- A New Perceptual Adverbialism.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (8):413-446.details
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Primary Intersubjectivity: Empathy, Affective Reversibility, 'Self-Affection' and the Primordial 'We'.Anya Daly - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):227-241.details
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Internal constraints for phenomenal externalists: a structure matching theory.Bryce Dalbey & Bradford Saad - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-29.details
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Unknowable Colour Facts.Brian Cutter - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):909-941.details
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Perceptual illusionism.Brian Cutter - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (4):396-417.details
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Paradise Regained: A Non-Reductive Realist Account of the Sensible Qualities.Brian Cutter - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):38-52.details
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Color and a priori knowledge.Brian Cutter - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):293-315.details
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A puzzle about the experience of left and right.Brian Cutter - 2020 - Noûs 55 (3):678-698.details
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Why it doesn’t matter to metaphysics what Mary learns.Robert Cummins, Martin Roth & Ian Harmon - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):541-555.details
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Perceptual Demonstrative Thought: A Property-Dependent Theory.Sean Crawford - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):439-457.details
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Naturalism and Intentionality: A Buddhist Epistemological Approach.Christian Coseru - 2009 - Asian Philosophy 19 (3):239-264.details
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Quotational higher-order thought theory.Sam Coleman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2705-2733.details
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Why the Intellect Cannot Have a Bodily Organ: De Anima 3.4.Caleb Cohoe - 2013 - Phronesis 58 (4):347-377.details
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True colours.Jonathan Cohen, C. L. Hardin & Brian P. McLaughlin - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):335-340.details
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Redder and Realer: Responses to Egan and Tye.Jonathan Cohen - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (3):313-326.details
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Précis: The Emotional Mind: A Control Theory of Affective States.Tom Cochrane - 2024 - Journal of the Philosophy of Emotion 5 (2):1-16.details
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True theories, false colors.Austen Clark - 1996 - Philosophy of Science (Supplement) 63 (3):143-50.details
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Under Pressure: Processing Representational Decoupling in False-Belief Tasks.Anna Ciaunica - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):527-542.details
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Non-transitive looks & fallibilism.Philippe Chuard - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (2):161 - 200.details
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Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs: How Peircean Semiotics Combines Phenomenal Qualia and Practical Effects.Marc Champagne - 2018 - Cham: Springer.details
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Attentional Structuring, Subjectivity, and the Ubiquity of Reflexive Inner Awareness.Amit Chaturvedi - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Sensorimotor expectations and the visual field.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):3991-4006.details
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Odors, Objects and Olfaction.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):81-94.details
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Naïve Realism and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):391-412.details
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Extended cognition, personal responsibility, and relational autonomy.Mason Cash - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):645-671.details
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Why the question of animal consciousness might not matter very much.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):83-102.details
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Suffering without subjectivity.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (2):99-125.details
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Reductive explanation and the "explanatory gap".Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):153-174.details
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Stained Glass as a Model for Consciousness.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):90-103.details
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Again, what the philosophy of biology is not.Werner Callebaut - 2005 - Acta Biotheoretica 53 (2):93-122.details
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Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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Hill on mind.Alex Byrne - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173:831-39.details
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How hard are the sceptical paradoxes?Alex Byrne - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):299–325.details
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Hallucination and Its Objects.Alex Byrne & Riccardo Manzotti - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):327-359.details
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Color realism and color science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.details
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Color realism revisited.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):791-793.details
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Color and the Mind‐Body Problem.Alex Byrne - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):223-44.details
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Consciousness and nonconceptual content. [REVIEW]Alex Byrne - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):261-274.details
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The Cartesian other.Alex Burri - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):325-342.details
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Reidian Dual Component Theory defended.Todd Buras - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1):4-24.details
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Editorial: Objects and Sound Perception. [REVIEW]Nicolas J. Bullot & Paul Égré - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (1):5-17.details
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Emergent Mental Properties are Not Just Double-Preventers.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jessica Hawkins - 2023 - Synthese 202 (2):1-22.details
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Type 2 blindsight and the nature of visual experience.Berit Brogaard - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 32:92-103.details
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Strong representationalism and centered content.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):373 - 392.details
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Representationalism and the determinacy of visual content.Ben Bronner - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):227-239.details
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The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind.Selmer Bringsjord - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):41-69.details
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Consciousness, self-consciousness, and the modern self.Klaus Brinkmann - 2005 - History of the Human Sciences 18 (4):27-48.details
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Meditation and the Scope of Mental Action.Michael Brent & Candace Upton - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (1):52-71.details
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Consciousness and content in perception.Bill Brewer - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):41-54.details
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Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl.Matt E. M. Bower - 2019 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (2):211-243.details
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