- Unfitting Absent Emotion.James Fritz - 2023 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 18. Oxford University Press. pp. 73-96.details
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The Weight of Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2573-2596.details
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Right and Wrong: Assessing Scalar Consequentialism.Brian McElwee - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-18.details
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Encroachment on Emotion.James Fritz - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):515-533.details
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Consequentialism and our best selves.Miles Tucker - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):101-120.details
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Pleasure is goodness; morality is universal.Neil Sinhababu - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.details
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Forever fitting feelings.Christopher Howard - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (1):80-98.details
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The Fundamental Divisions in Ethics.Matthew Hammerton - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.details
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Can we outsource all the reasons?Hrishikesh Joshi - 2022 - Philosophical Studies (12):1-16.details
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Fittingness: A User’s Guide.Chris Howard & Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2023 - In Chris Howard & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.details
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Hope, Worry, and Suspension of Judgment.James Fritz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):573-587.details
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Recognition, second‐personal authority, and nonideal theory.Stephen Darwall - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):562-574.details
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Explaining Normative Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Noûs 57 (1):51-80.details
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Fitting anxiety and prudent anxiety.James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8555-8578.details
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Are epistemic reasons normative?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2021 - Noûs 56 (3):670-695.details
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Is global consequentialism more expressive than act consequentialism?Elliott Thornley - 2022 - Analysis 82 (1):75-84.details
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Emotions and Process Rationality.Oded Na’Aman - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):531-546.details
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The Right Wrong‐Makers.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):426-440.details
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Navigating Recalcitrant Emotions.Alex Grzankowski - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (9):501-519.details
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A “Good” Explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):62-104.details
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Who’s on first.Daniel Wodak - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15.details
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The Ambitions of Consequentialism.Brian McElwee - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (2):198--218.details
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Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good.Richard Y. Chappell - 2020 - In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. New York, USA: Oup Usa. pp. 498-512.details
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Weighing epistemic and practical reasons for belief.Christopher Howard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2227-2243.details
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The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.details
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Desert, Control, and Moral Responsibility.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):407-426.details
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Fittingness.Christopher Howard - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12542.details
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Evaluative Beliefs First.Ben Bramble - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 8.details
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Demandingness Objections in Ethics.Brian McElwee - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):84-105.details
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Right in some respects: reasons as evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2191-2208.details
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Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.details
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(1 other version)The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).details
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Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).details
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Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.details
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Norms for emotions: intrinsic or extrinsic.Stéphane Lemaire - 2014 - Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.details
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Willpower Satisficing.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):251-265.details
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Fitting Attitude Theories of Value.Daniel Jacobsen - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Reference, Truth, and Biological Kinds.Marcel Weber - 2014 - In: J. Dutant, D. Fassio and A. Meylan (Eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.details
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Fittingness, Value and trans-World Attitudes.Andrew Reisner - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.details
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John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Normative realism and Brentanian accounts of fittingness.Reuben Sass - 2023 - Synthese 202 (6):1-25.details
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Précis of The Range of Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-7.details
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A Fitting Definition of Epistemic Emotions.Michael Deigan & Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):777-798.details
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The subtleties of fit: reassessing the fit-value biconditionals.Rachel Achs & Oded Na’Aman - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2523-2546.details
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What makes law law: categorial trends in analytic legal metaphysics.Triantafyllos Gkouvas - 2023 - Jurisprudence 14 (4):480-509.details
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Everything First.Errol Lord - 2023 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 97 (1):248-272.details
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Attitudes and the Normativity of Fittingness.Conor McHugh - 2023 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 97 (1):273-293.details
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Fittingness first?: Reasons to withhold belief.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3565-3581.details
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Modal dispositionalism and necessary perfect masks.Barbara Vetter & Ralf Busse - 2022 - Analysis 82 (1):84-94.details
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