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Knowledge and the norms of assertion.John Koethe - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):625-638.details
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How to Formulate Arguments from Easy Knowledge.Alexander Jackson - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):341-356.details
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Knowledge of Future Contingents.Andrea Iacona - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):447-467.details
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Credible Futures.Andrea Iacona & Samuele Iaquinto - 2021 - Synthese 199:10953-10968.details
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Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.details
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Probabilistic Proofs, Lottery Propositions, and Mathematical Knowledge.Yacin Hamami - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):77-89.details
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Norms of Constatives.Grzegorz Gaszczyk - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):517-536.details
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Lotteries, knowledge, and inconsistent belief: why you know your ticket will lose.Mylan Engel - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7891-7921.details
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A noncontextualist account of contextualist linguistic data.Mylan Engel - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (2):56-79.details
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The evidential support theory of conditionals.Igor Douven - 2008 - Synthese 164 (1):19-44.details
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Nelkin on the lottery paradox.Igor Douven - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):395-404.details
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Nelkin on the Lottery Paradox.Igor Douven - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):395-404.details
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Knowledge and practical reasoning.Igor Douven - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):101–118.details
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Knowledge and Practical Reasoning.Igor Douven - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):101-118.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Assertion, Moore, and Bayes.Igor Douven - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361-375.details
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Belief and certainty.Dylan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4597-4621.details
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Confusion about concessive knowledge attributions.Dylan Dodd - 2010 - Synthese 172 (3):381 - 396.details
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Against Fallibilism.Dylan Dodd - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):665 - 685.details
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Epistemic closure, assumptions and topics of inquiry.Marcello Di Bello - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3977-4002.details
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Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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The Problem of Easy Justification: An Investigation of Evidence, Justification, and Reliability.Samuel Alexander Taylor - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Iowadetails
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Defending Philosophy in the Face of Systematic Disagreement.Sanford Goldberg - 2013 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge. pp. 277-294.details
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Evaluating beliefs.Alexander Paul Vincent Jackson - unknowndetails
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From Virtue Epistemology to Abilism: Theoretical and Empirical Developments.John Turri - 2015 - In Christian B. Miller, Michael R. Furr, William Fleeson & Angela Knobel (eds.), Character: new directions from philosophy, psychology, and theology. Oxford: pp. 315-330.details
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Lotteries, Possibility and Skepticism.Daniel Immerman - 2015 - Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 12:51-67.details
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