- Affective Disclosure of Value: emotional experience, neo-sentimentalism and learning to value.Daniel Vanello - 2020 - Philosophy 95 (3):261-283.details
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A “Good” Explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):62-104.details
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Agent-Relative Reasons as Second-Order Value Responses.Jörg Löschke - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):477-491.details
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An Augmented Buck-Passing Account of Reasons and Value: Scanlon and Crisp on What Stops the Buck.Philip Cook - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (4):490-507.details
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Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):200-227.details
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Goodness, Values, Reasons.Johan Brännmark - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):329-343.details
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Buck-passing about Goodness.John Skorupski - 2007 - In J. Josefsson D. Egonsson (ed.), Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.details
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Constructivism in Ethics.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Valeurs et émotions, les perspectives du néo-sentimentalisme.Christine Tappolet - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):7-30.details
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What’s wrong with Moorean buck-passing?Francesco Orsi - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):727-746.details
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Buck-passing accounts of value.Jussi Suikkanen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):768-779.details
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Abandoning the buck passing analysis of final value.Andrew E. Reisner - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):379 - 395.details
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(2 other versions)Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value.Pekka Väyrynen - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 295-324.details
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Aspects of Blame: In which the nature of blame, blameworthiness, standing to blame and proportional blame are discussed.Marta Johansson Werkmäster - 2023 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
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Consequentialism and the Agent’s Point of View.Nathan Robert Howard - 2022 - Ethics 132 (4):787-816.details
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Ambidextrous Reasons (or Why Reasons First's Reasons Aren't Facts).Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (30):1-16.details
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The Good and the Right.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2007 - Utilitas 19 (3):326-353.details
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(1 other version)Value, Fitting‐Attitude Account of.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.details
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The New Explanatory Objection Against the Fitting Attitude Account of Value.Francesco Orsi & Andrés G. Garcia - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1845-1860.details
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Fitting-Attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):560-579.details
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Goodness and reasons: Accentuating the negative.Roger Crisp - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):257-265.details
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Fittingness, Value and trans-World Attitudes.Andrew Reisner - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.details
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What is normativity?John Skorupski - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (23):1 - 23.details
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G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons.Jonas Olson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):525 – 534.details
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Reasons, Values and Agent‐Relativity.R. Jay Wallace - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (4):503-528.details
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Fitting Attitudes And Essentially Contestable Concepts.Cain Todd - 2012 - Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2 - suppl.).details
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Aggregating Reasons and Persons: On Sorting Out the Logic of the Good, Royce’s Style.Mona Simion - 2014 - Contemporary Pragmatism 11 (2):107-121.details
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Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes.Leonard Kahn - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):131-142.details
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Epistemic Relations Between Goodness and Value.Joseph Gamache - 2020 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 94:171-182.details
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