- Knowledge‐first perceptual epistemology: A comment on Littlejohn and Millar.David de Bruijn - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (3):329-345.details
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Non‐Propositional Regulation.Giuseppe Lorini & Stefano Moroni - 2022 - Philosophical Investigations 45 (4):512-527.details
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Do you see what I know? On reasons, perceptual evidence, and epistemic status.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):205-220.details
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Reasons and factive emotions.Christina H. Dietz - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1681-1691.details
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Reading as a source of knowledge.René van Woudenberg - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):723-742.details
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Neither/Nor.Clayton Littlejohn - 2019 - In Casey Doyle, Joseph Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. New York: Routledge.details
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Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):190-222.details
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Epistemological Disjunctivism and its Representational Commitments.Craig French - 2019 - In Casey Doyle, Joseph Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. New York: Routledge.details
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Epistemological Disjunctivism and Introspective Indiscriminability.Chris Ranalli - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):183-205.details
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The bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge: a new solution to the basis problem for epistemological disjunctivism.Kegan J. Shaw - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2871-2884.details
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The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.details
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Evidence and its Limits.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemological Disjunctivism’s Genuine Access Problem.Tim Kraft - 2015 - Theoria 81 (4):311-332.details
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How and Why Knowledge is First.Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-45.details
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Fake Barns and false dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):369-389.details
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The Formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism.Craig French - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):86-104.details
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Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis.Chris Ranalli - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247.details
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Perceptual experience and seeing that p.Craig French - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1735-1751.details
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Beliefless Knowing.Paul Silva - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):723-746.details
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The weight of facts: A puzzle about perception, reasons and deliberation.Andrea Giananti - 2019 - Ratio 32 (2):104-113.details
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The Basis Problem for Epistemological Disjunctivism Revisited.Harmen Ghijsen - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1147-1156.details
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Meta-epistemological Scepticism: Criticisms and a Defence.Chris Ranalli - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Edinburghdetails
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