- Slim Epistemology with a Thick Skin.Pekka Väyrynen - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (3):389-412.details
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Sensuous content.J. Christopher Maloney - 1986 - Philosophical Papers 15 (November):131-54.details
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Perception and conceptual content.Alex Byrne - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 231--250.details
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Experience, Seemings, and Evidence.Indrek Reiland - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):510-534.details
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Probabilistic Justification Logic.Joseph Lurie - 2018 - Philosophies 3 (1):2-0.details
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Representation is representation of similarities.Shimon Edelman - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):449-467.details
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Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.details
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The Descent of Shame.Heidi L. Maibom - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):566 - 594.details
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On the distinction between semantic and conceptual representation.Fernando Martínez-Manrique - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (1):57-78.details
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A Defense of Russellian Descriptivism.Brandt H. van der Gaast - unknowndetails
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Asymmetric Dependence, Representation, and Cognitive Science.Charles Wallis - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):373-401.details
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The Structuring Causes of Behavior: Has Dretske Saved Mental Causation?Frank Hofmann & Peter Https://Orcidorg288X Schulte - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):267-284.details
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Taking the intentional stance seriously.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):379-390.details
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Perceptual representations: a teleosemantic answer to the breadth-of-application problem.Peter Https://Orcidorg288X Schulte - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (1):119-136.details
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Nonhuman intentional systems.H. S. Terrace - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):378-379.details
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A better way to deal with selection.B. F. Skinner - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):377-378.details
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Steps toward an ethological science.Mark S. Seidenberg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):377-377.details
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Content and consciousness versus the International stance.Alexander Rosenberg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):375-376.details
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Intentions and adaptations.H. L. Roitblat - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):375-375.details
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International plovers or just dump brids?Carolyn A. Ristau - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):373-375.details
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The International stance faces backward.Howard Rachlin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):373-373.details
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Dennett's rational animals: And how behavorism overlooked them.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):372-373.details
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Parlez-vous baboon, Bwana Sherlock?E. W. Menzel - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):371-372.details
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Adaptation and satisficing.John Maynard Smith - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):370-371.details
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Intentions as goads.David McFarland - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):369-370.details
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The scope and ingenuity of evolutionary systems.Dan Lloyd - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):368-369.details
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Elementary errors about evolution.Richard C. Lewontin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):367-368.details
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Dennett' “Panglossian paradigm”.Alison Jolly - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):366-367.details
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The adaptiveness_ of _mentalism?.Nicholas Humphrey - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):366-366.details
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Belief accripton, parsimony, and rationality.John Hell - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):365-366.details
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Adaptationist theorizing and intentional system theory.Gilbert Harman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):365-365.details
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Thinking about animal thoughts.Donald R. Griffin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):364-364.details
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Denoting and demoting international systems.George Graham - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):363-364.details
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Lloyd Morgan's canon in evolutionary context.Michael T. Ghiselin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):362-363.details
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A la recherche du docteur Pangloss.Niles Eldredge - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):361-362.details
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Adaptationism was always predictive and needed no defense.Richard Dawkins - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):360-361.details
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Science as an international system.Arthur C. Danto - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):359-360.details
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Dennett' instrumentalism: A frog at the bottom of the mug.Patricia Smith Churchland - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):358-359.details
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Cognitive ethology: Theory or poetry?Jonathan Bennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):356-358.details
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Rationality: putting the issue to the scientific community.John Beatty - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):355-356.details
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Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The 'panglossian paradigm' defended.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):343-90.details
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Rhesus monkeys are radical behaviorists.Gordon G. Gallup - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-129.details
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C. S. Peirce and Intersemiotic Translation.Joao Queiroz & Daniella Aguiar - 2015 - In Peter Pericles Trifonas (ed.), International Handbook of Semiotics. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 201-215.details
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Causal Explanation in Psychiatry.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - In Bluhm Robyn & Tekin Serife (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Psychiatry. Bloomsbury.details
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Literal Perceptual Inference.Alex Kiefer - 2017 - In Metzinger Thomas & Wiese Wanja (eds.), Philosophy and Predictive Processing. MIND Group.details
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Information, belief, and causal role.Paul G. Skokowski - 1999 - In Lawrence Moss, Gizburg S., Rijke Jonathaden & Maarten (eds.), Logic, Language and Computation Vol. CSLI Publications.details
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The Body and the Experience of Presence.Joerg Fingerhut - 2012 - In Jörg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive. De Gruyter. pp. 8--167.details
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Mentale Gehalte und erweiterter Geist: Warum das Argument der Nichtabgeleitetheit scheitert.Fabian Hundertmark - 2015 - In Jan G. Michel, Kim J. Boström & Michael Pohl (eds.), Ist der Geist im Kopf? Beiträge zur These des erweiterten Geistes. Brill/mentis. pp. 133-160.details
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The Rise of Cognitive Science in the 20th Century.Carrie Figdor - 2018 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge. pp. 280-302.details
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Pain: Perception or Introspection?Murat Aydede - 2017 - In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. New York: Routledge.details
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