- Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
|
|
Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
|
|
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.details
|
|
(1 other version)Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
|
|
A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance.David K. Lewis - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 263-293.details
|
|
Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Studia Logica 16:119-122.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.details
|
|
(1 other version)A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
|
|
(1 other version)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
|
|
(1 other version)Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235–256.details
|
|
Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
|
|
(1 other version)Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
|
|
Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
|
|
(1 other version)Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I. Normal Propositional Calculi.Saul A. Kripke - 1963 - Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 9 (5‐6):67-96.details
|
|
Information Structure in Discourse: Towards an Integrated Formal Theory of Pragmatics.Craige Roberts - 1996 - Semantics and Pragmatics 5:1-69.details
|
|
(1 other version)Belief and the will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 235-256.details
|
|
Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 263-297.details
|
|
Questions in montague english.Charles L. Hamblin - 1973 - Foundations of Language 10 (1):41-53.details
|
|
The Value of Biased Information.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):25-55.details
|
|
Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.details
|
|
Towards a Best Predictive System Account of Laws of Nature.Chris Dorst - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):877-900.details
|
|
Bridging Rationality and Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):633-657.details
|
|
Conditionalization Does Not Maximize Expected Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1155-1187.details
|
|
Correcting the guide to objective chance.Ned Hall - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):505-518.details
|
|
Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism.Ginger Schultheis - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):863-879.details
|
|
The puzzle of the unmarked clock and the new rational reflection principle.Adam Elga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):127-139.details
|
|
Distorted reflection.Rachael Briggs - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85.details
|
|
Higher-order uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.details
|
|
Updating for Externalists.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):487-516.details
|
|
On the principle of total evidence.Irving John Good - 1966 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4):319-321.details
|
|
An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence.Miriam Schoenfield - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):690-715.details
|
|
Akratic (epistemic) modesty.David Christensen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2191-2214.details
|
|
Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):511-534.details
|
|
(1 other version)Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 176-194.details
|
|
The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory.Jason Konek & Ben Levinstein - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):69-107.details
|
|
Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):342-370.details
|
|
Foundations and Applications of Inductive Probability.Roger D. Rosenkrantz - 1981 - Ridgeview Press.details
|
|
Chilling out on epistemic rationality: A defense of imprecise credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.details
|
|
New Rational Reflection and Internalism about Rationality.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
|
|
The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments.Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):691-728.details
|
|
A Pragmatist’s Guide to Epistemic Utility.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (4):613-638.details
|
|
Higher order degrees of belief.Brian Skyrms - 1980 - In David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Memory of F P Ramsey. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 109--137.details
|
|
Accuracy, Deference, and Chance.Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):43-87.details
|
|
Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals.Sophie Horowitz - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning.Hanti Lin & Kevin Kelly - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):957-981.details
|
|
Conditionalization, cogency, and cognitive value.Graham Oddie - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4):533-541.details
|
|