- I Ought, Therefore I Can Obey.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.details
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Essentially Intentional Action.Ginger Schultheis & Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt - manuscriptdetails
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Probabilistic Knowledge in Action.Carlotta Pavese - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):342-356.details
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Agent-Causation Revisited: Origination and Contemporary Theories of Free Will.Thad Botham - 2008 - Berlin, Germany: Verlag D Müller.details
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Mental Causation, Autonomy and Action Theory.Dwayne Moore - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):53-73.details
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Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Cameron Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
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Action explanation and the free will debate: How incompatibilist arguments go wrong1.Scott Sehon - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):351-368.details
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Free Will and Quantum Mechanics.Mario De Caro & Hilary Putnam - 2020 - The Monist 103 (4):415-426.details
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Semicompatibilism: no ability to do otherwise required.Taylor W. Cyr - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):308-321.details
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Taking Hobart Seriously.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (4):1407-1426.details
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Moral Shallowness, Metaphysical Megalomania, and Compatibilist-Fatalism.Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):173-188.details
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Autonomy in R. S. Peters' Educational Theory.Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (supplement s1):189-207.details
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Reid's Regress.Terence Cuneo & Randall Harp - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):678-698.details
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Skilled activity and the causal theory of action.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):523-550.details
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Libertarianism, action theory, and the loci of responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (2):153-174.details
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Intentional omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):158-177.details
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Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.Randolph Clarke - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):323-351.details
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Because She Wanted To.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):27-35.details
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Reasons Explanation and Agent Control.John Ross Churchill - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):241-253.details
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Failed-Art and Failed Art-Theory.Christy Mag Uidhir - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):381-400.details
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Unintentional collective action.Sara Rachel Chant - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):245 – 256.details
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Action, responsibility and the ability to do otherwise.Justin A. Capes - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):1-15.details
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New Essays on the Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):193 - 201.details
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Incompatibilism and fatalism: Reply to loss.Joseph K. Campbell - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):71-76.details
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Compatibilist alternatives.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):387-406.details
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Towards a Mechanistically Neutral Account of Acting Jointly: The Notion of a Collective Goal.Stephen A. Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):1-29.details
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Individualism and the metaphysics of actions.Matias Bulnes - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):113-132.details
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The Primacy of the Mental in the Explanation of Human Action.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu - 2009 - Disputatio 3 (26):1 - 16.details
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Intralevel mental causation.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):402-425.details
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Causalisms Reconsidered.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):147-.details
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Compatibilism and doxastic control.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):143-152.details
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Why Compatibilists Need Alternative Possibilities.Reid Blackman - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):529-544.details
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Causation and Free Will in Early Buddhist Philosophy.Paul Bernier - 2020 - Buddhist Studies Review 36 (2):191-220.details
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The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.details
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Thing Causation.Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Why there are no good arguments for any interesting version of determinism.Mark Balaguer - 2009 - Synthese 168 (1):1 - 21.details
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Free Will, Determinism, and Epiphenomenalism.Mark Balaguer - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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Incompatibilism and the Past.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):351-376.details
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Intention, cognitive commitment, and planning.Robert Audi - 1991 - Synthese 86 (3):361-378.details
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On not getting out of bed.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1639-1666.details
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Grounding and the luck objection to agent-causal libertarianism.Joel Archer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1763-1775.details
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Agency and awareness.Chrisoula Andreou - 2012 - Ratio 26 (2):117-133.details
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Out of habit.Santiago Amaya - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11161-11185.details
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Basic Actions Reloaded.Santiago Amaya - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (9):e12435.details
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Free will, narrative, and retroactive self-constitution.Roman Altshuler - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):867-883.details
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The Standard Story of Action and the Problem of Agential Guidance.Jesús H. Aguilar - 2020 - Critica 52 (155):3-25.details
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Agency, consciousness, and executive control.Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):21-30.details
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Preemptive Omissions.Joseph Metz - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):1117-1138.details
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The metaphysical importance of the compatibility question: comments on Mark Balaguer’s Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem.Michael McKenna - 2012 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-12.details
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Causing Things and Doing Things.Helen Steward - 2014 - In C. G. Pulman (ed.), Hart on Responsibility. New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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