CHAPTER ONE of Arien Mack and Irvin Rock Inattentional Blindness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

What is attention? Attention is often seen as a subject matter for the hard sciences of cognitive and brain processes, and is understood in terms of sub-personal mechanisms and processes. Correspondingly, there still is a stark contrast between the central role attention plays for the empirical investigation of the mind in psychology and the neurosciences, and its relative neglect in philosophy. Yet, over the past years, several philosophers have challenged the standard conception. A number of interesting philosophical questions concerning the (...) nature of attention arise. This article provides an introduction to contemporary debates concerning these questions. In particular, it discusses the question of how the pre-theoretic conception of attention might be reconciled with a scientific conception, arguments that provide support for an anti-reductivist theory of attention, and sketches several recent anti-reductivist theories and their inter-relations. (shrink)

Memmert tried to foster the development of attentional research by discussing four differences between attentional misdirection and inattentional blindness . Considering this goal, the comment was received in the intended way by the comments of 18 and 14 who make a number of highly valuable suggestions for further progress. As initially suggested by Memmert this dialog should help unravel the underlying attentional mechanisms of different paradigms. Therefore, we first discuss the suggested distinction between central and spatial IB by Most . (...) Second, we argue that working memory and perceptual load research seem particularly interesting in this regard and should be taken into consideration when conducting future research along the lines of IB and AM. Third, representative task designs can be an important mosaic piece in across-the-board attention theories and highly useful for deriving further testable hypothesis in naturalistic settings. The most important claim of all commentaries in this issue is that the proposed ideas can all be empirically tested and thereby contribute to the advancement of an unified theoretical framework incorporating IB, AM in consideration of overt and covert attention mechanisms. (shrink)

When the stored representation of the meaning of a stimulus is accessed through the processing of a sensory input it is maintained in an activated state for a certain amount of time that allows for further processing. This semantic activation is generally accompanied by conscious identification, which can be demonstrated by the ability of a person to perform discriminations on the basis of the meaning of the stimulus. The idea that a sensory input can give rise to semantic activation without (...) concomitant conscious identification was the central thesis of the controversial research in subliminal perception. Recently, new claims for the existence of such phenomena have arisen from studies in dichotic listening, parafoveal vision, and visual pattern masking. Because of the fundamental role played by these types of experiments in cognitive psychology, the new assertions have raised widespread interest. (shrink)

Tested the 2-process theory of detection, search, and attention presented by the current authors in a series of experiments. The studies demonstrate the qualitative difference between 2 modes of information processing: automatic detection and controlled search; trace the course of the learning of automatic detection, of categories, and of automatic-attention responses; and show the dependence of automatic detection on attending responses and demonstrate how such responses interrupt controlled processing and interfere with the focusing of attention. The learning of categories is (...) shown to improve controlled search performance. A general framework for human information processing is proposed. The framework emphasizes the roles of automatic and controlled processing. The theory is compared to and contrasted with extant models of search and attention. (shrink)

This paper looks at two puzzles raised by the phenomenon of inattentional blindness. First, how can we see at all if, in order to see, we must first perceptually attend to that which we see? Second, if attention is required for perception, why does it seem to us as if we are perceptually aware of the whole detailed visual field when it is quite clear that we do not attend to all that detail? We offer a general framework for thinking (...) about perception and perceptual consciousness that addresses these questions and we propose, in addition, an informal account of the relation between attention and consciousness. On this view, perceptual awareness is a species of attention. (shrink)

Threat-related stimuli can capture attention. However, it remains debated whether this capture is automatic or not. To address this question, we compared attentional biases to emotional faces using a dot-probe task (DPT) where emotion was never goal-relevant (Experiment 1) or made directly task-relevant by means of induction trials (Experiments 2–3). Moreover, the contingency between the DPT and induction trials was either partial (Experiment 2) or full (Experiment 3). Eye-tracking was used to ascertain that the emotional cue and the subsequent target (...) were processed with peripheral vision. Experiments 1 and 2 both showed that negative faces captured attention, with faster target processing when it appeared on the same side as the preceding fearful face (i.e. fear-valid trials) compared to the opposite side where the neutral face was shown (i.e. fear-invalid trials), but also when it appeared on the side of the preceding neutral face (i.e. happy-invalid trials) compared to the happy face (i.e. happy-valid trials). Importantly, this preferential spatial orienting to negative emotion was not observed in Experiment 3, where the goal relevance of emotion was high. However, in that experiment, fearful faces produced a specific attentional bias during the DPT, which was mostly driven by the induction trials themselves. (shrink)

