Citations of:
Deference Done Better
Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):99150 (2021)
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An indifference principle says that your credences should be distributed uniformly over each of the possibilities you recognise. A chance deference principle says that your credences should be aligned with the chances. My thesis is that, if we are antiHumeans about chance, then these two principles are incompatible. AntiHumeans think that it is possible for the actual frequencies to depart from the chances. So long as you recognise possibilities like this, you cannot both spread your credences evenly and defer to (...) 

A norm of local expert deference says that your credence in an arbitrary proposition A, given that the expert's probability for A is n, should be n. A norm of global expert deference says that your credence in A, given that the expert's entire probability function is E, should be E(A). Gaifman (1988) taught us that these two norms are not equivalent. Here, I provide characterisation theorems which tell us precisely when the norms give different advice. They tell us that, (...) 

Principles of expert deference say that you should align your credences with those of an expert. This expert could be your doctor, the objective chances, or your future self, after you've learnt something new. These kinds of principles face difficulties in cases in which you are uncertain of the truthconditions of the thoughts in which you invest credence, as well as cases in which the thoughts have different truthconditions for you and the expert. For instance, you shouldn't defer to your (...) 