Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Mary Astell on Self-Government and Custom.Marie Jayasekera - 2023 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 32 (3):452-472.
    This paper identifies, develops, and argues for an interpretation of Mary Astell’s understanding of self-government. On this interpretation, what is essential to self-government, according to Astell, is an agent’s responsiveness to her own reasoning. The paper identifies two aspects of her theory of self-government: an ‘authenticity’ criterion of what makes our motives our own and an account of the capacities required for responsiveness to our own reasoning. The authenticity criterion states that when our motives arise from some external source without (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Autonomy as a Social Role and the Function of Diversity.Raffaela Giovagnoli - 2018 - Philosophies 3 (3):1-12.
    In the ambit of the debate on “personal autonomy”, we propose to intend “personal autonomy” in a social sense. We undertake this move because we think that autonomy is compatible with socialization and we’ll give reasons for this claim. Moreover, we must consider the role of the wide variety of informational sources we are exposed to, which influence our behavior. Social background represents the ontological ground from which we develop the capacity for autonomy; at the same time, interaction with others (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Do You Mind Violating My Will? Revisiting and Asserting Autonomy.Eli Benjamin Israel - forthcoming - In Georgi Gardiner & Micol Bez (eds.), The Philosophy of Sexual Violence. Routledge.
    In this paper, I discuss a subset of preferences in which a person desires the fulfillment of a choice they have made, even if it involves the violation of their desires, as in rape fantasies. I argue that such cases provide us with a unique insight into personal autonomy from a proceduralist standpoint. In its first part, I analyze some examples in light of Frankfurt's endorsement theory and argue that even when we cannot endorse a practical decision that involves being (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Education for Critical Thinking: Can it be non‐indoctrinative?Stefaan E. Cuypers & Ishtiyaque Haji - 2006 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 38 (6):723–743.
    An ideal of education is to ensure that our children develop into autonomous critical thinkers. The ‘indoctrination objection’, however, calls into question whether education, aimed at cultivating autonomous critical thinkers, is possible. The core of the concern is that since the young child lacks even modest capacities for assessing reasons, the constituent components of critical thinking have to be indoctrinated if there is to be any hope of the child's attaining the ideal. Our primary objective is to defuse this objection. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Education for Critical Thinking: Can it be non‐indoctrinative?Ishtiyaque Haji Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2006 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 38 (6):723-743.
    An ideal of education is to ensure that our children develop into autonomous critical thinkers. The ‘indoctrination objection’, however, calls into question whether education, aimed at cultivating autonomous critical thinkers, is possible. The core of the concern is that since the young child lacks even modest capacities for assessing reasons, the constituent components of critical thinking have to be indoctrinated if there is to be any hope of the child's attaining the ideal. Our primary objective is to defuse this objection. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Problems with autonomy.Beate Rössler - 2002 - Hypatia 17 (4):143-162.
    : The article first develops an account of autonomy, explaining individual autonomy by means of three normative components and then discussing two objections. The first objection claims that autonomy has to be thought of as essentially relational; this objection is refuted. The second objection, labeled the skeptical objection, claims that we simply do not live autonomously, nor could we ever. Reference is made to novels by Iris Murdoch to present a skeptical solution to this objection.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Problems with Autonomy.Beate Rössler - 2002 - Hypatia 17 (4):143-162.
    The article first develops an account of autonomy, explaining individual autonomy by means of three normative components and then discussing two objections. The first objection claims that autonomy has to be thought of as essentially relational; this objection is refuted. The second objection, labeled the skeptical objection, claims that we simply do not live autonomously, nor could we ever. Reference is made to novels by Iris Murdoch to present a skeptical solution to this objection.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Autonomy and Addiction.Neil Levy - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):427-447.
    Whatever its implications for the other features of human agency at its best — for moral responsibility, reasons-responsiveness, self-realization, flourishing, and so on—addiction is universally recognized as impairing autonomy. But philosophers have frequently misunderstood the nature of addiction, and therefore have not adequately explained the manner in which it impairs autonomy. Once we recognize that addiction is not incompatible with choice or volition, it becomes clear that none of the Standard accounts of autonomy can satisfactorily explain the way in which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Autonomy and addiction.Neil Levy - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):427-447.
    Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics University of Melbourne, Parkville, 3010, Australia and.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Opportunity and Preference Learning.Christian Schubert - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):275-295.
    Abstract:Robert Sugden has suggested a normative standard of freedom as ‘opportunity’ that is supposed to help realign normative economics – with its traditional rational choice orientation – with behavioural economics. While allowing preferences to be incoherent, he wants to maintain the anti-paternalist stance of orthodox welfare economics. His standard, though, presupposes that people respond to uncertainty about their own future preferences by dismissing any kind of self-constraint. We argue that the approach lacks psychological substance: Sugden's normative benchmark – the ‘responsible (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • The Limits of Neutrality: Toward a Weakly Substantive Account of Autonomy.Sigurdur Kristinsson - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):257-286.
    Leading accounts of personal autonomy are content-neutral: they insist that there are no a priori constraints on the content of the desires or values that might motivate an autonomous action. In Gerald Dworkin's provocative words, ‘the autonomous person can be a tyrant or a slave, a saint or sinner, a rugged individualist or champion of fraternity, a leader or follower.’ ‘There is nothing in the idea of autonomy that precludes a person from saying, “I want to be the kind of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Frankfurt’s concept of identification.Chen Yajun - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-19.
    Harry Frankfurt had insightfully pointed out that an agent acts freely when he acts in accord with the mental states with which he identifies. The concept of identification rightly captures the ownership condition (something being one’s really own), which plays a significant role in the issues of freedom and moral responsibility. For Frankfurt, identification consists of one’s forming second-order volitions, endorsing first-order desires, and issuing in his actions wholeheartedly. An agent not only wants to φ but also fully embraces his (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Harm of Desire Modification in Non-human Animals: Circumventing Control, Diminishing Ownership and Undermining Agency.Marc G. Wilcox - 2022 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 35 (3):1-15.
    It is seemingly bad for animals to have their desires modified in at least some cases, for instance where brainwashing or neurological manipulation takes place. In humans, many argue that such modification interferes with our positive liberty or undermines our autonomy but this explanation is inapplicable in the case of animals as they lack the capacity for autonomy in the relevant sense. As such, the standard view has been that, despite any intuitions to the contrary, the modification of animals’ desires (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Selflessness and responsibility for self: Is deference compatible with autonomy?Andrea C. Westlund - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):483-523.
    She was intensely sympathetic. She was immensely charming. She excelled in the difficult arts of family life. She sacrificed herself daily. If there was chicken, she took the leg, if there was a draught, she sat in it—in short, she was so constituted that she never had a mind or wish of her own, but preferred to sympathise always with the minds and wishes of others. — Virginia Woolf (1979, 59).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  • Rethinking Relational Autonomy.Andrea C. Westlund - 2009 - Hypatia 24 (4):26-49.
    John Christman has argued that constitutively relational accounts of autonomy, as defended by some feminist theorists, are problematically perfectionist about the human good. I argue that autonomy is constitutively relational, but not in a way that implies perfectionism: autonomy depends on a dialogical disposition to hold oneself answerable to external, critical perspectives on one's action-guiding commitments. This type of relationality carries no substantive value commitments, yet it does answer to core feminist concerns about autonomy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   108 citations  
  • Nondomination and the Limits of Relational Autonomy.Danielle M. Wenner - 2020 - International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 13 (2):28-48.
    Relational autonomy theorists attempt to accommodate social embeddedness within a conception of autonomy. These attempts are conceptually messy, at best, and category errors, at worst. Rejecting the liberal conception of autonomy due to feminist concerns is more helpfully answered by the neorepublican notion of freedom as nondomination. The conception of freedom as nondomination captures the values that motivate the relational turn in moral and political theory and does so in a conceptually neater way than attempting to accommodate those concerns in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Exploitation and International Clinical Research: The Disconnect Between Goals and Policy.Danielle M. Wenner - 2018 - In David Boonin (ed.), Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 563-574.
