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  1. Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism.Jared Warren - 2020 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    What is the source of logical and mathematical truth? This book revitalizes conventionalism as an answer to this question. Conventionalism takes logical and mathematical truth to have their source in linguistic conventions. This was an extremely popular view in the early 20th century, but it was never worked out in detail and is now almost universally rejected in mainstream philosophical circles. Shadows of Syntax is the first book-length treatment and defense of a combined conventionalist theory of logic and mathematics. It (...)
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  • Killing Kripkenstein's Monster.Jared Warren - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):257-289.
    Here I defend dispositionalism about meaning and rule-following from Kripkenstein's infamous anti-dispositionalist arguments. The problems of finitude, error, and normativity are all addressed. The general lesson I draw is that Kripkenstein's arguments trade on an overly simplistic version of dispositionalism.
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  • In defence of error theory.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (2):209-230.
    Many contemporary philosophers rate error theories poorly. We identify the arguments these philosophers invoke, and expose their deficiencies. We thereby show that the prospects for error theory have been systematically underestimated. By undermining general arguments against all error theories, we leave it open whether any more particular arguments against particular error theories are more successful. The merits of error theories need to be settled on a case-by-case basis: there is no good general argument against error theories.
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  • Wittgenstein on Going On.Hannah Ginsborg - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):1-17.
    In a famous passage from the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein describes a pupil who has been learning to write out various sequences of numbers in response to orders such as “+1” and “+2”. He has shown himself competent for numbers up to 1000, but when we have him continue the “+2” sequence beyond 1000, he writes the numerals 1004, 1008, 1012. As Wittgenstein describes the case: We say to him, “Look what you’re doing!” — He doesn’t understand us. We say “You (...)
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  • Showing Mathematical Flies the Way Out of Foundational Bottles: The Later Wittgenstein as a Forerunner of Lakatos and the Philosophy of Mathematical Practice.José Antonio Pérez-Escobar - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):157-178.
    This work explores the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics in relation to Lakatos’ philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of mathematical practice. I argue that, while the philosophy of mathematical practice typically identifies Lakatos as its earliest of predecessors, the later Wittgenstein already developed key ideas for this community a few decades before. However, for a variety of reasons, most of this work on philosophy of mathematics has gone relatively unnoticed. Some of these ideas and their significance as precursors for (...)
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  • The Demands of Self-Constraint: Diagnosis and Idealism in Wittgenstein, Diamond, and Kant.Jens Pier - 2024 - In Herbert Hrachovec & Jakub Mácha (eds.), Platonism: Proceedings of the 43rd International Wittgenstein Symposium. Berlin: De Gruyter.
    The legacy of the Platonic dialogues may well lie, not in any classical idealist “doctrine of forms,” but in an inquisitive stance towards the puzzle behind any such doctrine—how thought can be about anything at all. This Platonic puzzle may, however, yield a different guise of idealism that is recognizably diagnostic: it aims to dispel our worry about thought’s objectivity as a confusion, engendered by a self-alienation of thought. These themes of diagnosis and idealism resurface in Wittgenstein, who in his (...)
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  • Logic of paradox revisited.Graham Priest - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):153 - 179.
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  • Revisiting Quine on Truth by Convention.Jared Warren - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (2):119-139.
    In “Truth by Convention” W.V. Quine gave an influential argument against logical conventionalism. Even today his argument is often taken to decisively refute logical conventionalism. Here I break Quine’s arguments into two— the super-task argument and the regress argument—and argue that while these arguments together refute implausible explicit versions of conventionalism, they cannot be successfully mounted against a more plausible implicit version of conventionalism. Unlike some of his modern followers, Quine himself recognized this, but argued that implicit conventionalism was explanatorily (...)
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  • Truthmakers and Modality.Ross Paul Cameron - 2008 - Synthese 164 (2):261 - 280.
    This paper attempts to locate, within an actualist ontology, truthmakers for modal truths: truths of the form or . In Sect. 1 I motivate the demand for substantial truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 21 criticise Armstrong's account of truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 31 examine essentialism and defend an account of what makes essentialist attributions true, but I argue that this does not solve the problem of modal truth in general. In Sect. 41 discuss, and dismiss, a theistic (...)
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  • Assertion, denial and non-classical theories.Greg Restall - 2012 - In Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer. pp. 81--99.
    In this paper I urge friends of truth-value gaps and truth-value gluts – proponents of paracomplete and paraconsistent logics – to consider theories not merely as sets of sentences, but as pairs of sets of sentences, or what I call ‘bitheories,’ which keep track not only of what holds according to the theory, but also what fails to hold according to the theory. I explain the connection between bitheories, sequents, and the speech acts of assertion and denial. I illustrate the (...)
