- Parfit über Intuitionismus und die Herausforderung moralischer Uneinigkeit.Kay Hüwelmeyer - 2016 - Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 3 (2):287-324.details
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The Normative, the Practical, and the Deliberatively Indispensable.Andrew Stewart - 2024 - Journal of Value Inquiry 58 (2):235-255.details
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The limits of the just-too-different argument.Ragnar Francén & Victor Moberger - 2024 - Ratio 37 (1):64-75.details
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Etiological Debunking Beyond Belief.Joshua Schechter - 2024 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 19:274-298.details
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Moral Occasionalism.David Killoren & Jacob Sparks - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Non-Naturalism and Reasons-Firstism: How to Solve the Discontinuity Problem by Reducing Two Queerness Worries to One.Victor Moberger - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):131-154.details
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Hume’s Dictum and Metaethics.Victor Moberger - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):328-349.details
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Not Just Errors: A New Interpretation of Mackie’s Error Theory.Victor Moberger - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (3).details
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The Mackiean Supervenience Challenge.Victor Moberger - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1):219-236.details
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Neo‐Humean rationality and two types of principles.Caj Strandberg - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (2):256-273.details
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What is Logical Monism?Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - In Christopher Peacocke & Paul Boghossian (eds.), Normative Realism.details
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Epistemic Disagreement and Practical Disagreement.Christopher Cowie - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):191-209.details
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The reliable route from nonmoral evidence to moral conclusions.Neil Sinhababu - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs: Inappropriate to Demand Them?John J. Tilley - 2020 - Theoria 86 (3):293-308.details
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Metasemantics, Moral Realism and Moral Doctrines.Christine Tiefensee - 2022 - In Visa A. J. Kurki & Mark Mcbride (eds.), Without Trimmings: The Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy of Matthew Kramer. Oxford, Vereinigtes Königreich: Oxford University Press. pp. 189-204.details
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Moral disagreement scepticism leveled.Jonathan Dixon - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):203-216.details
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Explanationism versus Modalism in Debunking (and Theory Choice).Harjit Bhogal - 2023 - Mind 132 (528):1005-1027.details
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The Reliability Challenge in Moral Epistemology.Matt Lutz - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:284-308.details
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Metaethics as Conceptual Engineering.Knut Olav Skarsaune - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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Evolutionary debunking of (arguments for) moral realism.Arnon Levy & Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - 2023 - Synthese 201 (5):1-22.details
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Relativized Essentialism about Modalities.Salim Hirèche - 2022 - Argumenta 7 (2):463-484.details
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Moral Realism by Other Means: The Hybrid Nature of Kant’s Practical Rationalism.Stefano Bacin - 2017 - In Elke Elisabeth Schmidt & Robinson dos Santos (eds.), Realism and Anti-Realism in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. De Gruyter. pp. 155-178.details
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Realist dependence and irrealist butterflies.Caj Strandberg - 2023 - Synthese 201 (3):1-23.details
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Expressivism and moral independence.Elliot Salinger - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):136-152.details
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The normativity of gender.R. A. Rowland - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):244-270.details
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The Right and the Wren.Christa Peterson & Jack Samuel - 2021 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 81-103.details
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Moral error theory, explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt.Silvan Wittwer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2969-2983.details
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Invariantist, Contextualist, and Relativist Accounts of Gender Terms.Dan Zeman - 2020 - EurAmerica 4 (50):739-781.details
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Euthyphro and Moral Realism: A Reply to Harrison.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2016 - Sophia 55 (3):437-449.details
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What if God commanded something horrible? A pragmatics-based defence of divine command metaethics.Philipp Kremers - 2021 - Religious Studies 57 (4):597–617.details
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Why the Horrendous Deeds Objection Is Still a Bad Argument.Matthew Flannagan - 2022 - Sophia 61 (2):399-418.details
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The Limits of Rational Belief Revision: A Dilemma for the Darwinian Debunker.Katia Vavova - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):717-734.details
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Are There Moral Truths?Bart Streumer - manuscriptdetails
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The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement.Eric Sampson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:23-46.details
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The Self-Effacement Gambit.Jack Woods - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):113-139.details
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Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason.Ruth Chang (ed.) - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
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Companions in Guilt Arguments in the Epistemology of Moral Disagreement.R. A. Rowland - 2019 - In Christopher Cowie & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt: Arguments in Metaethics. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 187-205.details
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The Metaethics of Maat.Kevin DeLapp - 2019 - In Colin Marshall (ed.), Comparative Metaethics: Neglected Perspectives on the Foundations of Morality. Routledge. pp. 19-39.details
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Omnivores and Synthesisers: Academic Philosophers as Interdisciplinary Specialists.Michael Klenk - 2020 - In Wouter Floria Kalf, Michael Klenk, Jeroen Hopster & Julia Hermann (eds.), Philosophy in the Age of Science?: Inquiries Into Philosophical Progress, Method, and Societal Relevance. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 173-194.details
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On the ‘Indispensable Explanatory Role’ of Mathematics.Juha Saatsi - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1045-1070.details
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Metasemantics for the Relaxed.Christine Tiefensee - 2021 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 16. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 108-133.details
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The Presumption of Realism.Nils Franzén - 2024 - Philosophical Studies.details
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Ethical Non-naturalism and the Guise of the Good.Francesco Orsi - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):581-590.details
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Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies.Christopher Cowie - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):115-130.details
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When does self‐interest distort moral belief?Nicholas Smyth - 2022 - Wiley: Analytic Philosophy 2 (4):392-408.details
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Actual Control - Demodalising Free Will.David Heering - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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The Aptness of Envy.Jordan David Thomas Walters - 2023 - American Journal of Political Science 1 (1):1-11.details
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An Evolutionary Sceptical Challenge to Scientific Realism.Christophe de Ray - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):969-989.details
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Why undermining evolutionary debunkers is not enough.Andrew del Rio - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7437-7452.details
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Dehorning the Darwinian Dilemma for Normative Realism.Michael J. Deem - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (5):727-746.details
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