    A growing proportion of clinical research funded by pharmaceutical companies, high-income country research agencies, and not-for-profit funders is conducted in low- and middle-income settings. Disparities in wealth and access to healthcare between the populations where new interventions are often tested and those where many of them are ultimately marketed raise concerns about exploitation. This chapter examines several ethical requirements frequently advanced as mechanisms for protecting research subjects in underserved communities from exploitation and evaluates the effectiveness of those mechanisms as responses (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Autonomy, Regress, and Manipulation.Steven Weimer - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):1141-1168.
    In this paper, I propose a novel deliberation-based theory of autonomy which grounds an agent’s autonomy in her nature as a rationally-reflective being. I defend that theory against competing approaches to autonomous agency by arguing that the theory I propose is best equipped to handle two of the more troublesome problems that theories of autonomy face: the regress problem and the problem of manipulation. Sarah Buss and Peter Railton have each recently claimed that the regress problem which plagues many prominent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Neurotechnologies, Relational Autonomy, and Authenticity.Mary Jean Walker & Catriona Mackenzie - 2020 - International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 13 (1):98-119.
    The ethical debate about neurotechnologies—including both drugs and implanted devices—has been largely framed around the questions of whether and when these technologies could damage or promote authenticity. Patients can experience changes in mood, behavior, emotion, or preferences—seemingly, changes in character or personality. Some describe such changes by saying they feel like different people; that they have become either more or less themselves; or that they feel as though some of their moods, behaviors, emotions or preferences are not their own. These (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):461-481.
    What happens when someone acts? A familiar answer goes like this. There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means, justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent's body. I think that the standard story is flawed in several respects. The flaw (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   200 citations  
  • Self‐Realization and Owing to Others: An Indirect Constraint?Somogy Varga - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (1):75-86.
    The relationship between self‐realization, and so what I really wholeheartedly endorse and owe to myself, and morality or what we owe to others is normally thought of as antagonism, or as a pleasant coincidence: only if I am indebted to such relations as my fundamental projects that I care wholeheartedly about does morality have a direct connection to self‐realization. The aim of this article is to argue against this picture. It will be argued that the structure of self‐realization and the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Autonomous Self-Expression and Meritocratic Dignity.Somogy Varga - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1131-1149.
    While “dignity” plays an increasingly important role in contemporary moral and political debates, there is profound dispute over its definition, meaning, and normative function. Instead of concluding that dignity’s elusiveness renders it useless, or that it signals its fundamental character, this paper focuses on illuminating one particular strand of meritocratic dignity. It introduces a number of examples and conceptual distinctions and argues that there is a specific strand of “expressive” meritocratic dignity that is not connected to holding a special office (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Immigration and self-determination.Bas van der Vossen - 2015 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (3):270-290.
    This article asks whether states have a right to close their borders because of their right to self-determination, as proposed recently by Christopher Wellman, Michael Walzer, and others. It asks the fundamental question whether self-determination can, in even its most unrestricted form, support the exclusion of immigrants. I argue that the answer is no. To show this, I construct three different ways in which one might use the idea of self-determination to justify immigration restrictions and show that each of these (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Respecting persons, respecting preferences.Mikhail Valdman - 2007 - Utilitas 19 (1):21-46.
    In this article, I argue that the state has a prima facie obligation to help its citizens satisfy their autonomous preferences. I argue that this obligation is grounded in the state's obligation to respect its citizens as persons, and that part of what is involved in respecting someone as a person is helping her satisfy her autonomous preferences. I argue that that which makes preferences autonomous is also that which makes them, and not their non-autonomous counterparts, worthy of respect. In (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Autonomy, History, and the Origins of Our Desires.Mikhail Valdman - 2011 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (3):415-434.
    A popular view among autonomy theorists is that facts about the history of a person's desires, and specifically facts about how they were formed or acquired, matter crucially to her autonomy. I argue that while there is an important relationship between a person's autonomy and the history of her desires, a person's autonomy does not depend on how her desires were formed or acquired. I argue that a desire's autonomy lies not in its origins but in whether its bearer has (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The Locus of Agency in Extended Cognitive Systems.Barbara Tomczyk - forthcoming - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-26.
