- Vigilance and control.Samuel Murray & Manuel Vargas - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):825-843.details
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The Place of the Trace: Negligence and Responsibility.Samuel Murray - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):39-52.details
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Responsibility for forgetting.Samuel Murray, Elise D. Murray, Gregory Stewart, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1177-1201.details
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Responsibility and vigilance.Samuel Murray - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):507-527.details
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Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.details
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Free Will and Open Alternatives.Carlos J. Moya - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):167-191.details
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Manipulation and Degrees of Blameworthiness.Martin Montminy & Daniel Tinney - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (3-4):265-281.details
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Derivative culpability.Martin Montminy - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (5):689-709.details
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Culpability and Irresponsibility.Martin Montminy - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):167-181.details
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Moral Testimony Pessimism and the Uncertain Value of Authenticity.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):261-284.details
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A Stochastic Process Model for Free Agency under Indeterminism.Thomas Müller & Hans J. Briegel - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (2):219-252.details
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The Platonic model: statement, clarification and defense.Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (3):378-392.details
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With group power comes great (individual) responsibility.Erin L. Miller - 2021 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 20 (1):22-44.details
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Reasonable foreseeability and blameless ignorance.Daniel J. Miller - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1561-1581.details
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Identifying with Our Desires.Christian Miller - 2013 - Theoria 79 (2):127-154.details
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Against Elective Forgiveness.Per-Erik Milam - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):569-584.details
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Answerability, Blameworthiness, and History.Daniel Miller - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):469-486.details
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Should or should not forensic psychiatrists think about free will?Gerben Meynen - 2009 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 12 (2):203-212.details
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Keeping It Simple: Rethinking Abilities and Moral Responsibility.Joseph Metz - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):651-668.details
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An ability-based theory of responsibility for collective omissions.Joseph Metz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2665-2685.details
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The emotion account of blame.Leonhard Menges - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):257-273.details
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Grounding Responsibility in Appropriate Blame.Leonhard Menges - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (1):15-24.details
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Did the NSA and GCHQ Diminish Our Privacy? What the Control Account Should Say.Leonhard Menges - 2020 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 7 (1):29-48.details
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A Defense of Privacy as Control.Leonhard Menges - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (3):385-402.details
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Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (1):1-21.details
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Faces of Vicarious Responsibility.Rowan Mellor - 2021 - The Monist 104 (2):238-250.details
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Free Will and Luck: Compatibilism versus Incompatibilism.Alfred R. Mele - 2020 - The Monist 103 (3):262-277.details
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Agents' abilities.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):447–470.details
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Autonomy and akrasia.Alfred R. Mele - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (3):207 – 216.details
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A Reason To Be Free: Operationalizing ‘Free Action’.Giulio Mecacci & Pim Haselager - 2015 - Neuroethics 8 (3):327-334.details
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Whose Argumentative Burden, which Incompatibilist Arguments?—Getting the Dialectic Right.Michael McKenna - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):429-443.details
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The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert.Michael McKenna - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):241-255.details
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Source compatibilism and that pesky ability to do otherwise: comments on Dana Nelkin’s making sense of freedom and responsibility. [REVIEW]Michael McKenna - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):105-116.details
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Saying good-bye to the direct argument the right way.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (3):349-383.details
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Resisting the Manipulation Argument: A Hard‐Liner Takes It on the Chin.Michael McKenna - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):467-484.details
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Reasons reactivity and incompatibilist intuitions.Michael McKenna - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):131-143.details
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Quality of Will, Private Blame and Conversation: Reply to Driver, Shoemaker, and Vargas.Michael McKenna - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (2):243-263.details
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Our evolving beliefs about evolved misbelief.Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):541.details
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On Manipulated Agents and History-Sensitive Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2021 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (2):285-298.details
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Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism. [REVIEW]Michael McKenna - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):145-174.details
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Frankfurt's argument against alternative possibilities: Looking beyond the examples.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):770-793.details
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Defending nonhistorical compatibilism: A reply to Haji and cuypers1.Michael McKenna - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):264-280.details
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Does Situationism Threaten Free Will and Moral Responsibility?Michael McKenna & Brandon Warmke - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (6):698-733.details
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Defending conversation and responsibility: reply to Dana Nelkin and Holly Smith.Michael McKenna - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (1):73-84.details
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Collective responsibility and an agent meaning theory.Michael McKenna - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):16–34.details
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Compatibilism & desert: critical comments on four views on free will.Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):3-13.details
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A Modest Historical Theory of Moral Responsibility.Michael McKenna - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):83-105.details
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A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument.Michael Mckenna - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.details
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Epistemic responsibility and doxastic agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.details
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Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.details
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