- Reply to Tanney.T. Crane - 1998 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6.details
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A New Framework for Conceptualism.John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.details
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(1 other version)Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and the Problem of Intentionality.Susan Brower-Toland - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):67-110.details
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Consequences of schematism.Alberto Voltolini - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.details
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(1 other version)Event concepts.Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi - 2008 - In Thomas F. Shipley & Jeff Zacks (eds.), Understanding Events: From Perception to Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 31�54.details
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In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience.Kathrin Glüer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.details
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Intentionality and the externalism versus internalism debate.Alessandra Tanesini - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (S2):45-53.details
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Causation, exclusion, and the special sciences.Panu Raatikainen - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (3):349-363.details
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Sensory experience and intentionalism.Pierre Le Morvan - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702.details
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Reply to Nes.Tim Crane - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):215–218.details
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Against propositionalism.Michelle Montague - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):503–518.details
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The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.details
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Mental causation, interventions, and contrasts (2006).Panu Raatikainen - details
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Representation and constraints: The inverse problem and the structure of visual space.Gary Hatfield - 2003 - Acta Psychologica 114:355-378.details
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(1 other version)Disjunctivism about visual experience.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 112--143.details
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(1 other version)Inverted qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Wittgenstein and Qualia.Ned Block - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.details
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Beware of the unicorn: Consciousness as being represented and other things that don't exist.Pete Mandik - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):5-36.details
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(2 other versions)Intentionality and Emotion: Comment on Hutto.Tim Crane - 2006 - In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative : Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. John Benjamins. pp. 107-119.details
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Intentionality as intentional inexistence.Laura Gow - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1371-1385.details
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Deeper into Brentano’s mind: response to critics.Mark Textor - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1440-1462.details
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The Strange Case of Dr. Moloch and Mr. Snazzo (or the Parmenides’ Riddle Once Again).Alberto Voltolini - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (4):54.details
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Lessons from Blur.Giulia Martina - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
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The problem of presentations: how it is that one object is perceptually given in multiple ways.Konrad Werner - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-25.details
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Crane and the mark of the mental.Andrea Raimondi - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):683-693.details
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An equivocation in the simple argument for downward causation.Matthew Rellihan - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):249-256.details
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Is so-called Phenomenal Intentionality Real Intentionality?Elisabetta Sacchi - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (4):687-710.details
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Self-Esteem, Social Esteem, and Pride.Alessandro Salice - 2020 - Emotion Review 12 (3):193-205.details
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(1 other version)Sobre el aporte de la filosofía a las teorías de conceptos en ciencia cognitiva.Bernardo Aguilera & R. Bernardo Pino - 2019 - Revista de Filosofía 76:7-27.details
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Causal Exclusion and Physical Causal Completeness.Dwayne Moore - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (4):479-505.details
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Consciousness.Tony Cheng - 2019 - In Heather Salazar (ed.), Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind. Rebus Foundation Publishing. pp. 41-48.details
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Hylomorphism, Intentionality, and Prior's Puzzle.Andrew Younan - 2021 - New Blackfriars 102 (1098):174-188.details
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(1 other version)What Does the Conservation of Energy Have to Do with Physicalism?Barbara Montero - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (4):383-396.details
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The Indispensability and Irreducibility of Intentional Objects.Casey Woodling - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:543-558.details
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Mental causation, compatibilism and counterfactuals.Dwayne Moore - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):20-42.details
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(1 other version)Načelo vezanosti, Searle i nesvjesna intencionalnost.Tomislav Janovic & Davor Pecnjak - 2007 - Prolegomena 6 (1):29-43.details
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Why phenomenal content is not intentional.Howard Robinson - 2009 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):79-93.details
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Non-Conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness.Tobias Schlicht - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):491 - 520.details
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Uomini, topi e formiche: riflessioni sulla scienza cognitiva1 (bozza).Carlo Penco - 2005 - In Fondazione Devoto (ed.), Cultura umanistica e cultura scientifica.details
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On the what-it-is-like-Ness of experience.Paul Snowdon - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):8-27.details
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Two conceptions of conceptualism and nonconceptualism.T. M. Crowther - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):245-276.details
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(1 other version)Davidson's externalism and swampman's troublesome biography.Andre Leclerc - 2005 - Principia 9 (1-2):159-175.details
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(1 other version)Troubles with Phenomenal Intentionality.Alberto Voltolini - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):237-256.details
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Illusions in speech sound and voice perception.Anna Drożdżowicz - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Kwame Gyekye as a Pan-Psychist.Adá Agadá - 2022 - Philosophia Africana 21 (1):28-44.details
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Relationality of intentionality.Mohammad Saleh Zarepour - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-24.details
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I See Not Only a Madonna, but Also a Hole, in the Picture.Alberto Voltolini - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):224-239.details
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Philosophical Intuition Is the Capacity to Recognize one’s Epistemic Position. An Old-Fashion Approach Based on Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, and Husserl.Konrad Werner - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1725-1751.details
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Are only mental phenomena intentional?Anders Nes - 2008 - Analysis 68 (299):205-215.details
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The Little Word “as.” On Making Contexts and Aspects Explicit.Konrad Werner - 2020 - Axiomathes 30 (1):69-90.details
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