- Magic, Alief and Make-Believe.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - forthcoming - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.details
|
|
Melioristic genealogies and Indigenous philosophies.Helen De Cruz & Johan De Smedt - 2022 - Philosophical Forum (4):1-18.details
|
|
The content of aliefs.Laura Danón - 2021 - Synthese 198 (9):8503-8520.details
|
|
Reply to Abell’s and Gilmore’s comments on Currie’s Imagining and Knowing: the Shape of Fiction.Greg Currie - 2022 - British Journal of Aesthetics 62 (2):215-222.details
|
|
Interpretivism and norms.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):905-930.details
|
|
Foundations of a we-perspective.Katja Crone - 2020 - Synthese (12):1-18.details
|
|
Foundations of a we-perspective.Katja Crone - 2021 - Synthese 198 (12):11815-11832.details
|
|
Moral motivation and the affective appeal.Jennifer Corns & Robert Cowan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):71-94.details
|
|
Replies to: Commentators.Annalisa Coliva - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):343-352.details
|
|
Disagreeing with Myself: Doxastic Commitments and Intrapersonal Disagreement.Annalisa Coliva - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):1-14.details
|
|
On depicting social agents.Herbert H. Clark & Kerstin Fischer - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e51.details
|
|
We believe the error theory.John Alton Christmann - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (5):632-644.details
|
|
Two modes of givenness of pre-reflective self-consciousness.Dionysis Christias - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (1):15-30.details
|
|
What is Conceptual Engineering and What Should it Be?David Chalmers - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63.details
|
|
Self-deception and shifting degrees of belief.Chi Yin Chan & Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (8):1204-1220.details
|
|
Are moral intuitions intellectual perceptions?Dario Cecchini - 2022 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 13 (1):31-40.details
|
|
Unconscious Racial Prejudice as Psychological Resistance: A Limitation of the Implicit Bias Model.Lori Gallegos de Castillo - 2018 - Critical Philosophy of Race 6 (2):262-279.details
|
|
False beliefs and naive beliefs: They can be good for you.Roberto Casati & Marco Bertamini - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):512-513.details
|
|
Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale.J. Adam Carter & Robert D. Rupert - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9243-9272.details
|
|
A tese da mente estendida à luz do externismo ativo: Como tornar Otto responsivo a razões?Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2020 - Trans/Form/Ação 43 (3):143-166.details
|
|
Slurring Perspectives.Elisabeth Camp - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (3):330-349.details
|
|
Doxastic desire and Attitudinal Monism.Douglas I. Campbell - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1139-1161.details
|
|
What we can (and can’t) infer about implicit bias from debiasing experiments.Nick Byrd - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-29.details
|
|
Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds.Cameron Buckner - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):1-28.details
|
|
Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds.Cameron Buckner - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):697-724.details
|
|
In the Thick of Moral Motivation.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):433-453.details
|
|
Unconscious Imagination and the Mental Imagery Debate.Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
|
|
The Normativity of Automaticity.Michael Brownstein & Alex Madva - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (4):410-434.details
|
|
Motor Intentions: How Intentions and Motor Representations Come Together.Chiara Brozzo - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (2):231-256.details
|
|
Implicit biases in visually guided action.Berit Brogaard - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):S3943–S3967.details
|
|
Ethical Automaticity.Michael Brownstein & Alex Madva - 2012 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1):68-98.details
|
|
Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution.Michael Brownstein & Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2815–2836.details
|
|
Attributionism and Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias.Michael Brownstein - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):765-786.details
|
|
Active belief.Matthew Boyle - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary 35 (S1):119-147.details
|
|
Unendorsed Beliefs.Cristina Borgoni - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):49-68.details
|
|
On knowing one's own resistant beliefs.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):212-225.details
|
|
Dissonance and Moorean Propositions.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):107-127.details
|
|
Dissonance and Doxastic Resistance.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):957-974.details
|
|
Dissonance and Irrationality: A Criticism of The In‐Between Account of Dissonance Cases.Cristina Borgoni - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):48-57.details
|
|
Epistemic Deontologism and Strong Doxastic Voluntarism: A Defense.Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (4):747-768.details
|
|
The Place of Philosophy in Bioethics Today.Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby, Sean Aas, Dan Brudney, Jessica Flanigan, S. Matthew Liao, Alex London, Wayne Sumner & Julian Savulescu - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics 22 (12):10-21.details
|
|
In Defense of “Denial”: Difficulty Knowing When Beliefs Are Unrealistic and Whether Unrealistic Beliefs Are Bad.J. S. Blumenthal-Barby & Peter A. Ubel - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics 18 (9):4-15.details
|
|
Implicit attitudes and awareness.Jacob Berger - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1291-1312.details
|
|
How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible?Hagit Benbaji - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):577-599.details
|
|
Knowledge requires belief – and it doesn’t? On belief as such and belief necessary for knowledge.Peter Baumann - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):151-167.details
|
|
Who Cares About Winning?Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):248-265.details
|
|
Review of Bortolotti's Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. [REVIEW]Emily Barrett & Cory Wright - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):600–603.details
|
|
Immersive Experience and Virtual Reality.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2024 - Philosophy and Technology 37 (1):1-24.details
|
|
The expectation of nothingness.James Baillie - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):185-203.details
|
|
On knowledge and obligation.Can Başķent, Loes Olde Loohuis & Rohit Parikh - 2012 - Episteme 9 (2):171-188.details
|
|