We investigate two under-explored factors in mitigating the risk of corporate fraud and regulatory enforcement against fraud, namely institutional investors and political connections. The role of institutional investors in the effective monitoring of a firm’s management is well established in the literature. We further observe that firms that have a large proportion of their shares held by institutional investors have a lower incidence of enforcement actions against corporate fraud. The importance of political connections for enterprises, whether in a developed market (...) such as the United States or an emerging market such as China, has been established by previous studies. However, we find evidence of another positive effect of political connections: they may reduce the incidence of enforcement action against corporate fraud. We also find that political connections play a more significant role in reducing regulatory enforcement incidents against non-state-owned enterprises and firms in weaker legal environments, whereas institutional ownership plays a more important role in reducing regulatory enforcement incidents against state-owned enterprises. (shrink)

Ecological psychology regards culture as a response to the demands of the environment. As rice farming in history has significantly influenced the formation of human cultural consciousness, we investigate how the rice culture of a chairperson’s birthplace affects a firm’s CSR activities. Our main finding reveals a positive and significant correlation between a chairperson’s rice culture and CSR activities. Further analysis demonstrates that this positive relationship is particularly pronounced in private firms and family firms. We also examine the incremental effect (...) of individual management heterogeneity and find that the positive relationship is strengthened when the chairperson has a shorter tenure or higher level of education. Additionally, more developed regions help enhance this positive relationship. To address the endogeneity concerns, we adopt an instrumental variable approach and exogenous event analysis based on chairperson turnover. The results are robust to a set of additional tests. Overall, our findings document the benefits of a chairperson’s rice culture in developing countries like China and reveal how this benefit is priced into CSR performance. (shrink)

The relationship between analysts' forecasts and corporate fraud is a vital theoretical and practical question that needs to be clarified. Based on a strict distinction between negative performance gaps relative to analyst forecasts (negative forecast gaps hereinafter) and analyst coverage, this study investigates the influence of analyst forecasts on corporate fraud from a panoramic perspective. Using panel data on listed companies in China from 2008 to 2019, we find that short-term performance pressure caused by negative forecast gaps is significantly positively (...) correlated with firms’ possibility for fraudulent behavior. However, this positive correlation is weaker in state-owned enterprises than in their non-state-owned counterparts. Further, as a key external governance mechanism, analyst coverage enhances the negative moderator effect of state ownership on the positive relationship between negative forecast gaps and the likelihood of corporate fraud. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between performance persistence and corporate governance. We document systematic differences in performance persistence across listed companies in China during 2001–2011, and empirically demonstrate that firms with better corporate governance show higher performance persistence. The results are robust over both the short and long terms. We also find that performance persistence is an important factor in refinancing, and it can lower companies’ costs of borrowing. Overall, our findings offer important implications for business ethics, as we demonstrate (...) how corporate governance can lower companies’ costs of debt. (shrink)

Corporate financial misconduct has garnered increased interest in business ethics research. Although prior research has provided insights into the consequences of financial misconduct, our understanding of why investors react differently to similar instances of misconduct, especially in emerging markets, remains limited. In this study, we first argue that direct information on the severity of misconduct is the primary basis for investors’ evaluations. Next, drawing on screening theory, we theorize that in contexts characterized by high information asymmetry, indirect information about existing (...) firm commitment cues plays a vital screening role by demonstrating the firm’s legitimacy and capability. Subsequently, we develop a tripod framework that integrates the social, market, and strategy dimensions as firm commitment cues that serve as fundamental screening mechanisms to mitigate the adverse effect of misconduct severity on investor reactions. We use a sample of 344 Chinese listed firms that engaged in financial misconduct during 2009–2019 and find that greater misconduct severity results in more negative investor reactions. However, this negative relationship is weakened when the firm demonstrates stronger social and strategy commitments but not stronger market commitment. (shrink)

