- A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
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An Epistemic Version of Pascal's Wager.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-17.details
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You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.details
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Three challenges (and three replies) to the ethics of belief.Brian Huss - 2009 - Synthese 168 (2):249-271.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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Epistemic feedback loops (or: how not to get evidence).Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):368-393.details
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Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
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Weighing epistemic and practical reasons for belief.Christopher Howard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2227-2243.details
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Religious disagreements and epistemic rationality.David M. Holley - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):33-48.details
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Knowledge norms of belief and belief formation: When the time is ripe to actualize one's epistemic potential.Frank Hofmann - 2021 - Ratio 34 (4):277-285.details
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Does Scepticism Presuppose Voluntarism?Jonathan Hill - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1):31-50.details
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Does Scepticism Presuppose Voluntarism?Jonathan Hill - 2016 - Brill.details
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Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.details
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Believing at Will.Pamela Hieronymi - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 35 (sup1):149-187.details
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Norms of Inquiry.Eliran Haziza - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (12):e12952.details
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Moderate Epistemic Akrasia.Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2018 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 50 (148):69-97.details
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Epistemic Responsibility and Criminal Negligence.Alexander Greenberg - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):91-111.details
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Schroeder and Whiting on Knowledge and Defeat.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):231-238.details
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Should have known.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2863-2894.details
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Evidence and What We Make of It.Logan Paul Gage - 2014 - Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (2):89-99.details
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Teleological epistemology.Jane Friedman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):673-691.details
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Junk Beliefs and Interest‐Driven Epistemology.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):568-583.details
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Fitting anxiety and prudent anxiety.James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8555-8578.details
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Quasi-evidentialism: Interests, justification and epistemic virtue.Karyn L. Freedman - 2017 - Episteme 14 (2):147-160.details
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Doxastic Deontology and Cognitive Competence.Gábor Forrai - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):687-714.details
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Evidentialism in action.A. K. Flowerree - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3409-3426.details
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Agency of belief and intention.A. K. Flowerree - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2763-2784.details
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The possibility of epistemic responsibility.Miguel Ángel Fernández - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):109-131.details
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Modest deontologism in epistemology.Richard Feldman - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):339 - 355.details
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Conservative Treatment of Evidence.Alireza Fatollahi - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):568-583.details
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Should epistemology take the zetetic turn?Arianna Falbo - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (10-11):2977-3002.details
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O que é agência epistêmica, afinal?Doraci Engel - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):540-565.details
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Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.details
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Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.details
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Evidence and fallibility.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):39-55.details
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The ethics of belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action.Daniel Whiting - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
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Do the Right Thing.Elinor Mason - 2017 - In Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 7. pp. 117-135.details
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مطهری و اخلاق باور.مجید ملایوسفی, احمد الهیاری & مریم اسکندری - 2012 - حکمت معاصر 3 (1):119-140.details
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Richard Swinburne's False Dilemma.Owen Crocker - 2020 - UBC Journal of Philosophical Enquiries 1 (1):63-80.details
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Truth in Ethics and Epistemology: A Defense of Normative Realism.Nathan Nobis - 2005 - Dissertation, University of Rochesterdetails
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Rational Uniqueness and Religious Disagreement.Christopher Willard-Kyle - manuscriptdetails
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Disagreement and the Normativity of Truth beneath Cognitive Command.Filippo Ferrari - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Aberdeendetails
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Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern Californiadetails
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Evidencialismo.Tommaso Piazza - 2017 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.details
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Truth: the Aim and Norm of Belief.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):121-136.details
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Belief and Difficult Action.Berislav Marušić - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12:1-30.details
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Evidencijalizam i povjerenje.Snježana Prijić-Samaržija - 2007 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 27 (3):671-683.details
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The Ethics of Religious Belief.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Religious Studies Archives 1 (4):1-10.details
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The “Ought” Implies “Can” Principle: A Challenge to Collective Intentionality.Guglielmo Feis - 2012 - Phenomenology and Mind 2:114-121.details
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