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Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'

Mind 120 (478):329-367 (2011)

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  1. Do Looks Constitute Our Perceptual Evidence?Harmen Ghijsen - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):132-147.
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  • A Defense of Liberalism in the Epistemology of Perception.Megan Feeney - 2019 - Dissertation, Rutgers University
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  • Perception and the External World.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1119-1145.
    In this paper, I argue that perception justifies belief about the external world in virtue of its phenomenal character together with its relations to the external world. But I argue that perceptual relations to the external world impact on the justifying role of perception only by virtue of their impact on its representational content. Epistemic level-bridging principles provide a principled rationale for avoiding more radically externalist theories of perceptual justification.
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  • How Can Experiences Explain Uncertainty?Susanna Siegel - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Can perceptual experiences be states of uncertainty? We might expect them to be, if the perceptual processes from which they're generated, as well as the behaviors they help produce, take account of probabilistic information. Yet it has long been presumed that perceptual experiences purport to tell us about our environment, without hedging or qualifying. Against this long-standing view, I argue that perceptual experiences may well occasionally be states of uncertainty, but that they are never probabilistically structured. I criticize a powerful (...)
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  • Ensemble Representation and the Contents of Visual Experience.Tim Bayne & Tom McClelland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):733-753.
    The on-going debate over the ‘admissible contents of perceptual experience’ concerns the range of properties that human beings are directly acquainted with in perceptual experience. Regarding vision, it is relatively uncontroversial that the following properties can figure in the contents of visual experience: colour, shape, illumination, spatial relations, motion, and texture. The controversy begins when we ask whether any properties besides these figure in visual experience. We argue that ‘ensemble properties’ should be added to the list of visually admissible properties. (...)
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  • Experience and Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):699-747.
    I argue that perceptual experience provides us with both phenomenal and factive evidence. To a first approximation, we can understand phenomenal evidence as determined by how our environment sensorily seems to us when we are experiencing. To a first approximation, we can understand factive evidence as necessarily determined by the environment to which we are perceptually related such that the evidence is guaranteed to be an accurate guide to the environment. I argue that the rational source of both phenomenal and (...)
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  • Ensemble Representation and the Contents of Visual Experience.McClelland Tom - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Of late philosophers of mind have been greatly exercised by a debate about the ‘admissible contents of perceptual experience’. The issue, roughly put, concerns the range of properties that ‘figure in’ perceptual experience. The focus of the debate has been very much on the contents of visual experience. It is relatively uncontroversial that colour, shape, illumination, spatial relations, motion, and texture can all figure in the contents of visual experience. The controversy begins when we ask whether any properties besides these (...)
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  • The Significance of High-Level Content.Nicholas Silins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):13-33.
    This paper is an essay in counterfactual epistemology. What if experience have high-level contents, to the effect that something is a lemon or that someone is sad? I survey the consequences for epistemology of such a scenario, and conclude that many of the striking consequences could be reached even if our experiences don't have high-level contents.
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  • Looks and Perceptual Justification.Matthew McGrath - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):110-133.
    Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks (...)
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  • Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath.Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):749-757.
    Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath each contributed to a symposium on "The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience" in Philosophical Studies. These are my replies their contributions.
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  • Unconscious Perceptual Justification.Jacob Berger, Bence Nanay & Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):569-589.
    Perceptual experiences justify beliefs. A perceptual experience of a dog justifies the belief that there is a dog present. But there is much evidence that perceptual states can occur without being conscious, as in experiments involving masked priming. Do unconscious perceptual states provide justification as well? The answer depends on one’s theory of justification. While most varieties of externalism seem compatible with unconscious perceptual justification, several theories have recently afforded to consciousness a special role in perceptual justification. We argue that (...)
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  • The Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Learning.Elijah Chudnoff - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):520-542.
    First impressions suggest the following contrast between perception and memory: perception generates new beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs; memory preserves old beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs. In this paper, I argue that reflection on perceptual learning gives us reason to adopt an alternative picture on which perception plays both generative and preservative epistemic roles.
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  • The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722.
    In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.
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  • The Epistemic Force of Perceptual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):87-100.
    What is the metaphysical nature of perceptual experience? What evidence does experience provide us with? These questions are typically addressed in isolation. In order to make progress in answering both questions, perceptual experience needs to be studied in an integrated manner. I develop a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perceptual experience, by arguing that sensory states provide perceptual evidence due to their metaphysical structure. More specifically, I argue that sensory states are individuated by the perceptual capacities (...)
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  • The Contents of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the contents of perception.
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  • Perceptual Confidence.John Morrison - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):15-48.
    Perceptual Confidence is the view that perceptual experiences assign degrees of confidence. After introducing, clarifying, and motivating Perceptual Confidence, I catalogue some of its more interesting consequences, such as the way it blurs the distinction between veridical and illusory experiences, a distinction that is sometimes said to carry a lot of metaphysical weight. I also explain how Perceptual Confidence fills a hole in our best scientific theories of perception and why it implies that experiences don't have objective accuracy conditions.
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  • The Agony of Defeat?Nicholas Silins - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):505-532.
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  • Can Disjunctivists Explain Our Access to the Sensible World?Adam Pautz - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):384-433.
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