This study investigates the relation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud in China. We document a significantly negative correlation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud using data on publicly traded firms between 2005 and 2010. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms penalize CEOs for fraud by lowering their pay. We also find that CEO compensation is lower in firms that commit more severe frauds. Panel data fixed effects and propensity score methods are used to demonstrate these effects. (...) Our results also indicate that corporate governance mechanisms influence the magnitude of punishment. We find that CEOs of privately controlled firms, firms that split the posts of CEO and chairman, and CEOs of firms located in developed regions suffer larger compensation penalties for committing financial fraud. Finally, we show that CEOs at firms that commit fraud are more likely to be replaced compared to those at non-fraud firms. (shrink)

This study focuses on a traditional business ethics question and aims to use advanced techniques to improve the performance of corporate fraud prediction. Based on the GONE framework, we adopt the machine learning model to predict the occurrence of corporate fraud in China. We first identify a comprehensive set of fraud-related variables and organize them into each category (i.e., Greed, Opportunity, Need, and Exposure) of the GONE framework. Among the six machine learning models tested, the Random Forest (RF) model outperforms (...) the other five models in corporate fraud prediction. Based on the RF model, we show that Exposure variables play a more important role in predicting corporate fraud than other input variables. These results highlight the importance of Exposure variables in corporate fraud prediction and promote the practical use of the machine learning model in solving business ethics questions. (shrink)

This paper examines the effect of financial shared service centers (FSSCs) on corporate misconduct. Using a sample of Chinese public companies with hand-collected FSSC data, we find that the adoption of FSSCs is negatively associated with the likelihood and frequency of corporate misconduct. The results hold to a battery of robustness tests. Moreover, we show that the negative association between FSSCs and corporate misconduct is more pronounced in firms that have no management equity ownership, disclose internal control weaknesses, and have (...) more subsidiaries. Additional analyses indicate that FSSCs can help mitigate both disclosure-related and nondisclosure-related misconduct. (shrink)

For over four decades, the topic of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation has attracted considerable attention from the fields of economics, finance, management, public policy, law, and business ethics. As scholarly interest in CEO pay has increased, so has public concern about the ethics of high CEO pay. Despite growing interest and pressure among the public and government to reduce CEO pay, it has continued to increase. Using a multi-method design incorporating a pilot study, two online experiments, and an event (...) study, we investigate the impact of CEO pay on consumer purchase intent and find that this negative relationship is magnified under conditions of brand crisis. We also find that the negative interaction of high CEO pay and brand crisis on purchase intent is more negative when the brand has strong equity. Finally, when the CEO is awarded high pay while the firm they manage is undergoing a brand crisis, consumers lose trust in the firm’s brand which reduces consumer purchase intent. This research provides insight on how governance decisions can impact consumer perceptions of corporate brands and consumer behavior, with implications for public policy leaders, boards of directors, CEOs, and Chief Marketing Officers regarding how to manage and message CEO pay. (shrink)

We contribute to the literature on intentions to report wrongdoing by examining whether Chinese internal auditors make consistent judgments when an ethical dilemma is presented in English and when the same dilemma is presented in Chinese. We invoke cultural frame switching theory, and our findings, which are based on a randomized experiment using between-subjects and within-subject mixed design, support the hypothesis that Chinese internal auditors are more likely to report wrongdoing when the ethical dilemma is presented in English than when (...) it is presented in Chinese. Our results, which demonstrate that internal auditors make inconsistent ethical judgments in English and Chinese, point to language-triggered cognitive bias resulting from cultural mindsets. We suggest practical interventions and language strategies to improve audit quality. (shrink)

Based on upper echelon theory, we employ machine learning to explore how CEO characteristics influence corporate violations using a large-scale dataset of listed firms in China for the period 2010–2020. Comparing ten machine learning methods, we find that eXtreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost) outperforms the other models in predicting corporate violations. An interpretable model combining XGBoost and SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP) indicates that CEO characteristics play a central role in predicting corporate violations. Tenure has the strongest predictive power and is negatively (...) associated with corporate violations, followed by marketing experience, education, duality (i.e., simultaneously holding the position of chairperson), and research and development experience. In contrast, shareholdings, age, and pay are positively related to corporate violations. We also analyze violation severity and violation type, confirming the role of tenure in predicting more severe and intentional violations. Overall, our findings contribute to preventing corporate violations, improving corporate governance, and maintaining order in the financial market. (shrink)

