- Fregean Particularism.Susanna Schellenberg - forthcoming - In Peter van Elswyk, Dirk Kindermann, Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini & Andy Egan (eds.), Unstructured Content. Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Introspecting in the 20th century.Maja Spener - 2017 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge. pp. 148-174.details
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(2 other versions)Particular Thoughts & Singular Thought.M. G. F. Martin - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:173-214.details
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In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.details
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Particularity of Content and Illusions of Identity.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (5):491-506.details
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Imagination, Perception and Memory. Making (some) sense of Walton’s view on Photographs and Depiction.Paloma Atencia-Linares - 2017 - Azafea: Revista de Filosofia 19:251-268.details
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Perceptual Demonstrative Thought: A Property-Dependent Theory.Sean Crawford - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):439-457.details
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Ensemble representation and the contents of visual experience.Tim Bayne & Tom McClelland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):733-753.details
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(1 other version)Particularity and Reflexivity in the Intentional Content of Perception.Olga Fernández Prat - 2010 - Theoria 21 (2):133-145.details
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(2 other versions)Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):114-133.details
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(2 other versions)What Is the Problem of Perception?Tim Crane - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):237-264.details
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The Problem of Perception in Analytic Philosophy.Tim Crane - unknowndetails
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The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48.details
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Object Files, Properties, and Perceptual Content.Santiago Echeverri - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):283-307.details
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The Goldilocks Problem of the specificity of visual phenomenal content.Robert Schroer - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):476-495.details
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How many concepts of consciousness?Ned Block - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):272-287.details
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Consciousness is not a natural kind.J. van Brakel - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):269-270.details
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Block's philosophical anosognosia.G. Rey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):266-267.details
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Blindsight, orgasm, and representational overlap.Michael Tye - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):268-269.details
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Should we continue to study consciousness?Richard M. Warren - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):270-271.details
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Blocking out the distinction between sensation and perception: Superblindsight and the case of Helen.Nicholas Humphrey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):257-258.details
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On distinguishing phenomenal consciousness from the representational functions of mind.Leonard D. Katz - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):258-259.details
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Phenomenal access: A moving target.Joseph Levine - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-261.details
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Access denied.Dan Lloyd - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-262.details
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A-consciousness: The local newspaper of the mind?David Navon - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):265-265.details
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The skeptic's dogmatism: a constructive response to the skeptical problem.Kaplan Levent Hasanoglu - 2011 - Dissertation, details
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Representationalism and Anti-Representationalism About Perceptual Experience.Keith A. Wilson - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Warwickdetails
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In Defence of a Structural Account of Indirect Realism.Michael Sollberger - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):815-837.details
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A verisimilitudinarian analysis of the Linda paradox.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2012 - VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.details
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(1 other version)Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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Smelling lessons.Clare Batty - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):161-174.details
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Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'.Nicholas Silins - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):329-367.details
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Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.details
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Color-Consciousness Conceptualism.Pete Mandik - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.details
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Heirs of nothing: The implications of transparency.Matthew Kennedy - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.details
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The logic, intentionality, and phenomenology of emotion.Michelle Montague - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.details
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Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content.Michael Tye - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589-613.details
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Interdiscourse or supervenience relations: The primacy of the manifest image.J. Brakel - 1996 - Synthese 106 (2):253 - 297.details
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Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant.Martin Davies - 1998 - In C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 321-363.details
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Perception and action: Alternative views.Susan Hurley - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):3-40.details
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The contents of perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(2 other versions)Particular thoughts and singular thought.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Logic, Thought and Language. Cambridge University Press. pp. 173-214.details
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The subjective view of experience and its objective commitments.Matthew Soteriou - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2):177-190.details
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The silence of the senses.Charles Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.details
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(2 other versions)On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.details
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(1 other version)Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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Sensible Intuition in Kant: Neither Conceptualism nor Nonconceptualim.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2010 - Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 33 (2):467-495.details
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(1 other version)Representing Tropes A New Defense of Trope Content View of Experience.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1757-1768.details
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The Unity of Perceptual Content.Indrek Reiland - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):941-961.details
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The perception/cognition distinction.Sebastian Watzl, Kristoffer Sundberg & Anders Nes - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (2):165-195.details
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