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  • Essence and Explanation.Albert Casullo - 2020 - Metaphysics 2 (1):88-96.
    In Necessary Beings, Bob Hale addresses two questions: What is the source of necessity? What is the source of our knowledge of it? He offers novel responses to them in terms of the metaphysical notion of nature or, more familiarly, essence. In this paper, I address Hale’s response to the first question. My assessment is negative. I argue that his essentialist explanation of the source of necessity suffers from three significant shortcomings. First, Hale’s leading example of an essentialist explanation merely (...)
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  • Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications.Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.) - 2012 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    A logic is called 'paraconsistent' if it rejects the rule called 'ex contradictione quodlibet', according to which any conclusion follows from inconsistent premises. While logicians have proposed many technically developed paraconsistent logical systems and contemporary philosophers like Graham Priest have advanced the view that some contradictions can be true, and advocated a paraconsistent logic to deal with them, until recent times these systems have been little understood by philosophers. This book presents a comprehensive overview on paraconsistent logical systems to change (...)
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  • How Are A Priori Truths Possible?1.Christopher Peacocke - 1993 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):175-199.
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  • The gödel paradox and Wittgenstein's reasons.Francesco Berto - 2009 - Philosophia Mathematica 17 (2):208-219.
    An interpretation of Wittgenstein’s much criticized remarks on Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem is provided in the light of paraconsistent arithmetic: in taking Gödel’s proof as a paradoxical derivation, Wittgenstein was drawing the consequences of his deliberate rejection of the standard distinction between theory and metatheory. The reasoning behind the proof of the truth of the Gödel sentence is then performed within the formal system itself, which turns out to be inconsistent. It is shown that the features of paraconsistent arithmetics match (...)
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  • Was Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist?Annalisa Coliva - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 33 (1):1-23.
    The paper reviews the grounds for relativist interpretations of Wittgenstein's later thought, especially in On Certainty . It distinguishes between factual and virtual forms of epistemic relativism and argues that, on closer inspection, Wittgenstein's notes don't support any form of relativism – let it be factual or virtual. In passing, it considers also so-called "naturalist" readings of On Certainty , which may lend support to a relativist interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas, finds them wanting, and recommends to interpret his positive proposal (...)
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  • Conventionalism about mathematics and logic.Hartry Field - 2022 - Noûs 57 (4):815-831.
    Conventionalism about mathematics has much in common with two other views: fictionalism and the multiverse view (aka plenitudinous platonism). The three views may differ over the existence of mathematical objects, but they agree in rejecting a certain kind of objectivity claim about mathematics, advocating instead an extreme pluralism. The early parts of the paper will try to elucidate this anti‐objectivist position, and question whether conventionalism really offers a third form of it distinct from fictionalism and the multiverse view. The paper (...)
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  • Strict finitism.Crispin Wright - 1982 - Synthese 51 (2):203 - 282.
    Dummett's objections to the coherence of the strict finitist philosophy of mathematics are thus, at the present time at least, ill-taken. We have so far no definitive treatment of Sorites paradoxes; so no conclusive ground for dismissing Dummett's response — the response of simply writing off a large class of familiar, confidently handled expressions as semantically incoherent. I believe that cannot be the right response, if only because it threatens to open an unacceptable gulf between the insight into his own (...)
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  • Tba.Juliet Floyd - 2016 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 5 (2):7-89.
    [This Invited Paper will be published in December 2016.].
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  • On Saying What You Really Want to Say: Wittgenstein, Gödel and the Trisection of the Angle.Juliet Floyd - 1995 - In Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), From Dedekind to Gödel: The Foundations of Mathematics in the Early Twentieth Century, Synthese Library Vol. 251 (Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 373-426.
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  • Wittgenstein's inversion of gödel's theorem.Victor Rodych - 1999 - Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):173-206.
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  • Logical Conventionalism and the Adoption Problem.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2023 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 97 (1):47-81.
    In this paper, I take issue with a core commitment of logical conventionalism: that we impose a logic on ourselves by adopting general linguistic conventions governing our use of logical terms, thereby determining the meanings of the logical constants and which of our inferences are valid. Drawing on Kripke’s ‘adoption problem’, I argue that general logical principles cannot be adopted, either explicitly or implicitly. I go on to argue that the meanings of our logical terms, and the validity of our (...)