    The increasing popularity of artificial cognitive enhancements raises the issue of their impact on the agent’s personal autonomy, and issues pertaining to how the latter is to be secured. The extended mind thesis implies that mental states responsible for autonomous action can be partly constituted by the workings of cognitive artifacts themselves, and the question then arises of whether this commits one to embracing an extended agent thesis. My answer is negative. After briefly presenting the main accounts on the conditions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What's Wrong With Undermatching?Michael Tiboris - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 48 (4):646-664.
    ‘Undermatched’ is the name education researchers have given to the surprisingly large number of students who attend post-secondary institutions which are less selective than their academic credentials would permit, or who simply fail to even apply for college when they are qualified to do so. At first, this might seem like an obviously bad trend, especially as rates of undermatching are much higher among students from low-income backgrounds. This article argues, however, that individual cases of undermatching are sometimes morally acceptable (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Standing to Praise.Daniel Telech - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper argues that praise is governed by a norm of standing, namely the evaluative commitment condition. Even when the target of praise is praiseworthy and known to be so by the praiser, praise can be inappropriate owing to the praiser’s lacking the relevant evaluative commitment. I propose that uncommitted praisers lack the standing to praise in that, owing to their lack of commitment to the relevant value, they have not earned the right to host the co-valuing that is the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Social Autonomy and Family-Based Informed Consent.James Stacey Taylor - 2019 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 44 (5):621-639.
    The Western focus on personal autonomy as the normative basis for securing persons’ consent to their treatment renders this autonomy-based approach to informed consent vulnerable to the charge that it is based on an overly atomistic understanding of the person. This leads to a puzzle: how does this generally-accepted atomistic understanding of the person fits with the emphasis on familial consent that occurs when family members are provided with the opportunity to veto a prospective donor’s wish to donate after she (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Ambivalence.J. S. Swindell - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):23-34.
    The phenomenon of ambivalence is an important one for any philosophy of action. Despite this importance, there is a lack of a fully satisfactory analysis of the phenomenon. Although many contemporary philosophers recognize the phenomenon, and address topics related to it, only Harry Frankfurt has given the phenomenon full treatment in the context of action theory – providing an analysis of how it relates to the structure and freedom of the will. In this paper, I develop objections to Frankfurt's account, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Why Strawson’s Basic Argument Is Not Impressive: an Answer from Frankfurt, Christman and Ekstrom.Fei Song - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1595-1607.
    Galen Strawson defends his pessimist position with his famous “Basic Argument”. He attempts to prove that no agent can meet the demands for the ultimate moral responsibility. I argue that the Basic Argument is not impressive because it commits to a linear justification framework under which not only the notion of free will and moral responsibility but every notion would inevitably involve a vicious infinite regress. Surprisingly, this point has not been significantly addressed in the literature of Strawson’s Basic Argument. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Power to Make Others Worship.Aaron Smuts - 2012 - Religious Studies 48 (2):221 - 237.
    Can any being worthy of worship make others worship it? I think not. By way of an analogy to love, I argue that it is perfectly coherent to think that one could be made to worship. However, forcing someone to worship violates their autonomy, not because worship must be freely given, but because forced worship would be inauthentic—much like love earned through potions. For this reason, I argue that one cannot be made to worship properly; forced worship would be unfitting. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The ethics of nudging: An overview.Andreas T. Schmidt & Bart Engelen - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (4):e12658.
    So‐called nudge policies utilize insights from behavioral science to achieve policy outcomes. Nudge policies try to improve people's decisions by changing the ways options are presented to them, rather than changing the options themselves or incentivizing or coercing people. Nudging has been met with great enthusiasm but also fierce criticism. This paper provides an overview of the debate on the ethics of nudging to date. After outlining arguments in favor of nudging, we first discuss different objections that all revolve around (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Should We Extend Voluntary Euthanasia to Non-medical Cases? Solidarity and the Social Context of Elderly Suffering.Andreas T. Schmidt - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (2):129-162.
