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  1. Revisiting consent for health information databanks.Stephan Millett & Peter O’Leary - 2015 - Research Ethics 11 (3):151-163.
    This paper argues that specific individual informed consent and other forms of consent predicated on a right to autonomy may not in all circumstances be appropriate for the establishment and use of large data sets of health information. We suggest that there are inherent failings in such an approach, shortcomings that we analyse below. We argue that individuals share an obligation to contribute their data, as doing so is cost-free and benefits accrue to the population as a whole. Large health (...)
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  • Character Traits, Social Psychology, and Impediments to Helping Behavior.Christian Miller - 2010 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (1):1-36.
    In a number of recent papers, I have begun to develop a new theory of character which is conceptually distinct both from traditional Aristotelian accounts as well as from the positive view of local traits outlined by John Doris. On my view, many human beings do have robust traits of character which play an important explanatory and predictive role, but which are triggered by certain situational variables which preclude them from counting as genuine Aristotelian virtues. Like others in this discussion, (...)
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  • A Perceptual Theory of Hope.Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    This paper addresses the question of what the attitude of hope consists in. We argue that shortcomings in recent theories of hope have methodological roots in that they proceed with little regard for the rich body of literature on the emotions. Taking insights from work in the philosophy of emotions, we argue that hope involves a kind of normative perception. We then develop a strategy for determining the content of this perception, arguing that hope is a perception of practical reasons. (...)
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  • Targeted Killing, Assassination, and the Problem of Dirty Hands.Tamar Meisels - 2023 - The Journal of Ethics 27 (4):585-599.
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  • Clarifying Moral Clarification: On Taylor’s Contribution to Metaethics.Michiel Meijer - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (5):705-722.
    Given Taylor’s status as one of the most important thinkers in contemporary moral and political philosophy, it is somewhat surprising that so little attention has been paid to the implications of h...
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  • What is at Stake in Debates among Normative Realists?Tristram McPherson - 2013 - Noûs 49 (1):123-146.
    One class of central debates between normative realists appears to concern whether we should be naturalists or reductionists about the normative. However, metaethical discussion of naturalism and reduction is often inconsistent, murky, or uninformative. This can make it hard to see why commitments relative to these metaphysical categories should matter to normative realists. This paper aims to clarify the nature of these categories, and their significance in debates between normative realists. I develop and defend what I call the joint-carving taxonomy, (...)
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  • Unifying Moral Methodology.Tristram Mcpherson - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):523-549.
    This article argues that the best way to pursue systematic normative ethical theorizing involves metaethical enquiry. My argument builds upon two central claims. First, I argue that plausible metaethical accounts can have implications that can help to resolve the methodological controversies facing normative ethics. Second, I argue that metaethical research is at least roughly as well supported as normative ethical research. I conclude by examining the implications of my thesis. Inter alia, it shows that the common practice of engaging in (...)
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  • Moorean Arguments and Moral Revisionism.Tristram McPherson - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2):1-25.
    G. E. Moore famously argued against skepticism and idealism by appealing to their inconsistency with alleged certainties, like the existence of his own hands. Recently, some philosophers have offered analogous arguments against revisionary views about ethics such as metaethical error theory. These arguments appeal to the inconsistency of error theory with seemingly obvious moral claims like “it is wrong to torture an innocent child just for fun.” It might seem that such ‘Moorean’ arguments in ethics will stand or fall with (...)
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  • Against quietist normative realism.Tristram McPherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):223-240.
    Recently, some philosophers have suggested that a form of robust realism about ethics, or normativity more generally, does not face a significant explanatory burden in metaphysics. I call this view metaphysically quietist normative realism . This paper argues that while this view can appear to constitute an attractive alternative to more traditional forms of normative realism, it cannot deliver on this promise. I examine Scanlon’s attempt to defend such a quietist realism, and argue that rather than silencing metaphysical questions about (...)
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  • Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:253-277.
    This chapter offers an analysis of the authoritatively normative concept PRACTICAL OUGHT that appeals to the constitutive norms for the activity of non-arbitrary selection. It argues that this analysis permits an attractive and substantive explanation of what the distinctive normative authority of this concept amounts to, while also explaining why a clear statement of what such authority amounts to has been so elusive in the recent literature. The account given is contrasted with more familiar constitutivist theories, and briefly shows how (...)
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  • The Many Moral Particularisms.Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):83-106.
    What place, if any, moral principles should or do have in moral life has been a longstanding question f or moral philosophy. For some, the proposition that moral philosophy should strive to articulate moral principles has been an article of faith. At least since Aristotle, however, there has been a rieh counter-tradition that questions the possibility or value of trying to capture morality in principled terms. In recent years, philosophers who question principled approaches to morality have argued under the banner (...)
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  • The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.
    This is a survey of recent debates concerning the normativity of belief. We explain what the thesis that belief is normative involves, consider arguments for and against that thesis, and explore its bearing on debates in metaethics.
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  • The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
    A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories.
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  • Observaciones sobre algunos aspectos de la filosofía de Ernst Tugendhat.David Martínez Rincón - 2018 - Universitas Philosophica 35 (71):351-377.
    This paper argues that there is a thread in the philosophy of E. Tugendhat binding together his moral and justice theories with his conceptual analysis. Oriented by the thesis that a conceptual analysis is necessary to explain what justice is, this paper reconstructs some aspects of Tugendhat’s philosophy. It is divided in four sections: First, I delve into the author’s definition and use of conceptual analysis. Second, I describe some features of Tugendhat’s moral theory of contractualism. Third, I examine his (...)
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  • Animal Abolitionism Meets Moral Abolitionism: Cutting the Gordian Knot of Applied Ethics.Joel Marks - 2013 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 10 (4):1-11.
    The use of other animals for human purposes is as contentious an issue as one is likely to find in ethics. And this is so not only because there are both passionate defenders and opponents of such use, but also because even among the latter there are adamant and diametric differences about the bases of their opposition. In both disputes, the approach taken tends to be that of applied ethics, by which a position on the issue is derived from a (...)
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  • Political Moralism and Constitutional Reasoning: A Reply to Bernard Williams.Roni Mann - 2020 - Res Publica 27 (2):235-253.
    Williams’s well-known critique of the ‘moralism’ of liberal political philosophy—its disconnect from political reality—holds special significance for the theory and practice of constitutional adjudication, where calls for ‘realism’ increasingly resound. Is constitutional discourse also guilty of moralism—as Williams himself thought—or might it succeed where political philosophy has failed? This paper reconstructs Williams’s critique of political moralism as one that decries the empty idealism of the philosophical project of abstraction: the quest for general, timeless, and universal principles drains theory of its (...)
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  • Passing, traveling and reality: Social constructionism and the metaphysics of race.Ron Mallon - 2004 - Noûs 38 (4):644–673.
    Among race theorists, the view that race is a social construction is widespread. While the term ‘ social construction’ is sometimes intended to mean merely that race does not constitute a robust, biological natural kind, it often labels the stronger position that race is real, but not a biological kind. For example, Charles Mills writes that, ‘‘the task of those working on race is to put race in quotes, ‘race’, while still insisting that nevertheless, it exists ’’. It is to (...)
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  • Anti-autonomism defended: A reply to hill.Stephen Maitzen - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (4):567-574.
    In the current issue of this journal, Scott Hill critiques some of my work on the “is”-“ought” controversy, the Hume-inspired debate over whether an ethical conclusion can be soundly, or even validly, derived from only non-ethical premises. I’ve argued that it can be; Hill is unconvinced. I reply to Hill’s critique, focusing on four key questions to which he and I give different answers.
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  • Objectivity, interpretation, and rights: A critique of Dworkin. [REVIEW]Jon Mahoney - 2004 - Law and Philosophy 23 (2):187-222.
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  • The Local Nature of Modern Moral Skepticism.Diego E. Machuca - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):315–324.
    Julia Annas has affirmed that the kind of modern moral skepticism which denies the existence of objective moral values rests upon a contrast between morality and some other system of beliefs about the world which is not called into doubt. Richard Bett, on the other hand, has argued that the existence of such a contrast is not a necessary condition for espousing that kind of moral skepticism. My purpose in this paper is to show that Bett fails to make a (...)
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  • Liberal naturalism and the scientific image of the world.David Macarthur - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (5):565-585.
    ABSTRACTThis paper distinguishes between the theoretical scientific image and the practical scientific image. The popular idea that there is a conceptual clash between the scientific and manifest images of the world is revealed as largely illusory. From the perspective of a liberal naturalism, the placement problem for ‘problematic’ entities or truths is not solved but dissolved. Persons, say, are not posits of any explanatory science, but beings acknowledged as rational agencies in second-personal space. Core elements of the manifest image are (...)
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  • De praktische en epistemische waarde van het pyrronisme.Diego Machuca - 2016 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (1):73-98.
    This paper assesses both the practical and the epistemic value of Pyrrhonism as this stance is described in Sextus Empiricus’s extant writings. It first explores whether the Pyrrhonist’s suspension of judgment and undisturbedness make us behave in a moral or immoral way, and whether they allow us to attain those goals that would make it possible to live well. It then examines whether the Pyrrhonist’s suspension of judgment makes it possible to reach the epistemic goals of attaining truth and avoiding (...)
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  • A Humanist Foundation for Restitution.Robert E. Mackay - 1993 - Ratio Juris 6 (3):324-336.
    This paper makes a case for an ethical underpinning for restorative justice. This approach is developed from a neo‐Aristotelian perspective. It adapts the conceptual framework of Alasdair MacIntyre for the articulation and resolution of epi‐stemological crises in traditions of enquiry, to the task of providing a critical and analytic framework for considering the crisis of rationale and practice in the contemporary criminal justice‐penal archipelago. The author argues that Restitution, conceived in neo‐Aristotelian terms, provides a resolution of that crisis. Finally, he (...)
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  • Deep Ecology as an Aesthetic Movement.Tony Lynch - 1996 - Environmental Values 5 (2):147 - 160.
    Many deep ecologists call for a 'new ecological ethic'. If this ethic is meant to be a moral ethic, then deep ecology fails. However if deep ecology is interpreted as an aesthetic movement, then it is both philosophically coherent and practically adequate.
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  • Moral Desirability and Rational Decision.Christoph Lumer - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (5):561-584.
    Being a formal and general as well as the most widely accepted approach to practical rationality, rational decision theory should be crucial for justifying rational morals. In particular, acting morally should also be rational in decision theoretic terms. After defending this thesis, in the critical part of the paper two strategies to develop morals following this insight are criticized: game theoretical ethics of cooperation and ethical intuitionism. The central structural objections to ethics of cooperation are that they too directly aim (...)
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  • Comments: Reality and time.J. R. Lucas - 1997 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (1):97 – 108.
    (1997). Comments: Reality and time. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 11, Festschrift for J. R. Lucas, pp. 97-108. doi: 10.1080/02698599708573553.
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  • Transcendental Arguments and the Sources of Value: Constitutivism as Critical Realism.Linda Lovelli - 2022 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 3 (2):171-192.
    In this paper, I present different ways in which transcendental argumentation has been used in contemporary debates in moral philosophy to justify the normative authority of morality. My aim is to defend strong “retorsive” transcendental argumentation as a way to ground a sort of critical realism in metaethics, comparing transcendental arguments proposed by Karl-Otto Apel, Christine Korsgaard and Alan Gewirth – which are sometimes referred to as “constitutivist” arguments. In particular, I endorse an argumentative strategy that considers the merits of (...)
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  • Semantic Non-Doxastic Agnostic Religious Faith.Kirk Lougheed - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (3):1067-1081.
    The purpose of this article is to articulate the possibility of semantic non-doxastic agnostic religious faith. Robin Le Poidevin, who introduced the idea of semantic religious agnosticism, defines it as being agnostic about which parts of religion to treat in realist terms and which parts to treat in fictionalist terms. I take Le Poidevin’s view and argue that it is consistent with a non-doxastic attitude toward the object of faith such as acceptance. I then explore the similarities and differences between (...)
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  • Science, Practice and Mythology: A Definition and Examination of the Implications of Scientism in Medicine. [REVIEW]Michael Loughlin, George Lewith & Torkel Falkenberg - 2013 - Health Care Analysis 21 (2):130-145.
    Scientism is a philosophy which purports to define what the world ‘really is’. It adopts what the philosopher Thomas Nagel called ‘an epistemological criterion of reality’, defining what is real as that which can be discovered by certain quite specific methods of investigation. As a consequence all features of experience not revealed by those methods are deemed ‘subjective’ in a way that suggests they are either not real, or lie beyond the scope of meaningful rational inquiry. This devalues capacities that (...)
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  • Making and finding values in nature: From a Humean point of view.Y. S. Lo - 2006 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):123 – 147.
    The paper advances a Humean metaethical analysis of "intrinsic value" - a notion fundamental in moral philosophy in general and particularly so in environmental ethics. The analysis reduces an object's moral properties (e.g., its value) to the empirical relations between the object's natural properties and people's psychological dispositions to respond to them. Moral properties turn out to be both objective and subjective, but in ways compatible with, and complementary to, each other. Next, the paper investigates whether the Humean analysis can (...)
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  • The Argument from Moral Experience.Don Loeb - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):469-484.
    It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory. In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it (...)
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  • Moral error theory.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):93–109.
    The paper explores the consequences of adopting a moral error theory targeted at the notion of reasonable convergence. I examine the prospects of two ways of combining acceptance of such a theory with continued acceptance of moral judgements in some form. On the first model, moral judgements are accepted as a pragmatically intelligible fiction. On the second model, moral judgements are made relative to a framework of assumptions with no claim to reasonable convergence on their behalf. I argue that the (...)
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  • Debunking morality: Evolutionary naturalism and moral error theory.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (4):567-581.
    The paper distinguishes three strategies by means of which empirical discoveries about the nature of morality can be used to undermine moral judgements. On the first strategy, moral judgements are shown to be unjustified in virtue of being shown to rest on ignorance or false belief. On the second strategy, moral judgements are shown to be false by being shown to entail claims inconsistent with the relevant empirical discoveries. On the third strategy, moral judgements are shown to be false in (...)
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  • The Reality of Field’s Epistemological Challenge to Platonism.David Liggins - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (5):1027-1031.
    In the introduction to his Realism, mathematics and modality, and in earlier papers included in that collection, Hartry Field offered an epistemological challenge to platonism in the philosophy of mathematics. Justin Clarke-Doane Truth, objects, infinity: New perspectives on the philosophy of Paul Benacerraf, 2016) argues that Field’s challenge is an illusion: it does not pose a genuine problem for platonism. My aim is to show that Clarke-Doane’s argument relies on a misunderstanding of Field’s challenge.
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  • Moore on Twin Earth.Neil Levy - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):137-146.
    In a series of articles, Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have argued that Richard Boyd’s defence of moral realism, utilizing a causal theory of reference, fails. Horgan and Timmons construct a twin Earth-style thought experiment which, they claim, generates intuitions inconsistent with the realist account. In their thought experiment, the use of (allegedly) moral terms at a world is causally regulated by some property distinct from that regulating their use here on Earth; nevertheless, Horgan and Timmons claim, it is intuitive (...)
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  • Evolutionary debunking of (arguments for) moral realism.Arnon Levy & Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - 2023 - Synthese 201 (5):1-22.
    Moral realism is often taken to have common sense and initial appearances on its side. Indeed, by some lights, common sense and initial appearances underlie all the central positive arguments for moral realism. We offer a kind of debunking argument, taking aim at realism’s common sense standing. Our argument differs from familiar debunking moves both in its empirical assumptions and in how it targets the realist position. We argue that if natural selection explains the objective phenomenology of moral deliberation and (...)
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  • Wang Yangming’s Reductionist Account of Practical Necessity: General and Particular.Yat-Hung Leung - 2020 - Sophia 59 (3):413-436.
    In this article, I argue that we can have a plausible account of the experience of practical necessity, namely, the experience that some action is necessitated for someone, by referring to the philosophy of Wang Yangming, a Neo-Confucian philosopher in Ming Dynasty China. The experience of practical necessity, according to Wang, can be of two kinds: general and particular, both having their bases on human nature and related to the fulfillment of the self. I argue that this account fares better (...)
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  • What God might be.John Leslie - 2019 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 85 (1):63-75.
    As Plato suggested, the cosmos may exist because this is ethically necessary. It then might well consist of infinitely many minds, each itself infinite through eternally knowing all that was worth knowing. Our universe would exist inside one of them, as a pattern in its thought. But intrinsic value could be a fiction, making Plato’s suggestion a non-starter. Again, indeterministic free will might have immense value. Those infinite minds could then differ from one another in constantly changing ways through the (...)
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  • In Search of Common Values Amongst Competing Universals: An Argument for the Return to Value’s Original Meaning.Andra le Roux-Kemp - 2018 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 31 (4):877-903.
    This article presents an argument for the return to the original meaning of the concept value. This is achieved by revisiting the genealogy of the concept and by placing in perspective and questioning the common parlance thereof in contemporary legal discourse. The approach is decidedly against the often casual way in which courts and commentators treat the concept, seemingly as concretisation, validation, exegesis or reinforcement of fundamental norms, but without paying attention to its original meaning and use. It is submitted (...)
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  • XI- Naturalism and Placement, or, What Should a Good Quinean Say about Mathematical and Moral Truth?Mary Leng - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (3):237-260.
    What should a Quinean naturalist say about moral and mathematical truth? If Quine’s naturalism is understood as the view that we should look to natural science as the ultimate ‘arbiter of truth’, this leads rather quickly to what Huw Price has called ‘placement problems’ of placing moral and mathematical truth in an empirical scientific world-view. Against this understanding of the demands of naturalism, I argue that a proper understanding of the reasons Quine gives for privileging ‘natural science’ as authoritative when (...)
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  • Morality and Mathematics, by Justin Clarke-Doane. [REVIEW]Mary Leng - 2022 - Mind 132 (528):1232-1241.
    From the perspective of a certain kind of physicalist naturalism, both mathematical and moral discourse look problematic. Our knowledge of the world is via caus.
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  • Desire, Disagreement, and Corporate Mental States.Olof Leffler - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    I argue against group agent realism, or the view that groups have irreducible mental states. If group agents have irreducible mental states, as realists assume, then the best group agent realist explanation of corporate agents features only basic mental states with at most one motivational function each. But the best group agent realist explanation of corporate agents does not feature only basic mental states with at most one motivational function each. So corporate agents lack irreducible mental states. How so? I (...)
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  • Mengzian Sensitivity to Social Roles.Gina Lebkuecher - 2024 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 23 (2):191-222.
    Classical Confucian philosopher Mengzi 孟子 offers resources that can help shed light on the metaphysical status of moral qualities and answer the question of how we come to perceive them. I argue that Mengzi puts forward an account of virtue as sensitivity similar to that offered by John McDowell. Both thinkers endorse a particular kind of motivationally internalist naturalistic moral realism, and both explain virtue as analogous to perception of secondary qualities. I offer an original contribution to existing literature by (...)
