- Toward a Reasons-First View of Normative Background Conditions.Andrés G. Garcia & Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):981-992.details
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Structuring Wellbeing.Christopher Frugé - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):564-580.details
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Fitting anxiety and prudent anxiety.James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8555-8578.details
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Resisting buck-passing accounts of prudential value.Guy Fletcher - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):77-91.details
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Two Visions of Welfare.Fred Feldman - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (2):99-118.details
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Do Fitting Emotions Tell Us Anything About Well-Being?James Fanciullo - 2020 - Utilitas 32 (1):118-125.details
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Adequacy in Education and Normative School Choice.Adelin Costin Dumitru - 2017 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 37 (2):123-146.details
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Desire-satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal.Dale Dorsey - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):151-171.details
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The Authoritative Normativity of Fitting Attitudes.R. A. Rowland - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 17:108-137.details
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Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.details
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A defence of the desire theory of well-being.Atus Mariqueo-Russell - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Southamptondetails
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Are Phenomenal Theories of Thought Chauvinistic?Preston Lennon - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Objectivity/Subjectivity of Values.Jason R. Raibley - 2014 - In Alex C. Michalos (ed.), Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research. Springer. pp. 4438-4443.details
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Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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William David Ross.Anthony Skelton - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Hedonism.Andrew Moore - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Impartiality.Troy Jollimore - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Pleasure.Leonard D. Katz - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Well-being.Roger Crisp - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Mutual Recognition and Well-Being: What Is It for Relational Selves to Thrive?Arto Laitinen - forthcoming - In Onni Hirvonen & Heikki J. Koskinen (eds.), Theory and Practice of Recognition. New York, London: pp. ch 3..details
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Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism.Cristian Constantinescu - 2014 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 9. Oxford University Press. pp. 152-185.details
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Non-Consequentialism Demystified.John Ku, Howard Nye & David Plunkett - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15 (4):1-28.details
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Papers in Population Ethics.Elliott Thornley - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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Consequentialism and Reasons for Action.Christopher Woodard - 2020 - In Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. Oxford: OUP. pp. 179–196.details
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Pleasurably Regarding the Pain of Fictional Others.Aaron Smuts - manuscriptdetails
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Duties of Minimal Wellbeing and Their role in Global Justice.Ambrose Y. K. Lee - unknowndetails
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Welfarism.Ben Bramble - forthcoming - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd print edition.details
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In Defense of the No-Reasons View of Love.Aaron Smuts - details
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How to study well-being: A proposal for the integration of philosophy with science.Michael Prinzing - 2021 - Review of General Psychology 25 (2):152-162.details
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An Improved Whole Life Satisfaction Theory of Happiness.Jussi Suikkanen - 2011 - International Journal of Wellbeing 1 (1):149-166.details
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Reasons and oughts: an explanation and defence of deontic buck-passing.Euan Hans Metz - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Readingdetails
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Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in Ethics.Andreas Lech Mogensen - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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Is Rawls Really a Kantian Contractarian?Baldwin Wong - 2016 - Public Reason 8 (1-2).details
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Don't Ask, Look! Linguistic Corpora as a Tool for Conceptual Analysis.Roland Bluhm - 2013 - In Migue Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico. pp. 7-15.details
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Democracy and the Common Good: A Study of the Weighted Majority Rule.Katharina Berndt Rasmussen - 2013 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Specificità e pluralità della Virtue Ethics.Angelo Campodonico - 2018 - Ragion Pratica: Rivista semestrale 50:161-178..details
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Ambidextrous Reasons (or Why Reasons First's Reasons Aren't Facts).Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (30):1-16.details
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Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
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Eliminating Prudential Reasons.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 8:236-257.details
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Utilitarianism, Welfare, Children.Anthony Skelton - 2014 - In Alexander Bagattini & Colin Macleod (eds.), The Nature of Children's Well-Being: Theory and Practice. Springer. pp. 85-103.details
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The Disjunctive Hybrid Theory of Prudential Value: An Inclusive Approach to the Good Life.Joseph Van Weelden - 2018 - Dissertation, Mcgill Universitydetails
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Happiness in prison.Sabrina Intelisano - unknowndetails
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Is it Better to Love Better Things?Aaron Smuts - 2015 - In Tony Milligan, Christian Maurer & Kamila Pacovská (eds.), Love and Its Objects.details
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The unpleasantness of pain.Abraham Sapién-Córdoba - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Glasgowdetails
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It's All in the Brain : A Theory of the Qualities of Perception.Jesper Östman - 2013 - Umeå Studies in Philosophy 11:168.details
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A Contemporary Account of Sensory Pleasure.Murat Aydede - 2018 - In Lisa Shapiro (ed.), Pleasure: A History. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 239-266.details
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A Defense of Basic Prudential Hedonism.Joe Nelson - 2020 - Dissertation, Duke Universitydetails
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