    Several Dutch politicians have recently argued that medical voluntary euthanasia laws should be extended to include healthy elderly citizens who suffer from non-medical ‘existential suffering’. In response, some seek to show that cases of medical euthanasia are morally permissible in ways that completed life euthanasia cases are not. I provide a different, societal perspective. I argue against assessing the permissibility of individual euthanasia cases in separation of their societal context and history. An appropriate justification of euthanasia needs to be embedded (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Persons or Property – Freedom and the Legal Status of Animals.Andreas T. Schmidt - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (1):20-45.
    _ Source: _Page Count 26 Is freedom a plausible political value for animals? If so, does this imply that animals are owed legal personhood rights or can animals be free but remain human property? Drawing on different conceptions of freedom, I will argue that while positive freedom, libertarian self-ownership, and republican freedom are not plausible political values for animals, liberal ‘option-freedom’ is. However, because such option-freedom is in principle compatible with different legal statuses, animal freedom does not conceptually imply a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Persons or Property – Freedom and the Legal Status of Animals.Andreas T. Schmidt - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (1):20-45.
    Is freedom a plausible political value for animals? If so, does this imply that animals are owed legal personhood rights or can animals be free but remain human property? Drawing on different conceptions of freedom, I will argue that while positive freedom, libertarian self-ownership, and republican freedom are not plausible political values for animals, liberal ‘option-freedom’ is. However, because such option-freedom is in principle compatible with different legal statuses, animal freedom does not conceptually imply a right to legal self-ownership. Nonetheless, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Comparative Risk: Good or Bad Heuristic?Peter H. Schwartz - 2016 - American Journal of Bioethics 16 (5):20-22.
    Some experts have argued that patients facing certain types of choices should not be told whether their risk is above or below average, because this information may trigger a bias (Fagerlin et al. 2007). But careful consideration shows that the comparative risk heuristic can usefully guide decisions and improve their quality or rationality. Building on an earlier paper of mine (Schwartz 2009), I will argue here that doctors and decision aids should provide comparative risk information to patients, even while further (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Autonomy and oppression: Beyond the substantive and content-neutral debate. [REVIEW]Andrew W. Schwartz - 2005 - Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (3-4):443-457.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Autonomy and Enhancement.G. Owen Schaefer, Guy Kahane & Julian Savulescu - 2013 - Neuroethics 7 (2):123-136.
    Some have objected to human enhancement on the grounds that it violates the autonomy of the enhanced. These objections, however, overlook the interesting possibility that autonomy itself could be enhanced. How, exactly, to enhance autonomy is a difficult problem due to the numerous and diverse accounts of autonomy in the literature. Existing accounts of autonomy enhancement rely on narrow and controversial conceptions of autonomy. However, we identify one feature of autonomy common to many mainstream accounts: reasoning ability. Autonomy can then (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • Optimization of what? For-profit health apps as manipulative digital environments.Marijn Sax - 2021 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (3):345-361.
    Mobile health applications that promise the user to help her with some aspect of her health are very popular: for-profit apps such as MyFitnessPal, Fitbit, or Headspace have tens of millions of users each. For-profit health apps are designed and run as optimization systems. One would expect that these health apps aim to optimize the health of the user, but in reality they aim to optimize user engagement and, in effect, conversion. This is problematic, I argue, because digital health environments (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • religious agency in Latin America’s hinterland.Radha Sarkar - 2021 - Feminist Review 129 (1):69-87.
    Does religiosity help or hinder the exercise of agency? This article brings new evidence to bear on this long-standing debate, examining the life and work of the indigenous activist and follower of liberation theology, Rigoberta Menchú, in Guatemala, and the experiences of a millenarian community in Brazil, particularly one of its leaders, Dona Dodô. The two cases elucidate the dynamics of agency and piety, challenging the idea that pious individuals lack agency. In particular, the article interrogates the construction of pious (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What is emotional authenticity?Mikko Salmela - 2005 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35 (3):209–230.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Social Media and its Negative Impacts on Autonomy.Siavosh Sahebi & Paul Formosa - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (3):1-24.
    How social media impacts the autonomy of its users is a topic of increasing focus. However, much of the literature that explores these impacts fails to engage in depth with the philosophical literature on autonomy. This has resulted in a failure to consider the full range of impacts that social media might have on autonomy. A deeper consideration of these impacts is thus needed, given the importance of both autonomy as a moral concept and social media as a feature of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Selective hard compatibilism.Paul Russell - 2010 - In J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 7. MIT Press. pp. 149-73.
