- Libertarianism without alternative possibilities.Joël Dolbeault - forthcoming - Metaphilosophy.details
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What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):461-481.details
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Action: Offshoring Strategies, Creative Governance, and Subnational Island Jurisdictions.Rowland Stout - 2006 - McGill-Queen's University Press.details
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A puzzle about the fixity of the past.Fabio Lampert - 2022 - Analysis 82 (3):426-434.details
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Intentional action first.Yair Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.details
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Intentions and self-referential content.Tomis Kapitan - 1995 - Philosophical Papers 24 (3):151-166.details
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Moral responsibility for actions: epistemic and freedom conditions.Alfred Mele - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):101-111.details
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Engaging with Pike: God, Freedom, and Time.John Martin Fischer, Patrick Todd & Neal Tognazzini - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):247-270.details
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Free Will and Abilities to Act.Randolph Clarke - 2019 - In Klaus von Stosch Saskia Wendel (ed.), Streit um die Freiheit: Philosophische und theologische Beiträge. Schoeningh/Brill. pp. 41-62.details
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Tekemättä jättämiset vastarintana.Kaisa Kärki - 2019 - In Outi Autti & Lehtola Veli-Pekka (eds.), Hiljainen Vastarinta. pp. 27-54.details
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The Disappearing Agent.Filip Čeč - 2017 - In Boran Berčić (ed.), Perspectives on the Self. University of Rijeka. pp. 235-253.details
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Divine Will Theory: Desires or Intentions?Christian Miller - 2013 - In L. Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.details
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Agent Causation and Free Will: a Case for Libertarianism.Thad Botham - 2017 - In Lenny Clapp (ed.), Philosophy for Us. Cognella. pp. 49-58.details
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The accomplishment of plans: a new version of the principle of double effect.Alexander R. Pruss - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):49-69.details
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Extending Introspection.Lukas Schwengerer - 2021 - In Inês Hipólito, Robert William Clowes & Klaus Gärtner (eds.), The Mind-Technology Problem : Investigating Minds, Selves and 21st Century Artefacts. Springer Verlag. pp. 231-251.details
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Nonhuman Moral Agency: A Practice-Focused Exploration of Moral Agency in Nonhuman Animals and Artificial Intelligence.Dorna Behdadi - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburgdetails
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A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism.David Widerker - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.details
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The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism.Jason Turner - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):565-587.details
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Deciding Under a Description.Matthew Heeney - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Objective and epistemic gradability: Is the new angle on the Knobe effect empirically grounded?Tomasz Zyglewicz & Bartosz Maćkiewicz - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (2):234-256.details
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Is conscious will an illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):59 - 70.details
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Is conscious will an illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):58-70.details
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Ability and the Past.Bokai Yao - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):397-406.details
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Hume and the phenomenology of agency.Joshua M. Wood - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):496-517.details
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Agent Causation Is Not Prior to Event Causation.Soo Lam Wong - 2021 - Disputatio 13 (61):143-158.details
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In Defense of Non-Causal Libertarianism.David Widerker - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):1-14.details
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A New Argument Against Libertarian Free Will?David Widerker - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):296-306.details
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Time Travel, Freedom, and Incompatibilism.Ryan Wasserman - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-14.details
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Forking Paths and Freedom: A Challenge to Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Robyn Repko Waller & Russell L. Waller - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1199-1212.details
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Minimal authorship (of sorts).Christy Mag Uidhir - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):373 - 387.details
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Intentional single and joint action.Raimo Tuomela - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (3):235 - 262.details
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Carlos Vaz Ferreira on Freedom and Determinism.Juan Garcia Torres - 2022 - Res Philosophica 99 (4):377-402.details
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Soft facts and ontological dependence.Patrick Todd - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):829-844.details
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Prepunishment and Explanatory Dependence: A New Argument for Incompatibilism about Foreknowledge and Freedom.Patrick Todd - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (4):619-639.details
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Against Limited Foreknowledge.Patrick Todd - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):523-538.details
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Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest.Matthew Talbert - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (1):89-109.details
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Consequentialism and Free Will.Maria Svedberg & Torbjörn Tännsjö - 2017 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 24:23-41.details
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From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action.Joshua Stuchlik - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):867-886.details
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Minimally Creative Thought.Dustin Stokes - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (5):658-681.details
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Graded Abilities and Action Fragility.David Storrs-Fox - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.details
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Anti-intellectualism, instructive representations, and the intentional action argument.Alison Ann Springle & Justin Humphreys - 2021 - Synthese (3):7919-7955.details
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Group Action Without Group Minds.Kenneth Silver - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):321-342.details
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Can a Corporation be Worthy of Moral Consideration?Kenneth Silver - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 159 (1):253-265.details
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The contours of control.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):395-411.details
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Is “Free Will” an Emergent Property of Immaterial Soul? A Critical Examination of Human Beings’ Decision-Making Process(es) Followed by Voluntary Actions and Their Moral Responsibility.Satya Sundar Sethy & M. Suresh - 2021 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 38 (3):491-505.details
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Double Defence Against Multiple Case Manipulation Arguments.Maria Sekatskaya - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (4):1283-1295.details
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Making a Difference in a Deterministic World.Carolina Sartorio - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (2):189-214.details
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A Partial Defense of the Actual-Sequence Model of Freedom.Carolina Sartorio - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):107-120.details
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Actual Causes and Free Will.Carolina Sartorio - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):147-165.details
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Free Will and Contextualism.Steven Rieber - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):223-252.details
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