Attention has become an important focal point of recent work in ethics and epistemology, yet philosophers continue to be noncommittal about what attention is. In this paper, I defend attention as selection for action in a weak form, namely that selection for action is sufficient for attention. I show that selection for action in this form is part of how we, the folk, experience it and how the cognitive scientist studies it. That is, selection for action pulls empirical and folk-psychology (...) together. Accordingly, philosophers who take seriously either source have reason to work with selection for action as their starting conception of attention. This conception provides a way to bridge empirical and philosophical concerns where attention is central. The theoretical advantages of selection for action have been obscured by the common opinion that it is easily refuted. I defend the position against many of the published objections and then deploy it to provide a foundation for the intuitive, but inchoate idea of attention being more or less, focusing on recent work in the ethics of attention. (shrink)

Predictive processing models of perception take issue with standard models of perception as hierarchical bottom-up processing modulated by memory and attention. The predictive framework posits that the brain generates predictions about stimuli, which are matched to the incoming signal. Mismatches between predictions and the incoming signal – so-called prediction errors – are then used to generate new and better predictions until the prediction errors have been minimized, at which point a perception arises. Predictive models hold that all bottom-up processes are (...) signals conveying prediction errors to higher areas, which respond by updating their predictions. We take issue with this claim and argue that object recognition requires bottom-up processing that cannot be understood in terms of prediction errors. Along the way, we expand on previous work casting doubt on the framework's ability to account for attention. Specifically, we argue that the type of attention that allows us to rapidly extract the gist of an object or scene presents an additional challenge to the predictive approach. We conclude by considering how the framework may be augmented to avoid these problems. (shrink)

According to the received view in the philosophical literature on pictorial perception, when perceiving an object in a picture, we perceive both the picture’s surface and the depicted object, but the surface is only unconsciously represented. Furthermore, it is suggested, such unconscious representation does not need attention. This poses a crucial problem, as empirical research on visual attention shows that there can hardly be any visual representation, conscious or unconscious, without attention. Secondly, according to such a received view, when looking (...) at a picture aesthetically, one both consciously represents and visually attends to both the depicted object and the picture’s surface simultaneously. Thus, contra the empirical research on attention, only conscious visual representations are coupled, by such current view, with attention. And this clearly poses a second problem, as this philosophical account is not in tune with what vision science tells us about the functioning of our visual system. Furthermore, this raises another crucial problem, namely, that of explaining why aesthetic experience of pictures does not feel odd or conflicting, since, as previously noted in the philosophical literature, and contra the received view, if we are simultaneously consciously perceiving both the picture’s surface and the depicted object, there seems to be two things, at the same time, in the foreground of one’s visual consciousness. But, if so, as suggested, this would lead to a conflicting spatial visual experience. This paper offers a new description of the role of visual attention in picture perception, which explains the difference between the usual and the aesthetic way of perceiving a depicted object, without facing the problems reported above. A crucial role in our new account is played by the notion of unconscious attention, the distinction between focal and distributed, as well as top-down and bottom-up visual attention and the relationship between visual attention and visual consciousness. The paper, thus, offers the first theory concerning the exercise of visual attention in pictorial perception that is both philosophically rigorous and empirically reliable. (shrink)

The review first discusses componential explanations of automaticity, which specify non/automaticity features (e.g., un/controlled, un/conscious, non/efficient, fast/slow) and their interrelations. Reframing these features as factors that influence processes (e.g., goals, attention, and time) broadens the range of factors that can be considered (e.g., adding stimulus intensity and representational quality). The evidence reviewed challenges the view of a perfect coherence among goals, attention, and consciousness, and supports the alternative view that (a) these and other factors influence the quality of representations in (...) an additive way (e.g., little time can be compensated by extra attention or extra stimulus intensity) and that (b) a first threshold of this quality is required for unconscious processing and a second threshold for conscious processing. The review closes with a discussion of causal explanations of automaticity, which specify factors involved in automatization such as repetition and complexity, and a discussion of mechanistic explanations, which specify the low-level processes underlying automatization. (shrink)