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  • Cognitive Neuroscience and Moral Decision-making: Guide or Set Aside?Derek Leben - 2010 - Neuroethics 4 (2):163-174.
    It is by now a well-supported hypothesis in cognitive neuroscience that there exists a functional network for the moral appraisal of situations. However, there is a surprising disagreement amongst researchers about the significance of this network for moral actions, decisions, and behavior. Some researchers suggest that we should uncover those ethics [that are built into our brains ], identify them, and live more fully by them, while others claim that we should often do the opposite, viewing the cognitive neuroscience of (...)
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  • Choosing normative properties: a reply to Eklund’s Choosing Normative Concepts.Stephanie Leary - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (5):455-474.
    ABSTRACT The literature surrounding Horgan and Timmons’s Moral Twin Earth scenarios has focused on whether such scenarios present a metasemantic problem for naturalist realists. But in Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund uses a similar scenario to illuminate a novel, distinctly metaphysical problem for normative realists of both naturalist and non-naturalist stripes. The problem is that it is not clear what would suffice for the sort of ardent realist view that normative realists have in mind – the view that reality itself favors (...)
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  • Dismissing the Moral Sceptic: A Wittgensteinian Approach.Sasha Lawson-Frost - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1235-1251.
    Cartesian scepticism poses the question of how we can justify our belief that other humans experience consciousness in the same way that we do. Wittgenstein’s response to this scepticism is one that does not seek to resolve the problem by providing a sound argument against the Cartesian sceptic. Rather, he provides a method of philosophical inquiry which enables us to move past this and continue our inquiry without the possibility of solipsism arising as a philosophical problem in the first place. (...)
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  • Global Justice as Process: Applying Normative Ideals of Indigenous African Governance.Helen Lauer - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (1):163-189.
    This contribution explores correctives to several errors that Thomas Nagel seems to presuppose in his seminal defence of scepticism about global justice. I rely on lessons learned and conventions surviving in West African contemporary social and moral contexts, where people engage as a matter of course in divergent, historically antagonistic cultural and political traditions. On this view, global justice is a work in progress—not a fixed univocal formula but an on-going collaborative effort, a project in perpetual renovation and inter-cultural reconsideration (...)
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  • How to Pull a Metaphysical Rabbit out of an End-Relational Semantic Hat.Nicholas Laskowski - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (4):589-607.
    Analytic reductivism in metaethics has long been out of philosophical vogue. In Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normativity (2014), Stephen Finlay tries to resuscitate it by developing an analytic metaethical reductive naturalistic semantics for ‘good.’ He argues that an end-relational semantics is the simplest account that can explain all of the data concerning the term, and hence the most plausible theory of it. I argue that there are several assumptions that a reductive naturalist would need to make about contextual (...)
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  • The Ethics of Partiality.Benjamin Lange - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 1 (8):1-15.
    Partiality is the special concern that we display for ourselves and other people with whom we stand in some special personal relationship. It is a central theme in moral philosophy, both ancient and modern. Questions about the justification of partiality arise in the context of enquiry into several moral topics, including the good life and the role in it of our personal commitments; the demands of impartial morality, equality, and other moral ideals; and commonsense ideas about supererogation. This paper provides (...)
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  • Partiality, Asymmetries, and Morality’s Harmonious Propensity.Benjamin Lange & Joshua Brandt - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-42.
    We argue for asymmetries between positive and negative partiality. Specifically, we defend four claims: i) there are forms of negative partiality that do not have positive counterparts; ii) the directionality of personal relationships has distinct effects on positive and negative partiality; iii) the extent of the interactions within a relationship affects positive and negative partiality differently; and iv) positive and negative partiality have different scope restrictions. We argue that these asymmetries point to a more fundamental moral principle, which we call (...)
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