- Non-Consequentialism Demystified.John Ku, Howard Nye & David Plunkett - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15 (4):1-28.details
|
|
Reasons and Emotions.Christine Tappolet - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
What is Value? Where Does it Come From? A Philosophical Perspective.Christine Tappolet & Mauro Rossi - 2015 - In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), The Value Handbook: The Affective Sciences of Values and Valuation. pp. 3-22.details
|
|
Fitting-Attitude Analyses and the Relation Between Final and Intrinsic Value.Antoine C. Dussault - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):166-189.details
|
|
The Personal and the Fitting.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (3):341-352.details
|
|
Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2017 - London and New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Evan Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes From the Philosophy of John Broome. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
Value, Fitting‐Attitude Account of.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.details
|
|
Fitting Attitude Theories of Value.Daniel Jacobsen - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
The Right Version of 'the Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem'.Lars Samuelsson - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (3):383-404.details
|
|
Reference, Truth, and Biological Kinds.Marcel Weber - 2014 - In: J. Dutant, D. Fassio and A. Meylan (Eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.details
|
|
The Use of Reasons in Thought (and the Use of Earmarks in Arguments).Pamela Hieronymi - 2013 - Ethics 124 (1):114-127.details
|
|
Fittingness, Value and trans-World Attitudes.Andrew Reisner - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.details
|
|
Value-Preference Symmetry and Fitting-Attitude Accounts of Value Relations.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):476-491.details
|
|
Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited. [REVIEW]Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (1):1-17.details
|
|
Constructivism in Ethics.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons.Stephane Lemaire - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):31-53.details
|
|
Valeurs et émotions, les perspectives du néo-sentimentalisme.Christine Tappolet - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):7-30.details
|
|
Reasons as explanations.John Brunero - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.details
|
|
What’s wrong with Moorean buck-passing?Francesco Orsi - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):727-746.details
|
|
Value and reasons to favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.details
|
|
Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason.Jonathan Way - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):489-515.details
|
|
Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes.Leonard Kahn - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):131-142.details
|
|
The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):457-488.details
|
|
Buck-passing accounts of value.Jussi Suikkanen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):768-779.details
|
|
Abandoning the buck passing analysis of final value.Andrew E. Reisner - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):379 - 395.details
|
|
Is there reason to be theoretically rational?Andrew Reisner - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
The wrong kind of solution to the wrong kind of reason problem.Jonas Olson - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (2):225-232.details
|
|
Decisions, Reasons and Rationality.Garrett Cullity - 2008 - Ethics 119 (1):57-95.details
|
|
The right kind of solution to the wrong kind of reason problem.Gerald Lang - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (4):472-489.details
|
|
Defending the wide-scope approach to instrumental reason.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):213 - 233.details
|
|
Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Fitting attitudes and welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:47-73.details
|
|
Aspects of Blame: In which the nature of blame, blameworthiness, standing to blame and proportional blame are discussed.Marta Johansson Werkmäster - 2023 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
|
|
Attitudes and the Normativity of Fittingness.Conor McHugh - 2023 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 97 (1):273-293.details
|
|
The Weight of Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2573-2596.details
|
|
Brentano's Fallacy: Moore's Arguments Against Brentano's Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value.Krister Bykvist - 2021 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 38 (3):243-259.details
|
|
What Is Evaluable for Fit?Oded Na'aman - 2023 - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.details
|
|
Fittingness: A User’s Guide.Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland - 2023 - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.details
|
|
Pursuit and inquisitive reasons.Will Fleisher - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 94 (C):17-30.details
|
|
Franz Brentano: An Invitation to Philosophy.Uriah Kriegel - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Epistemic Reasons Are Not Normative Reasons for Belief.Samuel Montplaisir - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):573-587.details
|
|
The explanatory objection to the fitting attitude analysis of value.Francesco Orsi & Andrés G. Garcia - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1207-1221.details
|
|
Ambidextrous Reasons (or Why Reasons First's Reasons Aren't Facts).Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (30):1-16.details
|
|
Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
|
|
Evidentialism doesn’t make an exception for belief.Keshav Singh - 2021 - Synthese 198 (6):5477-5494.details
|
|
Dissolving the wrong kind of reason problem.Richard Rowland - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1455-1474.details
|
|
The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.details
|
|
A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Selim Berker - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):427-470.details
|
|