- Expressivism, question substitution and evolutionary debunking.Kyriacou Christos - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (8):1019-1042.details
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Hybrid Views in Meta‐ethics: Pragmatic Views.Guy Fletcher - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (12):848-863.details
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Logic and Semantics for Imperatives.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):617-664.details
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Does Disgust Influence Moral Judgment?Joshua May - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):125-141.details
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Knowledge as a thick concept: explaining why the Gettier problem arises.Brent G. Kyle - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.details
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Alternative normative concepts.Matti Eklund - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):139-157.details
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The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation.Caj Strandberg - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.details
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Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, And The Alief/Belief Distinction.Uriah Kriegel - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):469-486.details
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Hybrid Expressivism and the Analogy between Pejoratives and Moral Language.Ryan J. Hay - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):450-474.details
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Cognitivism, non-cognitivism, and skepticism about folk psychology.James Harold - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):165 - 185.details
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Against quietist normative realism.Tristram McPherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):223-240.details
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A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language.Caj Strandberg - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):87-122.details
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(1 other version)Mixed-up meta-ethics.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):235-256.details
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What is the Frege-Geach problem?Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):703-720.details
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Four Faces of Moral Realism.Stephen Finlay - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):820-849.details
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Hybrid Theories: Cognitive Expressivism.Alex Silk - forthcoming - In David Copp & Connie Rosati (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaethics. Oxford University Press.details
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An empirical argument against moral non-cognitivism.Thomas Pölzler & Jennifer Cole Wright - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):1141-1169.details
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Normative Reference as a Normative Question.Camil Golub - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Sidestepping the Frege-Geach Problem.Graham Bex-Priestley & Will Gamester - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Speculative Aesthetic Expressivism.Neil Sinclair & Jon Robson - 2022 - British Journal of Aesthetics (2):181-197.details
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Inescapable articulations: Vessels of lexical effects.Una Stojnić & Ernie Lepore - 2021 - Noûs 56 (3):742-760.details
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An Empirical Argument against Moral Non-Cognitivism.Thomas Pölzler & Jen Wright - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Slurs: A Novel Explicandum and Adequacy Constraint for Slur Theories.Adam Patterson - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):2029-2046.details
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Slurs, Pejoratives, and Hate Speech.Mihaela Popa-Wyatt - 2020 - Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy.details
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Slurring Perspectives.Elisabeth Camp - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (3):330-349.details
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Expressivism, Minimalism and Moral Doctrines.Christine Tiefensee - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Cambridgedetails
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Inferential Expressivism and the Negation Problem.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 16.details
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Slurs, roles and power.Mihaela Popa-Wyatt & Jeremy L. Wyatt - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2879-2906.details
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The sense of incredibility in ethics.Nicholas Laskowski - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):93-115.details
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Pejoratives and Ways of Thinking.Adam Sennet & David Copp - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (3):248-271.details
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Judgment Internalism: An Argument from Self-Knowledge.Jussi Suikkanen - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):489-503.details
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The promise and perils of hybrid moral semantics for naturalistic moral realism.Michael Rubin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):691-710.details
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A meta-ethical approach to single-player gamespace: introducing constructive ecumenical expressivism as a means of explaining why moral consensus is not forthcoming.Garry Young - 2014 - Ethics and Information Technology 16 (2):91-102.details
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(1 other version)Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?Bart Streumer - 2013 - Ratio 26 (4):450-470.details
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Varieties of Expressivism.Dorit Bar-On & James Sias - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):699-713.details
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Moral Realism and Two-Dimensional Semantics.Tim Henning - 2011 - Ethics 121 (4):717-748.details
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(3 other versions)Deflationary normative pluralism.Evan Tiffany - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 231-262.details
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Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Ethics 119 (2):257-309.details
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Expression for expressivists.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):86–116.details
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(1 other version)Meta‐ethics and the problem of creeping minimalism.James Dreier - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):23–44.details
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An Expressivist Theory of Taste Predicates.Dilip Ninan - 2024 - Philosophers' Imprint 24 (1).details
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Quasi-Naturalism and the Problem of Alternative Normative Concepts.Camil Golub - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (5):474-500.details
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Pejorative Verbs and the Prospects for a Unified Theory of Slurs.Adam Sennet & David Copp - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (2):130-151.details
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Pragmatism. Propositional Priority and the Organic Model of Propositional Individuation.Neftalí Villanueva & María J. Frápolli - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (43):203-217.details
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A User’s Guide to Hybrid Tools.Caleb Perl - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):129-158.details
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Against Moral Intellectualism.Zed Adams - 2013 - Philosophical Investigations 37 (1):37-56.details
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(1 other version)Minimal Expressivism.María José Frápolli & Neftalí Villanueva - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):471-487.details
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Hume on Justice.Rosalind Hursthouse - 2010 - In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 264.details
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Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): Prinz's Subjectivist Moral Realism1.David Copp - 2011 - Noûs 45 (3):577-594.details
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(2 other versions)Objectionable thick concepts in denials.Pekka Väyrynen - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):439-469.details
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