- Contrastive Bayesianism.Branden Fitelson - 2013 - In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in philosophy. New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.details
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Evidence of Evidence as Higher Order Evidence.Anna-Maria A. Eder & Peter Brössel - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 62-83.details
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An argument for the likelihood-ratio measure of confirmation.Jose L. Zalabardo - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):630-635.details
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The Bootstrapping Problem.Jonathan Weisberg - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.details
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Inevitable ignorance as a standard for excusability: an epistemological analysis.Giovanni Tuzet & Roberto Ciuni - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5047-5066.details
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The probabilistic no miracles argument.Jan Sprenger - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (2):173-189.details
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The objectivity of Subjective Bayesianism.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):539-558.details
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Foundations of a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (3):371-398.details
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Equivalent testimonies as a touchstone of coherence measures.Mark Siebel & Werner Wolff - 2008 - Synthese 161 (2):167-182.details
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Der Rabe und der Bayesianist.Mark Siebel - 2004 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 35 (2):313-329.details
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Against Probabilistic Measures of Coherence.Mark Siebel - 2005 - Erkenntnis 63 (3):335-360.details
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The degree of epistemic justification and the conjunction fallacy.Tomoji Shogenji - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):29-48.details
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The logic of coherence.Michael Schippers & Mark Siebel - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7697-7714.details
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On the coherence of higher-order beliefs.Stefan Schubert & Erik J. Olsson - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):112-135.details
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Coherence, striking agreement, and reliability: On a putative vindication of the Shogenji measure.Michael Schippers - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3661-3684.details
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Irrelevant conjunction and the ratio measure or historical skepticism.J. Brian Pitts - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2117-2139.details
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The Likelihood Ratio Measure and the Logicality Requirement.Yukinori Onishi & Otávio Bueno - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):459-475.details
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Reliability conducive measures of coherence.Erik J. Olsson & Stefan Schubert - 2007 - Synthese 157 (3):297-308.details
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Undesigned Coincidences and Coherence for an Hypothesis.Lydia McGrew - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):801-828.details
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What Is the Point of Confirmation?Franz Huber - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1146-1159.details
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Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning?Franz Huber - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):101-116.details
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Milne’s Argument for the Log‐Ratio Measure.Franz Huber - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (4):413-420.details
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Assessing theories, Bayes style.Franz Huber - 2008 - Synthese 161 (1):89-118.details
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Discussion: Re‐solving irrelevant conjunction with probabilistic independence.James Hawthorne & Branden Fitelson - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):505-514.details
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A probabilistic analysis of argument cogency.David Godden & Frank Zenker - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1715-1740.details
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Method Coherence and Epistemic Circularity.Will Fleisher - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):455-480.details
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Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):207-241.details
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The Wason task(s) and the paradox of confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):207-241.details
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The paradox of confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.details
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Putting the irrelevance back into the problem of irrelevant conjunction.Branden Fitelson - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (4):611-622.details
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Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and relational confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):473-489.details
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Declarations of independence.Branden Fitelson & Alan Hájek - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3979-3995.details
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Bayesian confirmation and auxiliary hypotheses revisited: A reply to Strevens.Branden Fitelson & Andrew Waterman - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):293-302.details
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A probabilistic theory of coherence.Branden Fitelson - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):194–199.details
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A decision procedure for probability calculus with applications.Branden Fitelson - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):111-125.details
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Symmetries and asymmetries in evidential support.Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):129 - 142.details
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Evidential externalism.Jeffrey Dunn - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):435-455.details
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Measuring coherence.Igor Douven & Wouter Meijs - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):405 - 425.details
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Fitch’s Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism.Igor Douven - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):149-182.details
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Bootstrap Confirmation Made Quantitative.Igor Douven & Wouter Meijs - 2006 - Synthese 149 (1):97-132.details
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Confirmational Holism and Theory Choice: Arrow Meets Duhem.Eleonora Cresto & Diego Tajer - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):71-111.details
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Solving the Tacking Problem with Contrast Classes.Jake Chandler - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):489-502.details
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Contrastive confirmation: some competing accounts.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):129-138.details
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The Likelihood Ratio Measure and the Logicality Requirement.Otávio Bueno & Yukinori Onishi - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):459-475.details
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Rational Relations Between Perception and Belief: The Case of Color.Peter Brössel - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (4):721-741.details
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Assessing Theories: The Coherentist Approach.Peter Brössel - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):593-623.details
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Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End.Peter Brössel & Franz Huber - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):737-749.details
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Keynes’s Coefficient of Dependence Revisited.Peter Brössel - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):521-553.details
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Logical Foundations of Evidential Support.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):500-512.details
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Too Odd (Not) to Be True? A Reply to Olsson.Luc Bovens, Branden Fitelson, Stephan Hartmann & Josh Snyder - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):539-563.details
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