- In what sense is knowledge the Norm of assertion?Pascal Engel - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):45-59.details
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The Lottery Paradox and the Pragmatics of Belief.Igor Douven - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):351-373.details
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The evidential support theory of conditionals.Igor Douven - 2008 - Synthese 164 (1):19-44.details
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In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno.Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (2):289-297.details
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Fitch’s Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism.Igor Douven - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):149-182.details
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Deflating the correspondence intuition.Igor Douven & Frank Hindriks - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (3):315–329.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Assertion, Moore, and Bayes.Igor Douven - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361-375.details
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A Principled Solution to Fitch’s Paradox.Igor Douven - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (1):47-69.details
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Unzipping the Zetetic Turn.David Domínguez - 2023 - Synthese 202 (6):1-29.details
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Relevance and Non-Factive Knowledge Attributions.Filippo Domaneschi & Simona Di Paola - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (1):83-115.details
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No Hope for Conciliationism.Jonathan Dixon - 2024 - Synthese 203 (148):1-30.details
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Epistemic contextualism can be stated properly.Alexander Dinges - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3541-3556.details
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Knowledge, conservatism, and pragmatics.Paul Dimmock & Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3239-3269.details
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Can probability theory explain why closure is both intuitive and prone to counterexamples?Marcello Di Bello - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2145-2168.details
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Epistemic closure, assumptions and topics of inquiry.Marcello Di Bello - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3977-4002.details
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Science, assertion, and the common ground.Corey Dethier - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-19.details
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The Conditionals of Deliberation.K. DeRose - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):1-42.details
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Replies to Nagel, Ludlow, and Fantl and McGrath. [REVIEW]Keith Derose - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):703-721.details
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Assertions and future tense semantics.Ciro De Florio & Aldo Frigerio - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4729-4747.details
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Contextualismo y testimonio.Leandro De Brasi - 2014 - Análisis Filosófico 34 (1):61-75.details
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Knowledge claims and context: belief.Wayne A. Davis - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):399-432.details
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Knowledge claims and context: loose use.Wayne A. Davis - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):395-438.details
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Grice’s Razor and Epistemic Invariantism.Wayne A. Davis - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:147-176.details
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Epistemology and HIV Transmission.Lacey J. Davidson & Mark Satta - 2021 - In Heidi Elizabeth Grasswick & Nancy Arden McHugh (eds.), Making the Case: Feminist and Critical Race Philosophers Engage Case Studies. Albany: SUNY Press. pp. 241-267.details
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Berg’s Answer to Frege’s Puzzle.Wayne A. Davis - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):19-34.details
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Scientific Conclusions Need Not Be Accurate, Justified, or Believed by their Authors.Haixin Dang & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - Synthese 199:8187–8203.details
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Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account.Eleonora Cresto - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3737-3753.details
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Belief and contextual acceptance.Eleonora Cresto - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):41-66.details
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Two claims about epistemic propriety.E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):471-488.details
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Does knowledge secure warrant to assert?E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):285 - 300.details
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Pritchard, Revisionism and Warranted Assertability.Nathan Cockram - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (4):439-454.details
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Assertion, Belief, and Context.Roger Clarke - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4951-4977.details
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Intrinsic Interferers and the Epistemology of Dispositions.Sungho Choi - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):199-232.details
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What Are the Pragmatics of Explanation?John W. Carroll - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (3):337-357.details
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Not Knowing a Cat is a Cat: Analyticity and Knowledge Ascriptions.J. Adam Carter, Martin Peterson & Bart van Bezooijen - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):817-834.details
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Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (4):615-635.details
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Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
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Dogmatism and Inquiry.Sam Carter & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - Mind.details
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Conditional Collapse.Sam Carter - 2023 - Mind 132 (528):971-1004.details
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Pluralistic skepticism: Advertisement for speech act pluralism.Herman Cappelen - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):15–39.details
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Gettier Made ESEE.Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (3):368-383.details
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Looking beyond reductionism and anti-reductionism.Felix Bräuer - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):230-248.details
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Assertion: The Constitutive Rule Account and the Engagement Condition Objection.Felix Bräuer - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2259–2276.details
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Aesthetic Testimony and Aesthetic Authenticity.Felix Bräuer - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (3):395–416.details
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The knowledge Norm for assertion.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):89-103.details
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Shifty talk: knowledge and causation.Jessica Brown - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):183-199.details
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Knowledge and Assertion.Jessica Brown - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.details
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Cognitive diversity and epistemic norms.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):326-342.details
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