    .... The strategy I have defended involves drawing a distinction between those who can and cannot legitimately hold an agent responsible in circumstances when the agent is being covertly controlled (e.g. through implantation processes). What is intuitively unacceptable, I maintain, is that an agent should be held responsible or subject to reactive attitudes that come from another agent who is covertly controlling or manipulating him. This places some limits on who is entitled to take up the participant stance in relation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Against authenticity: Autonomy and oppressive circumstances.Maite Rodríguez Apólito - forthcoming - Philosophy and Social Criticism.
    An ongoing debate between ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ theorists of personal autonomy addresses the following question: should agents have the final say on their own autonomy or should the objective circumstances in which agents live take prevalence when assessing their autonomy? Proceduralists favour the first strategy and substantive theorists restrict more explicitly the conditions under which autonomy is possible. I focus on forms of heteronomy which derive from oppressive circumstances and accept that substantive theorists are correct in contending that (i) forms (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Autonomy, Competence and Non-interference.Joseph T. F. Roberts - 2018 - HEC Forum 30 (3):235-252.
    In light of the variety of uses of the term autonomy in recent bioethics literature, in this paper, I suggest that competence, not being as contested, is better placed to play the anti-paternalistic role currently assigned to autonomy. The demonstration of competence, I will argue, can provide individuals with robust spheres of non-interference in which they can pursue their lives in accordance with their own values. This protection from paternalism is achieved by granting individuals rights to non-interference upon demonstration of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Criminal Law and the Autonomy Assumption: Adorno, Bhaskar, and Critical Legal Theory.Craig Reeves - 2014 - Journal of Critical Realism 13 (4):339-367.
    This article considers and criticizes criminal law‘s assumption of the moral autonomy of individuals, showing how that view rests on questionable and obscure Kantian commitments about the self, and proposes a naturalistic alternative developed through a synthetic reading of Adorno‘s and Bhaskar‘s account of the subject in relation to nature and society. As an embodied, emergent, changing subject whose practically rational powers are emergent, polymorphous, and contingent, the subject‘s moral autonomy is dependent on the conditions for experiences of solidarity in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral Bio-enhancement, Freedom, Value and the Parity Principle.Jonathan Pugh - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):73-86.
    A prominent objection to non-cognitive moral bio-enhancements is that they would compromise the recipient’s ‘freedom to fall’. I begin by discussing some ambiguities in this objection, before outlining an Aristotelian reading of it. I suggest that this reading may help to forestall Persson and Savulescu’s ‘God-Machine’ criticism; however, I suggest that the objection still faces the problem of explaining why the value of moral conformity is insufficient to outweigh the value of the freedom to fall itself. I also question whether (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Brainjacking in deep brain stimulation and autonomy.Jonathan Pugh, Laurie Pycroft, Anders Sandberg, Tipu Aziz & Julian Savulescu - 2018 - Ethics and Information Technology 20 (3):219-232.
    'Brainjacking’ refers to the exercise of unauthorized control of another’s electronic brain implant. Whilst the possibility of hacking a Brain–Computer Interface (BCI) has already been proven in both experimental and real-life settings, there is reason to believe that it will soon be possible to interfere with the software settings of the Implanted Pulse Generators (IPGs) that play a central role in Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) systems. Whilst brainjacking raises ethical concerns pertaining to privacy and physical or psychological harm, we claim (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Personal Autonomy and (Digital) Technology: An Enactive Sensorimotor Framework.Marta Pérez-Verdugo & Xabier E. Barandiaran - 2023 - Philosophy and Technology 36 (4):1-28.
    Many digital technologies, designed and controlled by intensive data-driven corporate platforms, have become ubiquitous for many of our daily activities. This has raised political and ethical concerns over how they might be threatening our personal autonomy. However, not much philosophical attention has been paid to the specific role that their hyper-designed (sensorimotor) interfaces play in this regard. In this paper, we aim to offer a novel framework that can ground personal autonomy on sensorimotor interaction and, from there, directly address how (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark