- The Justification of Associative Duties.Seth Lazar - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (1):28-55.details
|
|
Legal obligation and reasons.Christopher Essert - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (1):63-88.details
|
|
Fitting Attitudes and Solitary Goods.Francesco Orsi - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):687-698.details
|
|
The Guise of Reasons.Alex Gregory - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):63-72.details
|
|
Constructivism in Ethics.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Retributivism: The Right and the Good. [REVIEW]Adil Ahmad Haque - 2013 - Law and Philosophy 32 (1):59-82.details
|
|
What’s wrong with Moorean buck-passing?Francesco Orsi - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):727-746.details
|
|
Value and reasons to favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.details
|
|
De dicto desires and morality as fetish.Vanessa Carbonell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):459-477.details
|
|
Moral Reality: A Defence of Moral Realism.Caj Strandberg - 2004 - Lund University.details
|
|
Explaining Reasons: Where Does the Buck Stop?Ulrike Heuer - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (3):1-25.details
|
|
Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value.Pekka Väyrynen - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Clarendon Press. pp. 295-324.details
|
|
Brentano and the Buck-Passers.Sven Danielsson & Jonas Olson - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):511 - 522.details
|
|
The Source of Responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2023 - Ethics 133 (2):163–188.details
|
|
Why de dicto desires are fetishistic.Xiao Zhang - 2021 - Ratio 34 (4):303-311.details
|
|
Moral Fetishism and a Third Desire for What’s Right.Nathan Howard - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 20 (3).details
|
|
Moral Judgment and Motivation.Xiao Zhang - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Birminghamdetails
|
|
Are all practical reasons based on value?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 17:27-53.details
|
|
Immorality and Irrationality.Alex Worsnip* - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):220-253.details
|
|
Agent-Relative Reasons as Second-Order Value Responses.Jörg Https://Orcidorg Löschke - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):477-491.details
|
|
Which Moral Properties Are Eligible for Perceptual Awareness?Preston J. Werner - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (3):290-319.details
|
|
Fittingness.Christopher Howard - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12542.details
|
|
Reasons, Dispositions, and Value.Aaron P. Elliott - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Wrong Kind of Reasons.Nye Howard - 2018 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 340-354.details
|
|
Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):200-227.details
|
|
The motivation question.Nicholas Southwood - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3413-3430.details
|
|
Rationality has its reasons, of which reason knows not: A vindication of the normativity of rationality.Bruno Guindon - unknowndetails
|
|
Reason-based Value or Value-based Reasons?Sven Nyholm - 2006 - In Björn Haglund & Helge Malmgren (eds.), Kvantifikator För En Dag - Essays Dedicated to Dag Westerståhl on His Sixtieth Birthday. Philosophical Communications. pp. 193-202.details
|
|
Fitting Attitude Theories of Value.Daniel Jacobsen - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Wrongness and reasons.Ulrike Heuer - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):137 - 152.details
|
|
Moore on the right, the good, and uncertainty.Michael Smith - 2006 - In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 2006--133.details
|
|
Reasons and value – in defence of the buck-passing account.Jussi Suikkanen - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):513 - 535.details
|
|
G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons.Jonas Olson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):525 – 534.details
|
|
Authenticity, Meaning and Alienation: Reasons to Care Less About Far Future People.Stefan Riedener - forthcoming - In Jacob Barrett, Hilary Greaves & David Thorstad (eds.), Essays on Longtermism. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Ethical Theories and Controversial Intuitions.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):318-345.details
|
|
The New Explanatory Objection Against the Fitting Attitude Account of Value.Francesco Orsi & Andrés G. Garcia - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1845-1860.details
|
|
Separating facts and evaluation: motivation, account, and learnings from a novel approach to evaluating the human impacts of machine learning.Ryan Jenkins, Kristian Hammond, Sarah Spurlock & Leilani Gilpin - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-14.details
|
|
The explanatory objection to the fitting attitude analysis of value.Francesco Orsi & Andrés G. Garcia - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1207-1221.details
|
|
Reasons to act, reasons to require, and the two-level theory of moral explanation.Jörg Https://Orcidorg Löschke - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):169-185.details
|
|
How It All Relates : Exploring the Space of Value Comparisons.Henrik Andersson - 2017 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
|
|
(1 other version)The moral status of nature : reasons to care for the natural world.Lars Samuelsson - 2008 - Dissertation, details
|
|
Comparing values : essays on comparability, transitivity, and vagueness.Nicolas Espinoza - unknowndetails
|
|
Metaethics After Moore.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
Sources, reasons, and requirements.Bruno Guindon - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1253-1268.details
|
|
(1 other version)Value, Fitting‐Attitude Account of.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.details
|
|
Goodness and reasons: Accentuating the negative.Roger Crisp - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):257-265.details
|
|
Making space for the normativity of coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2022 - Noûs 56 (2):393-415.details
|
|
Reasons and oughts: an explanation and defence of deontic buck-passing.Euan Hans Metz - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Readingdetails
|
|