This study investigates the interaction between suppliers and fraudulent customer firms from the perspective of reputation damage and reputation recovery. Specifically, reputation damage from the regulatory penalty for corporate fraud induces the trust crisis and suppliers respond to fraudulent firms by reducing the trade credit supply. To repair a damaged reputation and rebuild the trust, fraudulent firms raise the ratio of prepayment to purchase volume when purchasing from small suppliers and increase the proportion of purchase from large suppliers in the (...) next year. Channel analysis shows that the declining trust is one of potential mechanisms to reduce the trade credit. Furthermore, the negative effect is more pronounced for fraudulent firms with non-related party suppliers, higher supplier concentration, less analyst coverage, and for fraudulent firms located in regions with less-developed financial environment. Additionally, supplier sanctions have a spillover effect on non-fraudulent customer firms in the same industry. The conclusions are robust to a series of checks, including PSM–DiD, firm and year fixed effect, the alternative measure for trade credit financing, the industry-year fixed effect and the consideration of the monetary policy and financial crisis. (shrink)

This study examines whether the delegated monitoring of main banks effectively decreases severe agency problems. For example, this includes accounting fraud in bank-dominated corporate governance. In this context, the fraud triangle specifies the three main factors of opportunity, incentive, and rationalization. Main banks may reduce the factor of opportunity through actions such as monitoring, which plays a moderating role by reducing the potential for managerial misconduct, whereas, the incentive factor may be enhanced through the subsequent pressure that influences managers to (...) force turnover when they do not repay debts. The potential influence that the main banks have on the fraud rationalization factor may be stronger in firms that are more dependent on main-bank borrowing. This study analyzed data from publicly listed firms in Japan for the period between 2008 and 2016 to determine how main-bank relationships affected accounting fraud, thus allowing an assessment of delegated monitoring practices. Findings showed that main-bank relationships were helpful for reducing accounting fraud, suggesting its overall effectiveness in delegated monitoring. Results also showed that large audit firms did not necessarily prevent accounting fraud, which implies that main banks can employ their own monitoring as a substitute for the roles typically played by these firms. Here, the main policy implication is that main-bank relationships may strengthen business ethics in the context of bank-dominated corporate governance. In conclusion, the continued analysis of bank monitoring may benefit stakeholders while strengthening business ethics in bank-centered economies. (shrink)

This paper explores how managers’ and supervisors’ equity incentives impact the likelihood of committing corporate fraud in Chinese-listed firms. Previous research has shown that corporate fraud in China is a widespread phenomenon and has severe consequences for affected firms and executives. However, our understanding of the reasons that fraud is committed in a Chinese setting has been very limited thus far. This is an increasingly important topic, because corporate governance is rapidly changing in China, and it is unclear whether adopting (...) the executive compensation practices of the West is appropriate for Chinese firms. We show that managers’ equity incentives increase their propensity to commit corporate fraud. We also find that this effect is more pronounced for state-owned firms. However, we find a negative but not significant relationship between the equity incentives of the supervisory board and the incidence of fraud. (shrink)

This study investigates the key factors that elicit financial reporting fraud among companies in Malaysia. Using enforcement action releases issued by the Security Commission of Malaysia and Bursa Malaysia, we identify a sample of 76 firms that had committed financial reporting fraud during the period of 1996–2016. We use the fraud triangle framework and the Malaysian International Standards on Auditing 240 to identify the factors. Since the simple probit model fails to address the identification problem, we estimate our results using (...) a bivariate probit model. The new model estimates the effects of pressure, opportunity, and rationalization on the probability of fraud likelihood by disentangling the detection probability of fraud. Among several proxies used for pressure, our results suggest that aggressive tax reporting and financial difficulties increase the likelihood of fraud commission. In regard to opportunity, we find that dedicated institutional investors, independence of the board, effective audit committee, and the presence of a female on the board provide active monitoring and oversight in reducing fraud occurrence. Results for rationalization suggest that prior violations and frequent changes of external auditors increase the chances of fraud occurrence. This research offers possible insights to auditors, managers, and regulators to prevent, detect, and react to fraud. Specifically, it highlights the specific factors that may exacerbate the fraudulent intentions of firms. (shrink)