In the following sections, English summaries of the three studies presented in this dissertation are given. For a detailed German synopsis of the present work, see chapter 8. Research in the field of aging and dementia is a main concern as the population of elderly people is growing continuously due to increasing life expectancy and thus, an accumulative number of people who live well beyond 65 years of age run a risk of developing age-associated neurodegenerative disorders of cognitive function, such (...) as Alzheimer’s disease, emerging as a major health problem. The present work is based on growing evidence that deficits in visual selective attention occur early in the progression to AD and therefore might be present as the first non-memory deficits at the early prodromal stage of mild cognitive impairment. The present dissertation was performed to contribute to the still ongoing debate as to whether certain aspects of visual selective attention are par-ticularly vulnerable or preserved, especially at the stage of MCI, and whether attentional func-tioning might be qualitatively and/ or quantitatively different from attentional performance at the AD stage on the one hand or normal functioning on the other hand. As theoretical basis, Bundesen’s theory of visual attention was employed to assess several latent, mathematically independent and quantitative parameter es-timates which are derived from two highly comparable paradigms – computerized whole re-port and partial report of briefly presented visual letter arrays. Central conclusions arising out of TVA-based investigations point at four central strengths of this tool for attentional assessment – the quality criteria sensitivity, specificity, reliability and validity. Study 1: In AD, the amyloid cascade hypothesis assumes that rising plaque and tangle burden invokes loss of nerve cells through direct and indirect effects on synaptic, neuronal and neuritic function, resulting in progressive intellectual decline. Thus, sensitive biomarkers loading functionally on the neural alterations invoked by AD from early on, might improve the possibility to identify at risk subjects in time, providing a chance for effective treatment. The first study examined whether cognitive parameters for estimating the capacity of visual attention might serve that purpose. Based on Bundesen’s TVA, visual information uptake was analyzed in 18 subjects with probable AD, 18 subjects with amnestic MCI, and 18 healthy elderly control subjects. Groups were matched for gender, age, and education. From a whole report task requiring ver-bal report of briefly presented letters, four parameters were derived, characterizing different aspects of visual processing capacity: perceptual threshold t0, iconic memory μ, processing speed C, and visual short-term memory storage capacity K. Comparison of these attentional parameters between groups revealed an elevation of the per-ceptual threshold already in MCI subjects, while processing speed and VSTM storage capacity showed a significant decline for AD patients, only. AD patients on medication with acetyl-choline esterase inhibitors had higher processing speed, but were still below the level of MCI patients. Perceptual threshold values were significantly correlated with disease duration, but not with cognitive measures. Conversely, speed and VSTM were significantly related to cog-nitive scores, but not to disease duration. In particular, VSTM storage was related to neurop-sychological tasks applying visual material, while speed showed an additional relationship also to measures of verbal memory. These results indicate a staged pattern of deficits affecting pre-attentive visual processing in MCI, and attentive processing in AD. They fit into the amyloid cascade hypothesis according to which the neuropathology of AD is characterized by a net accumulation and deposition of β-amyloid in the initial phase, giving rise to neuronal and neuritic dysfunction. Later, gradual neuronal loss and transmitter disturbances finally cause the increasing intellectual de-cline during further progression of the disease. A threshold elevation may thus be considered as a possible index of impaired neuronal functioning prior to cell death, while speed and VSTM deficits may be indicative already of a substantial loss of neuronal cell assemblies and a degeneration of neurotransmitter systems. Study 2: AD is the most frequent form of dementia which appears both as a familial and a sporadic va-riant. In the by far more frequent sporadic form, a genetic risk factor is also implicated, in that carriers of the apolipoprotein E ε4 allele have a 3 to 15 times higher risk of develop-ing the disease, compared to non-carriers. Using an identical TVA-based partial report paradigm as in the present study, Finke et al. had found a close relationship between the severity of the underlying genetic pathology in another neurodegenerative, namely Huntington’s, disease and the direction and degree of spatial attentional weighting. Sensitive tools for assessing selective visual attention might serve as early cognitive markers in the course of AD and therefore enhance the identification rate of at-risk subjects at the MCI stage as well as of subjects with underlying genetic risk. The second study aimed at examining whether attentional parameters of visuospatial and task-related selection are appropriate means for that purpose. Visual selective attention was investigated in 32 