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Reasons, motives, and the demands of morality: An introduction

In Stephen L. Darwall (ed.), Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches. Oxford University Press. pp. 305--312 (1997)

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  1. Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
    This paper offers an analysis of the authoritatively normative concept PRACTICAL OUGHT that appeals to the constitutive norms for the activity of non-arbitrary selection. I argue that this analysis permits an attractive and substantive explanation of what the distinctive normative authority of this concept amounts to. I contrast my account with more familiar constitutivist theories, and briefly show how it answers ‘schmagency’-style objections to constitutivist explanations of normativity. Finally, I explain how the account offered here can be used to help (...)
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  • Ethical Judgment and Motivation.David Faraci & Tristram McPherson - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 308-323.
    This chapter explores the relationship between ethical judgement writ large (as opposed to merely moral judgement) and motivation. We discuss arguments for and against views on which ethical judgement entails motivation, either alone or under conditions of rationality or normalcy, either at the individual or community level.
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  • Metaethics and Nihilism in Reginster's The Affirmation of Life.Nadeem J. Z. Hussain - 2012 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 43 (1):99-117.
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  • Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-Breaking.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.
    According to the Desire-Based Reasons Model reasons for action are provided by desires. Many, however, are critical about the Model holding an alternative view of practical reason, which is often called valued-based. In this paper I consider one particular attempt to refute the Model, which advocates of the valued-based view often appeal to: the idea of reason-based desires. The argument is built up from two premises. The first claims that desires are states that we have reason to have. The second (...)
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  • VIII-An Argument Against Motivational Internalism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part2):135-156.
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  • In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference: Ideally Coherent Eccentrics and the Contingency of What Matters.Sharon Street - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):273-298.
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  • Weak Motivational Internalism, Lite: Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do.Jesse Steinberg - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):1-24.
    I argue that there is a continuum of judgments ranging from those that are affectively rich, what might be called passionate judgments, to those that are purely cognitive and nonaffective, what might be called dispassionate judgments. The former are akin to desires and other affective states and so are necessarily motivating. Applying this schema to moral judgments, I maintain that the motivational internalist is wrong in claiming that all moral judgments are necessarily motivating, but right in regard to the subset (...)
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  • Alternative Motivation: A New Challenge to Moral Judgment Internalism.Andrew Sneddon - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):41 – 53.
    Internalists argue that there is a necessary connection between motivation and moral judgment. The examination of cases plays an important role in philosophical debate about internalism. This debate has focused on cases concerning the failure to act in accordance with a moral judgment, for one reason or another. I call these failure cases . I argue that a different sort of case is also relevant to this debate. This sort of case is characterized by (1) moral judgment and (2) behavior (...)
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  • The Role of All Things Considered Judgements in Practical Deliberation.Edmund Henden - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):295 – 308.
    Suppose an agent has made a judgement of the form, 'all things considered, it would be better for me to do a rather than b (or any range of alternatives to doing a)' where a and b stand for particular actions. If she does not act upon her judgement in these circumstances would that be a failure of rationality on her part? In this paper I consider two different interpretations of all things considered judgements which give different answers to this (...)
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  • Internal Reasons and Practical Limits on Rational Deliberation.Carolyn Mason - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):163 – 177.
    Could someone who wants a gin and tonic have a normative reason to drink petrol and tonic? Bernard Williams and Michael Smith both say, 'No'. They argue that what an agent has normative reason to do is determined by rational deliberation that involves correcting the agent's beliefs and current motivations. On such an account of normative reasons, an agent who is motivated to act in some way due to a false belief does not have reason to act in that way. (...)
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  • Motivational Internalism.Christian Basil Miller - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):233-255.
    Cases involving amoralists who no longer care about the institution of morality, together with cases of depression, listlessness, and exhaustion, have posed trouble in recent years for standard formulations of motivational internalism. In response, though, internalists have been willing to adopt narrower versions of the thesis which restrict it just to the motivational lives of those agents who are said to be in some way normal, practically rational, or virtuous. My goal in this paper is to offer a new set (...)
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  • Egoism and Morality.Stephen Darwall - 2011 - In Desmond M. Clarke & Catherine Wilson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early Modern Europe. Oxford University Press.
    This article examines changes in the conception of morality and egoism in early modern Europe. It explains that the postulate that human beings were fractious, covetous, and endowed with a strong drive towards self-aggrandizement was associated with Thomas Hobbes, and his writings produced a strong counterflow in the form of assertions and demonstrations of altruism and benevolence as natural endowments of human beings. It suggests that the modern ethical thought has defined itself by its concern with a specific ethical conception (...)
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  • Internalism and Accidie.Kent Ingvar Hurtig - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (3):517 - 543.
    Bernard Williams has famously argued that there are only “internal” reasons for action. Although Williams has produced several, slightly different versions of internalism over the years, one core idea has remained the same: the reasons a person has for acting must be essentially linked to, derived from, or in some other way connected to, that person’s “subjective motivational set”. I have two aims in this paper. First, after having cleared up some initial ambiguities, I try to show that Williams’s internalism (...)
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  • Sharon Streets Humeanischer Konstruktivismus Und Das Verhältnis von Normativität Und Moral.Sören Hilbrich - 2017 - Zeitschrift Für Praktische Philosophie 4 (1):61-80.
    Sharon Street vertritt einen Humeanischen Konstruktivismus in der Metaethik, nach dem die normativen Gründe einer Akteurin von dem System ihrer eigenen normativen Urteile abhängen. Ein normatives Urteil ist nach Street genau dann wahr, wenn es zu der ideal kohärenten Menge der normativen Urteile gehört, die die Akteurin im Überlegungsgleichgewicht hätte. In diesem Aufsatz wird die Frage diskutiert, wie diese Konzeption von Normativität mit einer Konzeption von Moral verbunden werden kann. Eine Möglichkeit hierfür besteht darin, an einer engen Verbindung von Normativität (...)
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  • On the Relationship Between Science and Ethics.Massimo Pigliucci - 2003 - Zygon 38 (4):871-894.
    The relationship between ethics and science has been discussed within the framework of continuity versus discontinuity theories, each of which can take several forms. Continuity theorists claim that ethics is a science or at least that it has deep similarities with the modus operandi of science. Discontinuity theorists reject such equivalency, while at the same time many of them claim that ethics does deal with objective truths and universalizable statements, just not in the same sense as science does. I propose (...)
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  • De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism.Jon Tresan - 2006 - Noûs 40 (1):143–165.
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  • Regimenting Reasons.Jonas Olson & Frans Svensson - 2005 - Theoria 61 (3):203-214.
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  • Moral Belief Attribution: A Reply to Roskies.Michael Cholbi - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):629 – 638.
    I here defend my earlier doubts that VM patients serve as counterexamples to motivational internalism by highlighting the difficulties of belief attribution in light of holism about the mental and by suggesting that a better understanding of the role of emotions in the self-attribution of moral belief places my earlier Davidsonian "theory of mind" argument in a clearer light.
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  • Belief Attribution and the Falsification of Motive Internalism.Michael Cholbi - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):607 – 616.
    The metatethical position known as motive internalism (MI) holds that moral beliefs are necessarily motivating. Adina Roskies (in Philosophical Psychology, 16) has recently argued against MI by citing patients with injuries to the ventromedial (VM) cortex as counterexamples to MI. Roskies claims that not only do these patients not act in accordance with their professed moral beliefs, they exhibit no physiological or affective evidence of being motivated by these beliefs. I argue that Roskies' attempt to falsify MI is unpersuasive because (...)
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  • Deflationary Normative Pluralism.Evan Tiffany - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 231-262.
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