- The Epistemology of Prejudice.Endre Begby - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):90-99.details
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The Public Ecology of Freedom of Association.Andres Moles - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (1):85-103.details
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The expectation of nothingness.James Baillie - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):185-203.details
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What are the cognitive costs of racism? A reply to Gendler.Joshua Mugg - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):217-229.details
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(1 other version)Partiality and prejudice in trusting.Katherine Hawley - 2014 - Synthese 191 (9).details
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Some Questions for Tamar Szabo Gendler. [REVIEW]Tyler Doggett - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):764-774.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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Descartes’s Clarity First Epistemology.Elliot Samuel Paul - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.details
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How Darwin can help Post-Structuralists Maintain that Apartheid was Unconditionally Unjust.Ragnar van der Merwe - forthcoming - The Journal of Ethics.details
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(1 other version)Morality Does Not Encroach.Zachary Goodsell & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - In Juan Comesana & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Knowledge and Rationality: Essays in Honor of Stewart Cohen. Routledge.details
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Separating action and knowledge.Mikayla Kelley - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.details
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A "purist" feminist epistemology?Emily Tilton - 2023 - Dissertation, University of British Columbiadetails
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Unreliable Emotions and Ethical Knowledge.James Hutton - manuscriptdetails
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Pode uma crença imoral ser epistemicamente racional?Gustavo Oliva de Oliveira - 2023 - Revista Opinião Filosófica 14 (2):1-15.details
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Instrumentalism, Moral Encroachment, and Epistemic Injustice.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.details
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Moral Encroachment under Moral Uncertainty.Boris Babic & Zoë Johnson King - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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From Falsehood to Truth, and From Truth to Error. [REVIEW]Alex Madva - 2023 - Analysis 83 (2):405-416.details
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Against the newer evidentialists.David Thorstad - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (12):3511-3532.details
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The Ethics of Belief (3rd edition).Rima Basu - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.details
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Decision Theory without Luminosity.Yoaav Isaacs & Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2023 - Mind 133 (530):346-376.details
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Why Human Prejudice is so Persistent: A Predictive Coding Analysis.Tzu-Wei Hung - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (6):779-797.details
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Ben Baker (2021). Reporte evaluativo de un manuscrito (hipotético) para un libro introductorio a la filosofía.Fredy Prieto - 2023 - Cuestiones de Filosofía 9 (32):171-188.details
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Reasons for Belief in Context.Darren Bradley - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.details
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Knowledge and Disinformation.Mona Simion - forthcoming - Episteme:1-12.details
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Against comfort: political implications of evading discomfort.Ditte Marie Munch-Jurisic - 2020 - Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs 10 (2):277-297.details
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Epistemic and Aesthetic Conflict.Zoe Jenkin - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (4):457-479.details
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Inductive Reasoning Involving Social Kinds.Barrett Emerick & Tyler Hildebrand - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-20.details
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Perceptual learning.Zoe Jenkin - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (6):e12932.details
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Moral Encroachment, Symmetry, and Believing Against the Evidence.Caroline von Klemperer - 2023 - Philosophical Studies (7).details
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Emancipatory Attention.Christopher Mole - 2024 - Philosophers' Imprint 24 (1).details
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The structure of moral encroachment.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5-6):1793-1812.details
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IV—Lost in (Modal) Space: Demographic Base-Rate Neglect in the Service of Modal Knowledge.Jessie Munton - 2023 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 123 (1):73-96.details
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Scepticism about epistemic blame.Tim Smartt - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1813-1828.details
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On critical African philosophy: Mapping the boundaries of a good philosophical tradition.Adeshina Afolayan - 2023 - Metaphilosophy 54 (2-3):223-237.details
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(1 other version)Criminal Proof: Fixed or Flexible?Lewis Ross - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly (4):1-23.details
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The Abnormality of Discrimination: A Phenomenological Perspective.Tristan Hedges - 2022 - Genealogy+Critique 8 (1):1-22.details
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(1 other version)The Bias Dilemma: The Ethics of Algorithmic Bias in Natural-Language Processing.Oisín Deery & Katherine Bailey - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (3).details
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Doxastic Harm.Anne Baril - 2022 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 46:281-306.details
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Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency.Cory Davia - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (2):179-196.details
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Rumination and Wronging: The Role of Attention in Epistemic Morality.Catharine Saint-Croix - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):491-514.details
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You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.details
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Moral Encroachment and Positive Profiling.Lisa Cassell - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (5):1759-1779.details
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The Problem of Morally Repugnant Beliefs.Declan Smithies - 2023 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 18. Oxford University Press. pp. 218-241.details
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Understanding implicit bias: A case for regulative dispositionalism.Annemarie Kalis & Harmen Ghijsen - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (8):1212-1233.details
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III—Doxastic Wrongs, Non-Spurious Generalizations and Particularized Beliefs.Cécile Fabre - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (1):47-69.details
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(1 other version)What should relational egalitarians believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2022 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.details
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Uncoordinated Norms of Belief.Oliver Traldi - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):625-637.details
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Responsibility for implicitly biased behavior: A habit‐based approach.Josefa Toribio - 2021 - Journal of Social Philosophy 53 (2):239-254.details
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Bubbles and Chambers: Post-Truth and Belief Formation in Digital Social-Epistemic Environments.Massimiliano Badino - 2022details
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