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  • Contradictions and falling bridges: what was Wittgenstein’s reply to Turing?Ásgeir Berg Matthíasson - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (3).
    In this paper, I offer a close reading of Wittgenstein's remarks on inconsistency, mostly as they appear in the Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. I focus especially on an objection to Wittgenstein's view given by Alan Turing, who attended the lectures, the so-called ‘falling bridges’-objection. Wittgenstein's position is that if contradictions arise in some practice of language, they are not necessarily fatal to that practice nor necessitate a revision of that practice. If we then assume that we have adopted (...)
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  • The philosophy of alternative logics.Andrew Aberdein & Stephen Read - 2009 - In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The development of modern logic. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 613-723.
    This chapter focuses on alternative logics. It discusses a hierarchy of logical reform. It presents case studies that illustrate particular aspects of the logical revisionism discussed in the chapter. The first case study is of intuitionistic logic. The second case study turns to quantum logic, a system proposed on empirical grounds as a resolution of the antinomies of quantum mechanics. The third case study is concerned with systems of relevance logic, which have been the subject of an especially detailed reform (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Wittgenstein and Idealism.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 7:76-95.
    Tractatus, 5.62 famously says: ‘… what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said but makes itself manifest. The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language mean the limits of my world.’ The later part of this repeats what was said in summary at 5.6: ‘the limits of my language mean the limits of my world’. And the key to the problem ‘how much truth there is in solipsism’ has (...)
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  • Grammar and analyticity: Wittgenstein and the logical positivists on logical and conceptual truth.Kai Michael Büttner - 2023 - Philosophical Investigations 46 (2):196-220.
    Wittgenstein's conception of logical and conceptual truth is often thought to rival that of the logical positivists. This paper argues that there are important respects in which these conceptions complement each other. Analyticity, in the positivists' sense, coincides, not with Wittgenstein's notion of a grammatical proposition, but rather with his notion of a tautology. Grammatical propositions can usually be construed as analyticity postulates in Carnap's sense of the term. This account of grammatical and analytic propositions will be illustrated by appeal (...)
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  • Strict Finitism, Feasibility, and the Sorites.Walter Dean - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (2):295-346.
    This article bears on four topics: observational predicates and phenomenal properties, vagueness, strict finitism as a philosophy of mathematics, and the analysis of feasible computability. It is argued that reactions to strict finitism point towards a semantics for vague predicates in the form of nonstandard models of weak arithmetical theories of the sort originally introduced to characterize the notion of feasibility as understood in computational complexity theory. The approach described eschews the use of nonclassical logic and related devices like degrees (...)
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  • The Possibility Bias is not Justified.Samuel Kimpton-nye - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-17.
    Necessity, but not possibility, is typically thought to be rare and suspicion-worthy. This manifests in an asymmetry in the burden of proof incurred by modal claims. In general, claims to the effect that some proposition is impossible/necessary require significant argumentative support and, in general, claims to the effect that some proposition is possible/contingent are thought to be justified freely or by default. Call this the possibility bias. In this paper, I argue that the possibility bias is not epistemically justified. We (...)
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  • Wittgenstein and Objectivity in Ethics: A Reply to Brandhorst.Benjamin De Mesel - 2016 - Philosophical Investigations 40 (1):40-63.
    In “Correspondence to Reality in Ethics”, Mario Brandhorst examines the view of ethics that Wittgenstein took in his later years. According to Brandhorst, Wittgenstein leaves room for truth and falsity, facts, correspondence and reality in ethics. Wittgenstein's target, argues Brandhorst, is objectivity. I argue that Brandhorst's arguments in favour of truth, facts, reality and correspondence in ethics invite similar arguments in favour of objectivity, that Brandhorst does not recognise this because his conception of objectivity is distorted by a Platonist picture (...)
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  • Recursive Functions and Metamathematics: Problems of Completeness and Decidability, Gödel's Theorems.Rod J. L. Adams & Roman Murawski - 1999 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer Verlag.
    Traces the development of recursive functions from their origins in the late nineteenth century to the mid-1930s, with particular emphasis on the work and influence of Kurt Gödel.
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  • Wittgenstein on Proof and Concept-Formation.Sorin Bangu - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    In his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein claims, puzzlingly, that ‘the proof creates a new concept’ (RFM III-41). This paper aims to contribute to clarifying this idea, and to showing how it marks a major break with the traditional conception of proof. Moreover, since the most natural way to understand his claim is open to criticism, a secondary goal of what follows is to offer an interpretation of it that neutralizes the objection. The discussion proceeds by analysing a (...)
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  • Carnap and Beth on the Limits of Tolerance.Benjamin Marschall - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (4):282–300.
    Rudolf Carnap’s principle of tolerance states that there is no need to justify the adoption of a logic by philosophical means. Carnap uses the freedom provided by this principle in his philosophy of mathematics: he wants to capture the idea that mathematical truth is a matter of linguistic rules by relying on a strong metalanguage with infinitary inference rules. In this paper, I give a new interpretation of an argument by E. W. Beth, which shows that the principle of tolerance (...)
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  • Thick concepts, non-cognitivism, and Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations.Adam M. Croom - 2010 - South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):286-309.
    Non-cognitivists claim that thick concepts can be disentangled into distinct descriptive and evaluative components and that since thick concepts have descriptive shape they can be mastered independently of evaluation. In Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, John McDowell uses Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to show that such a non-cognitivist view is untenable. In this paper I do several things. I describe the non-cognitivist position in its various forms and explain its driving motivations. I then explain McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism and the Wittgensteinian considerations upon (...)
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  • Making Sense of Paraconsistent Logic: The Nature of Logic, Classical Logic and Paraconsistent Logic.Koji Tanaka - 2012 - In Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer. pp. 15--25.
    Max Cresswell and Hilary Putnam seem to hold the view, often shared by classical logicians, that paraconsistent logic has not been made sense of, despite its well-developed mathematics. In this paper, I examine the nature of logic in order to understand what it means to make sense of logic. I then show that, just as one can make sense of non-normal modal logics (as Cresswell demonstrates), we can make `sense' of paraconsistent logic. Finally, I turn the tables on classical logicians (...)
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  • (1 other version)Motivating Wittgenstein's Perspective on Mathematical Sentences as Norms.Simon Friederich - 2011 - Philosophia Mathematica 19 (1):1-19.
    The later Wittgenstein’s perspective on mathematical sentences as norms is motivated for sentences belonging to Hilbertian axiomatic systems where the axioms are treated as implicit definitions. It is shown that in this approach the axioms are employed as norms in that they function as standards of what counts as using the concepts involved. This normative dimension of their mode of use, it is argued, is inherited by the theorems derived from them. Having been motivated along these lines, Wittgenstein’s perspective on (...)
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  • Hard and Blind: On Wittgenstein’s Genealogical View of Logical Necessity.Sorin Bangu - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):439-458.
    My main aim is to sketch a certain reading (‘genealogical’) of later Wittgenstein’s views on logical necessity. Along the way, I engage with the inferentialism currently debated in the literature on the epistemology of deductive logic.
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  • (1 other version)The Basis of Necessity and Possibility.Bob Hale - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:109-138.
    The article argues that modal concepts should be explained in terms of the essences or nature of things: necessarilypif, and because, there is something the nature of which ensures thatp; possiblypif, and because, there is nothing whose nature rules out its being true thatp. The theory is defended against various objections and difficulties, including ones arising from attributing essences to contingent individuals.
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  • A dilemma about necessity.Peter W. Hanks - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):129 - 148.
    The problem of the source of necessity is the problem of explaining what makes necessary truths necessarily true. Simon Blackburn has presented a dilemma intended to show that any reductive, realist account of the source of necessity is bound to fail. Although Blackburn's dilemma faces serious problems, reflection on the form of explanations of necessities reveals that a revised dilemma succeeds in defeating any reductive account of the source of necessity. The lesson is that necessity is metaphysically primitive and irreducible.
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  • Wittgenstein and finitism.Mathieu Marion - 1995 - Synthese 105 (2):141 - 176.
    In this paper, elementary but hitherto overlooked connections are established between Wittgenstein's remarks on mathematics, written during his transitional period, and free-variable finitism. After giving a brief description of theTractatus Logico-Philosophicus on quantifiers and generality, I present in the first section Wittgenstein's rejection of quantification theory and his account of general arithmetical propositions, to use modern jargon, as claims (as opposed to statements). As in Skolem's primitive recursive arithmetic and Goodstein's equational calculus, Wittgenstein represented generality by the use of free (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Wittgenstein and Idealism.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 7:76-95.
    Tractatus, 5.62 famously says: ‘… what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said but makes itself manifest. The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language mean the limits of my world.’ The later part of this repeats what was said in summary at 5.6: ‘the limits of my language mean the limits of my world’. And the key to the problem ‘how much truth there is in solipsism’ has (...)
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  • Philosophical pictures about mathematics: Wittgenstein and contradiction.Hiroshi Ohtani - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2039-2063.
