- The New Evil Demon, a Frankfurt-style Counterfactual Intervener, and a Subject’s Perspective Objection: Reply to McCain.Andrew Moon - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (1):107-116.details
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Relating Neuroscience to Responsibility: Comments on Hirstein, Sifferd, and Fagan’s Responsible Brains.Michael S. Moore - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):283-298.details
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La fiabilidad teórica del determinismo. Un examen desde la propuesta de Mariano Artigas.Martín Montoya - 2016 - Scientia et Fides 4 (2):245-262.details
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The Logic of Action and Control.Leona Mollica - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (5):1237-1268.details
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Crossing the Line: New Intuitions Behind Frankfurt-Type Cases.Aleksandr Mishura - 2017 - Axiomathes 27 (4):393-402.details
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Is the Self-Interest Theory Self-Defeating?Joseph Mintoff - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (1):35-.details
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With group power comes great (individual) responsibility.Erin L. Miller - 2021 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 20 (1):22-44.details
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Frankfurt and the folk: An experimental investigation of Frankfurt-style cases.Jason S. Miller & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):401-414.details
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Omissions, Moral Luck, and Minding the (Epistemic) Gap.Joseph Metz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (4):301-314.details
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Keeping It Simple: Rethinking Abilities and Moral Responsibility.Joseph Metz - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):651-668.details
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An ability-based theory of responsibility for collective omissions.Joseph Metz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2665-2685.details
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Transferring Non-Responsibility.Pedro Merlussi & Gabriel de Andrade Maruchi - 2019 - Ethic@: An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 18 (3):285–298.details
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Did the NSA and GCHQ Diminish Our Privacy? What the Control Account Should Say.Leonhard Menges - 2020 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 7 (1):29-48.details
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A Defense of Privacy as Control.Leonhard Menges - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (3):385-402.details
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Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck*: ALFRED R. MELE.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (2):274-293.details
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Moral responsibility and agents' histories.Alfred Mele - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):161 - 181.details
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Moral responsibility and agents’ histories.Alfred Mele - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):161-181.details
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Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):263-286.details
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Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (1):1-21.details
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Free Will and Luck: Compatibilism versus Incompatibilism.Alfred R. Mele - 2020 - The Monist 103 (3):262-277.details
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Can Libertarians Make Promises?Alfred Mele - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:217-241.details
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Determinism, free will, and the Austrian School of Economics.Dawid Megger - 2021 - Journal of Economic Methodology 28 (3):304-321.details
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Where Frankfurt and Strawson Meet.Michael McKenna - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):163-180.details
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Whose Argumentative Burden, which Incompatibilist Arguments?—Getting the Dialectic Right.Michael McKenna - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):429-443.details
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Source compatibilism and that pesky ability to do otherwise: comments on Dana Nelkin’s making sense of freedom and responsibility. [REVIEW]Michael McKenna - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):105-116.details
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Saying good-bye to the direct argument the right way.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (3):349-383.details
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Saying Good-Bye to the Direct Argument the Right Way.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (3):349-383.details
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Resisting Todd’s Moral-Standing Zygote Argument.Michael McKenna - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273):657-678.details
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John Martin Fischer's The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control: Michael S. McKenna.Michael S. McKenna - 1997 - Legal Theory 3 (4):379-397.details
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Guest editor's introduction.Michael S. McKenna - 2000 - The Journal of Ethics 4 (4):309-312.details
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Frankfurt's argument against alternative possibilities: Looking beyond the examples.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):770-793.details
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A critical assessment of Pereboom’s Frankfurt-style example.Michael McKenna - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3117-3129.details
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Epistemic responsibility and doxastic agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.details
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Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.details
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XV—Intelligent Capacities.Victoria McGeer - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (3):347–376.details
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Attitudinal control.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2745-2762.details
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Taking control of belief.Miriam McCormick - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):169-183.details
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A dilemma for morally responsible time travelers.Kelly McCormick - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):379-389.details
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Alternative possibilities and asymmetry.Erasmus Mayr - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):105-125.details
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Alternative Possibilities, Volitional Necessities, and Character Setting.Benjamin Matheson - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):287-307.details
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Work lovers, freedom, and basic income.Julia Maskivker - 2011 - Contemporary Political Theory 10 (1):21-36.details
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Why a Uniform Basic Income Offends Justice.Julia Maskivker - 2018 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 11 (2):191-219.details
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Regularity Accounts of Causation and the Problem of Pre-emption: Dark Prospects Indeed. [REVIEW]Cei Maslen - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (3):419-434.details
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Moral Responsibility.Elinor Mason - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (4):343-353.details
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Beyond free will: The embodied emergence of conscious agency.Michael F. Mascolo & Eeva Kallio - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (4):437-462.details
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Intentions, Permissibility, and Choice.Anton Markoč - 2018 - Res Publica 24 (4):493-508.details
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Considering Intentions in Decision Making: What Is So Odd about It?Anton Markoč - 2017 - Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (4):481-498.details
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Agent causation as the solution to all the compatibilist’s problems.Ned Markosian - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383-398.details
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Agents, actions and reasons.Maria Alvarez - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (1):45-58.details
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Agentive Modals.Matthew Mandelkern, Ginger Schultheis & David Boylan - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):301-343.details
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