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  1. Introspection Is Signal Detection.Jorge Morales - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Introspection is a fundamental part of our mental lives. Nevertheless, its reliability and its underlying cognitive architecture have been widely disputed. Here, I propose a principled way to model introspection. By using time-tested principles from signal detection theory (SDT) and extrapolating them from perception to introspection, I offer a new framework for an introspective signal detection theory (iSDT). In SDT, the reliability of perceptual judgments is a function of the strength of an internal perceptual response (signal- to-noise ratio) which is, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Calibration in Consciousness Science.Matthias Michel - 2021 - Erkenntnis (2):1-22.
    To study consciousness, scientists need to determine when participants are conscious and when they are not. They do so with consciousness detection procedures. A recurring skeptical argument against those procedures is that they cannot be calibrated: there is no way to make sure that detection outcomes are accurate. In this article, I address two main skeptical arguments purporting to show that consciousness scientists cannot calibrate detection procedures. I conclude that there is nothing wrong with calibration in consciousness science.
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  • Denialism: What Do the so-called Consciousness Deniers Deny?Orly Shenker - 2020 - Iyyun 68:307-337.
    Some philosophers consider that some of their colleagues deny that consciousness exists. We shall call the latter ‘deniers’, adopting a term that was initially meant pejoratively. What do the deniers deny? In order to answer this question, we shall examine arguments, both of some deniers and of their critics, and present denialism as a systematic highly non-trivial position that has had some interesting achievements. We will show that the denialist project concerns the epistemology of the mind and specifically of consciousness: (...)
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  • (1 other version)Linguistic Judgments As Evidence.Steven Gross - forthcoming - In Nicholas Allott, Terje Lohndal & Georges Rey (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Chomsky. Wiley-Blackwell.
    An overview of debates surrounding the use of meta-linguistic judgments in linguistics, including recent relevant empirical results.
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  • (1 other version)Les données en première personne et l’expérimentation en psychologie (First-Person Data and Psychological Experiments).Pascal Ludwig & Matthias Michel - 2019 - Philosophia Scientiae 23:111-130.
    En sciences sociales, les scientifiques utilisent les rapports des sujets sur leurs propres états mentaux dans leurs démarches expérimentales. Ainsi, l’introspection, ou la capacité des sujets à former des croyances sur leurs propres états mentaux, y joue un rôle important. Selon les tenants de l’introspectionnisme, l’introspection est une méthode, certes privée, mais qui permet de justifier directement des hypothèses scientifiques. Ainsi, contrairement aux méthodes utilisées dans les sciences de la nature qui se fondent uniquement sur des données publiques, les sciences (...)
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  • Gestalt psychology, frontloading phenomenology, and psychophysics.Uljana Feest - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 9):2153-2173.
    In his 1935 book Principles of Gestalt Psychology, Kurt Koffka stated that empirical research in perceptual psychology should begin with “a phenomenological analysis,” which in turn would put constraints on the “true theory.” In this paper, I take this statement as a point of departure to investigate in what sense Gestalt psychologists practiced a phenomenological analysis and how they saw it related to theory construction. I will contextualize the perceptual research in Gestalt psychology vis-a-vis Husserlian phenomenology on the one hand (...)
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  • The overlooked ubiquity of first-person experience in the cognitive sciences.Joana Rigato, Scott M. Rennie & Zachary F. Mainen - 2019 - Synthese 198 (9):8005-8041.
    Science aims to transform the subjectivity of individual observations and ideas into more objective and universal knowledge. Yet if there is any area in which first-person experience holds a particularly special and delicate role, it is the sciences of the mind. According to a widespread view, first-person methods were largely discarded from psychology after the fall of introspectionism a century ago and replaced by more objective behavioral measures, a step that some authors have begun to criticize. To examine whether these (...)
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  • Consciousness, introspection, and subjective measures.Maja Spener - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter discusses the main types of so-called ’subjective measures of consciousness’ used in current-day science of consciousness. After explaining the key worry about such measures, namely the problem of an ever-present response bias, I discuss the question of whether subjective measures of consciousness are introspective. I show that there is no clear answer to this question, as proponents of subjective measures do not employ a worked-out notion of subjective access. In turn, this makes the problem of response bias less (...)
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  • Phenomenal Experiences, First-Person Methods, and the Artificiality of Experimental Data.Uljana Feest - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):927-939.
    This paper argues that whereas philosophical discussions of first-person methods often turn on the veridicality of first-person reports, more attention should be paid to the experimental circumstances under which the reports are generated, and to the purposes of designing such experiments. After pointing to the ‘constructedness’ of first-person reports in the science of perception, I raise questions about the criteria by which to judge whether the reports illuminate something about the nature of perception. I illustrate this point with a historical (...)
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  • (1 other version)Calibration in Consciousness Science.Matthias Michel - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):829-850.
    To study consciousness, scientists need to determine when participants are conscious and when they are not. They do so with consciousness detection procedures. A recurring skeptical argument against those procedures is that they cannot be calibrated: there is no way to make sure that detection outcomes are accurate. In this article, I address two main skeptical arguments purporting to show that consciousness scientists cannot calibrate detection procedures. I conclude that there is nothing wrong with calibration in consciousness science.
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  • Objectifying the phenomenal in experimental psychology: Titchener and beyond.Gary Hatfield - 2015 - Philosophia Scientiae 19 (3):73-94.
    This paper examines the origins and legacy of Titchener’s notion of stimulus error in the experimental study of sensory experience. It places Titchener’s introspective methods into the intellectual world of early experimental psychology. It follows the subsequent development of perceptual experimentation primarily in the American literature, with notice to British and German studies as needed. Subsequent investigators transformed the specific notion of a “stimulus error” into experimental questions in which subjects’ attitudes toward their perceptual tasks became independent variables to be (...)
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  • Inattentive Perception, Time, and the Incomprehensibility of Consciousness.Jürgen Krüger - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 12:804652.
    Cerebral energy supply is insufficient to support continuous neuronal processing of the plethora of time-constant objects that we are aware of. As a result, the brain is forced to limit processing resources to (the most relevant) cases ofchange. The neuronally generated world is thus temporally discontinuous. This parallels the fact that, in all relevant microscopic fundamental equations of nature, temporalchangeplays a dominant role. When a scientist calculates a “solution” to such an equation, integration over time is an essential step. The (...)
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