- Empirical evidence for moral Bayesianism.Haim Cohen, Ittay Nissan-Rozen & Anat Maril - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):801-830.details
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Folk Moral Relativism.Hagop Sarkissian, John Park, David Tien, Jennifer Cole Wright & Joshua Knobe - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):482-505.details
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Moral Relativism.Chris Gowans - 2014 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab.details
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The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):128-159.details
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Personality and Philosophical Bias.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2016 - In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley. pp. 578–589.details
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The Empirical Case for Folk Indexical Moral Relativism.James R. Beebe - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy 4.details
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Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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Empirische Studien zu Fragen der Bedarfsgerechtigkeit.Alexander Max Bauer - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Oldenburgdetails
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Mixed-up meta-ethics.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):235-256.details
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Are People Implicitly Moral Objectivists?Lieuwe Zijlstra - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (1):229-247.details
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Folk metaethics and error.Xinkan Zhao - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Meta-ethics and the mortality: Mortality salience leads people to adopt a less subjectivist morality.Onurcan Yilmaz & Hasan G. Bahçekapili - 2018 - Cognition 179 (C):171-177.details
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The meta-ethical grounding of our moral beliefs: Evidence for meta-ethical pluralism.Jennifer C. Wright, Piper T. Grandjean & Cullen B. McWhite - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):336-361.details
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Should morality be abolished? An empirical challenge to the argument from intolerance.Jennifer Cole Wright & Thomas Pölzler - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (3):350-385.details
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Implicit Metaethical Intuitions: Validating and Employing a New IAT Procedure.Johannes M. J. Wagner, Thomas Pölzler & Jennifer C. Wright - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (1):1-31.details
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Causal nominalism and the one over many problem.Matthew Tugby - 2013 - Analysis 73 (3):455-462.details
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The meta-wisdom of crowds.Justin Sytsma, Ryan Muldoon & Shaun Nichols - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11051-11074.details
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The morality of harm.Paulo Sousa, Colin Holbrook & Jared Piazza - 2009 - Cognition 113 (1):80-92.details
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Error Theory and Abolitionist Ethics.Lucia Schwarz - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (3):431-455.details
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What is Moral Reasoning?Leland F. Saunders - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (1):1-20.details
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Folk Platitudes as the Explananda of Philosophical Metaethics: Are They Accurate? And Do They Help or Hinder Inquiry?Hagop Sarkissian - 2017 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):565-575.details
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Can moral obligations be empirically discovered?Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):271-291.details
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Empirical research on folk moral objectivism.Thomas Pölzler & Jennifer Cole Wright - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (5).details
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How to Measure Moral Realism.Thomas Pölzler - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):647-670.details
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Moral Progress, Knowledge and Error: Do People Believe in Moral Objectivity?Thomas Pölzler, Lieuwe Zijlstra & Jacob Dijkstra - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Revisiting Folk Moral Realism.Thomas Pölzler - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):455-476.details
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An empirical argument against moral non-cognitivism.Thomas Pölzler & Jennifer Cole Wright - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):1141-1169.details
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Anti-Realist Pluralism: a New Approach to Folk Metaethics.Thomas Pölzler & Jennifer Cole Wright - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):53-82.details
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Kinds of norms.Elizabeth O'Neill - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12416.details
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Folk concepts and intuitions: From philosophy to cognitive science.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (11):514-518.details
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The past and future of experimental philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.details
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On trying to save the simple view.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.details
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On Trying to Save the Simple View.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.details
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Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions : an essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 202–213.details
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Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions: An essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Adam Feltz - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):202-213.details
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Psychopathy and internalism.Victor Kumar - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):318-345.details
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Moral judgment as a natural kind.Victor Kumar - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2887-2910.details
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It’s common sense – you don’t need to believe to disagree!Miklós Kürthy, Graham Bex-Priestley & Yonatan Shemmer - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Confidence in one’s social beliefs: Implications for belief justification.Asher Koriat & Shiri Adiv - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (4):1599-1616.details
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Experimental Philosophy.Joshua Knobe, Wesley Buckwalter, Shaun Nichols, Philip Robbins, Hagop Sarkissian & Tamler Sommers - 2012 - Annual Review of Psychology 63 (1):81-99.details
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Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics.Justin Khoo & Joshua Knobe - 2016 - Noûs:109-143.details
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The meta-ethical significance of experiments about folk moral objectivism.Jeroen Hopster - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):831-852.details
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Two Accounts of Moral Objectivity: from Attitude-Independence to Standpoint-Invariance.Jeroen Hopster - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):763-780.details
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Ethical Mooreanism.Jonathan Fuqua - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6943-6965.details
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Mind the gap(s): sociality, morality, and oxytocin. [REVIEW]Benjamin James Fraser - 2014 - Biology and Philosophy 29 (1):143-150.details
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Moral error theories and folk metaethics.Benjamin Fraser - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):1-18.details
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The Influence of Social Interaction on Intuitions of Objectivity and Subjectivity.Fisher Matthew, Knobe Joshua, Strickland Brent & C. Keil Frank - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (4):1119-1134.details
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Predicting Philosophical Disagreement.Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):978-989.details
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Moral Character: An Empirical Theory. [REVIEW]Adam Feltz - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):1079-1082.details
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Do You Know More When It Matters Less?Adam Feltz & Chris Zarpentine - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):683–706.details
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