    In the scholarship on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of mathematics, the dominant interpretation is a theoretical one that ascribes to Wittgenstein some type of ‘ism’ such as radical verificationism or anti-realism. Essentially, he is supposed to provide a positive account of our mathematical practice based on some basic assertions. However, I claim that he should not be read in terms of any ‘ism’ but instead should be read as examining philosophical pictures in the sense of unclear conceptions. The contrast here is (...)
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  • 3 Wittgenstein and the Inexpressible.Juliet Floyd - 2007 - In Alice Crary (ed.), Wittgenstein and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Cora Diamond. MIT Press. pp. 177-234.
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  • The later Wittgenstein’s guide to contradictions.Alessio Persichetti - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3783-3799.
    This paper portrays the later Wittgenstein’s conception of contradictions and his therapeutic approach to them. I will focus on and give relevance to the Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, plus the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. First, I will explain why Wittgenstein’s attitude towards contradictions is rooted in: a rejection of the debate about realism and anti-realism in mathematics; and Wittgenstein’s endorsement of logical pluralism. Then, I will explain Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach towards contradictions, and why it means that (...)
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  • Distribution in the logic of meaning containment and in quantum mechanics.Ross T. Brady & Andrea Meinander - 2012 - In Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer. pp. 223--255.
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  • Wittgenstein on context and philosophical pictures.Hiroshi Ohtani - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1795-1816.
    In this paper, I will investigate Wittgenstein’s idea about the context-sensitivity of utterance. It is the idea that there is a big gap between understanding a sentence in the sense of knowing the idioms and discerning the grammar in it, and what is said by using it in a particular context. Although context-sensitivity in this moderate sense is a familiar idea in Wittgensteinian scholarship, it has mainly been studied as an idea in “Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language.” However, Wittgenstein’s interest in (...)
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  • Rule Following, Anxiety, and Authenticity.David Egan - 2021 - Mind 130 (518):567-593.
    This paper argues that the problematic of rule following in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and Heidegger's analysis of anxiety in Being and Time have analogous structures. Working through these analogies helps our interpretation of both of these authors. Contrasting sceptical and anti-sceptical readings of Wittgenstein helps us to resolve an interpretive puzzle about what an authentic response to anxiety looks like for Heidegger. And considering the importance of anxiety to Heidegger's conception of authenticity allows us to locate in Wittgenstein's later philosophy (...)
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  • Wittgenstein on 2, 2, 2 ...: The opening of remarks on the foundations of mathematics.Juliet Floyd - 1991 - Synthese 87 (1):143 - 180.
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  • Pluralism and “Bad” Mathematical Theories: Challenging our Prejudices.Michèle Friend - 2012 - In Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer. pp. 277--307.
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  • Wittgenstein and Gödel: An Attempt to Make ‘Wittgenstein’s Objection’ Reasonable†.Timm Lampert - 2018 - Philosophia Mathematica 26 (3):324-345.
    According to some scholars, such as Rodych and Steiner, Wittgenstein objects to Gödel’s undecidability proof of his formula $$G$$, arguing that given a proof of $$G$$, one could relinquish the meta-mathematical interpretation of $$G$$ instead of relinquishing the assumption that Principia Mathematica is correct. Most scholars agree that such an objection, be it Wittgenstein’s or not, rests on an inadequate understanding of Gödel’s proof. In this paper, I argue that there is a possible reading of such an objection that is, (...)
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  • Wittgenstein on Incompleteness Makes Paraconsistent Sense.Francesco Berto - 2012 - In Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer. pp. 257--276.
    I provide an interpretation of Wittgenstein's much criticized remarks on Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem in the light of paraconsistent arithmetics: in taking Gödel's proof as a paradoxical derivation, Wittgenstein was right, given his deliberate rejection of the standard distinction between theory and metatheory. The reasoning behind the proof of the truth of the Gödel sentence is then performed within the formal system itself, which turns out to be inconsistent. I show that the models of paraconsistent arithmetics (obtained via the Meyer-Mortensen (...)
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  • On discourses addressed by infidel logicians.Walter Carnielli & Marcelo E. Coniglio - 2012 - In Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer. pp. 27--41.
    We here attempt to address certain criticisms of the philosophical import of the so-called Brazilian approach to paraconsistency by providing some epistemic elucidations of the whole enterprise of the logics of formal inconsistency. In the course of this discussion, we substantiate the view that difficulties in reasoning under contradictions in both the Buddhist and the Aristotelian traditions can be accommodated within the precepts of the Brazilian school of paraconsistency.
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