patients with amnestic MCI, 16 patients with probable AD, and 36 healthy elderly control subjects. Groups were matched for age, gender and educational level. In combination with Bundesen’s TVA, two mathematically in-dependent and quantitative parameter estimates were derived from a partial report of briefly presented letter arrays: top-down control of attentional selection, representing task-related at-tentional weighting for prioritizing relevant visual objects, and spatial distribution of atten-tional weights across the left and right visual hemifield. Compared to controls, MCI patients showed significantly reduced top-down controlled selec-tion which further deteriorated in AD subjects. Moreover, attentional weighting was signifi-cantly unbalanced across hemifields in MCI and tended to be more lateralized in AD. The ma-jority of patients was biased to the left. Across MCI and AD patients, ApoE4 carriers revealed a leftward spatial bias. The leftward bias was the more pronounced the younger the ApoE4-positive patients and the earlier disease onset. ApoE4-negative subjects showed balanced attentional weighting. These results indicate that impaired top-down control may be linked to early dysfunction of cortico-cortical networks connecting parietal and frontal lobes. Accompanying, an early inter-hemispheric asymmetry in temporo-parietal cortical interactions might cause a pathological spatial bias. As the inheritance of ApoE4 is associated with an interhemispheric imbalance in parietal cortical interactions, a pathological spatial bias may function as early cognitive marker for detecting subjects at risk for probable AD. Study 3: In the latter study, the TVA-based partial report paradigm proved to be a sensitive tool for ve-rifying that both, deficits in task-related selection and a pathological attentional imbalance, are already present at the early stage of amnestic MCI and increase further at the AD stage. It was hypothesized that these deficiencies in selective attention may result from an early disconnection syndrome and an interhemispheric imbalance in cortical interactions, respectively, in the fronto-parietal attention network, before gradual neuronal loss leads to further decline in selective attentional and intellectual functions at later stages. In the third study, these hypotheses were tested by investigat-ing the relationship of both partial report parameters, top-down control α and especially the laterality index of attentional weighting wλ, to regional glucose metabolism measured by rest-ing-state positron emission tomography in a sample of 30 amnestic MCI or mild AD patients. Hypometabolism across all patients was slightly increased in the left hemisphere. Interestingly, the more reduced the metabolism in the left temporo-parietal junction the more pro-nounced was the top-down control deficit. Accordingly, hypometabolism in the left TPJ pre-dicted the magnitude of the spatial bias. Furthermore, relative hypometabolism in the left TPJ and left inferior parietal lobe as compared to the right TPJ and right IPL, respectively, was correlated with direction and degree of spatial bias. Taken together, PET imaging results support the hypotheses that, one the one hand, early def-icits in task-related weighting may result from a fronto-parietal disconnection syndrome al-ready at the stage of MCI. On the other hand, very early AD seems to be also associated with an interhemispheric imbalance of metabolism, particularly in the temporo-parietal cortices, resulting in a correspondingly directed and distinctive visuo-spatial attentional bias. Conclusions and outlook: This dissertation intended to investigate the probable valuable contribution of the whole and partial report of briefly presented letter arrays based on Bundesen’s theory of visual attention in assessing am-nestic MCI and AD patients in comparison to healthy elderly control subjects. The results of the three presented studies suggest a staging model of visual selective atten-tional impairments in MCI and AD. Deficits of pre-attentive processing, task-related and spatial weighting were already detectable in MCI patients, while aspects of processing capacity were still intact. At a later stage of the disease, further deterioration of top-down control α and increasing lateralization of spatial weighting wλ accompanied impairments in perceptual processing speed C and VSTM storage capacity K. In conclusion, the TVA-based assessment of selective visual attention proved to be a sensitive diagnostic tool for revealing subtle deficits already at the stage of MCI which might exhibit the capability of an early cognitive marker for the identification of subjects at risk of AD. To address this question, this survey needs to be complemented by longitudinal studies. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to shape a theoretical framework of attentiveness in care, which may function as a background to study attentiveness in a health care setting empirically. More insight into the functions, forms, and aspects of attentiveness in a particular health care setting is important, as there is a lack of indicators and criteria that enable a sharp picture of the caring side of health provision. The concept of attentiveness and its relation to care have seldom been (...) examined thoroughly and broadly. This article argues that attentiveness is constitutive for good care, as it can create a space in which a relationship may arise. (shrink)

