and foremost as ‘feelings’. Although Kant's views on the nature of feelings have (...)
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  • Qual a motivação para se defender uma teoria causal da memória?César Schirmer Dos Santos - 2018 - In Juliano Santos do Carmo & Rogério F. Saucedo Corrêa (eds.), Linguagem e cognição. Pelotas: NEPFil. pp. 63-89.
    Este texto tem como objetivo apresentar a principal motivação filosófica para se defender uma teoria causal da memória, que é explicar como pode um evento que se deu no passado estar relacionado a uma experiência mnêmica que se dá no presente. Para tanto, iniciaremos apresentando a noção de memória de maneira informal e geral, para depois apresentar elementos mais detalhados. Finalizamos apresentando uma teoria causal da memória que se beneficia da noção de veritação (truthmaking).
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  • Emotions, Appraisals, and Embodied Appraisals.David Pineda - 2015 - Critica 47 (140):3-30.
    La teoría perceptiva de las emociones que Jesse Prinz ha defendido recientemente mantiene la tesis jamesiana según la cual la emoción es un efecto causal del conjunto de cambios corporales que aparecen típicamente durante los episodios emotivos, y es, por tanto, posterior a dichos cambios. Prinz defiende también que las emociones encierran valoraciones del estímulo emotivo, pero a la vista de sus razones a favor de la tesis jamesiana, sostiene que tales valoraciones son corporeizadas. En este trabajo, en primer lugar (...)
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  • The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory.Luca Barlassina & Albert Newen - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):637-678.
    In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural correlates (...)
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  • O Lugar das Emoções na Ética e na Metaética.Flavio Williges, Marcelo Fischborn & David Copp (eds.) - 2018 - Pelotas: NEPFil online/Editora da UFPel.
    Esta coletânea explora o papel desempenhado pelas emoções na teorização em ética e metaética. Inclui capítulos escritos por pesquisadores do Brasil e de outros países.
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  • Consciousness and Emotion.Demian Whiting - 2018 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Routledge.
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  • Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Phenomenal intentionality is a kind of intentionality, or aboutness, that is grounded in phenomenal consciousness, the subjective, experiential feature of certain mental states. The phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), is a theory of intentionality according to which there is phenomenal intentionality, and all other kinds of intentionality at least partly derive from it. In recent years, PIT has increasingly been seen as one of the main approaches to intentionality.
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  • Emotion.Ronald de Sousa - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Normativity, Realism and Emotional Experience.Michael-John Turp - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-18.
    Norms are standards against which actions, dispositions of mind and character, states of affairs and so forth can be measured. They also govern our behaviour, make claims on us, bind us and provide reasons for action and thought that motivate us. J. L. Mackie argued that the intrinsic prescriptivity, or to-be-pursuedness, of moral norms would make them utterly unlike anything else that we know of. Therefore, we should favour an error theory of morality. Mackie thought that the to-be-pursuedness would have (...)
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  • Emotions as Attitudes.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):293-311.
    In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should instead locate it at the level of attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we review the leading contemporary accounts of the emotions. We next offer reasons to think (...)
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  • The Epistemic Value of Emotions in Politics.Benedetta Romano - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):589-608.
    In this paper, I consider emotional reactions in response to political facts, and I investigate how they may provide relevant knowledge about those facts. I assess the value of such knowledge, both from an epistemic and a political perspective. Concerning the epistemic part, I argue that, although emotions are not in themselves sufficient to ground evaluative knowledge about political facts, they can do so within a network of further coherent epistemic attitudes about those facts. With regards to the political part, (...)
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  • Emotion.R. De Sousa - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 3.
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