Inattentional blindness is described as the failure to perceive a supra-threshold stimulus when attention is directed away from that stimulus. Based on performance on an explicit recognition memory test and concurrent functional imaging data Rees, Russell, Frith, and Driver [Rees, G., Russell, C., Frith, C. D., & Driver, J. . Inattentional blindness versus inattentional amnesia for fixated but ignored words. Science, 286, 2504–2507] reported inattentional blindness for word stimuli that were fixated but ignored. The present study examined both explicit and (...) implicit memory for fixated but ignored words using a selective-attention task in which overlapping picture/word stimuli were presented at fixation. No explicit awareness of the unattended words was apparent on a recognition memory test. Analysis of an implicit memory task, however, indicated that unattended words were perceived at a perceptual level. Thus, the selective-attention task did not result in perfect filtering as suggested by Rees et al. While there was no evidence of conscious perception, subjects were not blind to the implicit perceptual properties of fixated but ignored words. (shrink)

We discuss potential benefits of research in which attention is directed toward or away from a spoken channel and measures of the allocation of attention are used. This type of research is relevant to at least two basic, still-unresolved issues in cognitive psychology: the extent to which unattended information is processed and the extent to which unattended information that is processed can later be remembered. Four recent studies of this type that address these questions in various ways are reviewed as (...) illustrations. We conclude from these studies that unattended information appears to be partially processed automatically, though attention enhances the processing considerably, and the unattended information that is processed may not be retrievable in direct or many indirect memory tasks, though it remains possible that there is an automatically stored memory trace. (shrink)

Attention is necessary for the conscious perception of any object. Objects not attended to are not seen. What is it that captures attention when we are engaged in some attention-absorbing task? Earlier research has shown that there are only a very few stimuli which have this power and therefore are reliably detected under these conditions . The two most reliable are the observer’s own name and a happy face icon which seem to capture attention by virtue of their meaning. Three (...) experiments are described which explore whether these stimuli are detected under conditions, heretofore unexamined, which either cause inattentional blindness or are associated with a perceptual failure associated with the limits of attention. The evidence obtained indicates that these stimuli have a unique capacity to capture and extend the limits of attention under conditions in which this has been deemed highly unlikely. (shrink)

I have two goals in this paper. First, I want to show by example that inferences about theoretical entities are relatively contingent affairs. Previously accepted conceptual metaphors in science set both the general form of new theories and our acceptance of the theories as plausible. In addition, they determine how we define the relevant parameters in investigating phenomena in the first place. These items then determine how we conceptualize things in the world. Second, and maybe more importantly, I want to (...) solve a puzzle that falls out of our current explication of attention, namely why we have it. Given the now widely accepted view that our brains are massively parallel, it is difficult to see why we should have evolved attentional mechanisms at all. Why gate when we can already process what we transduce in parallel? Here I answer that puzzle and suggest a perspective on attention that makes it a bit easier to understand, although this perspective also entails that we have to revise how we individuate experimental protocols and relevant data. (shrink)

This article investigates how auditory attention affects inattentional blindness , a failure of conscious awareness in which an observer does not notice an unexpected event because their attention is engaged elsewhere. Previous research using the attentional blink paradigm has indicated that listening to music can reduce failures of conscious awareness. It was proposed that listening to music would decrease IB by reducing observers’ frequency of task-unrelated thoughts . Observers completed an IB task that varied both visual and auditory demands. Listening (...) to music was associated with significantly lower IB, but only when observers actively attended to the music. Follow-up experiments suggest this was due to the distracting qualities of the audio task. The results also suggest a complex relationship between IB and TUTs: during demanding tasks, as predicted, noticers of the unexpected stimulus reported fewer TUTs than non-noticers. During less demanding tasks, however, noticers reported more TUTs than non-noticers. (shrink)