- The Ethics of Attention: an argument and a framework.Sebastian Watzl - 2022 - In Sophie Archer (ed.), Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Interlocking content and attitude: a reply to the anti-normativist.Javier González de Prado & Víctor M. Verdejo - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (10):1051-1072.details
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Everything is Self-Evident.Steven Diggin - 2021 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 12 (4):413-426.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2020 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.details
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The Motivating Role of Truth in Reasoning: A Defence of Object-Dependent Fregean Senses.Johan Gersel - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2701-2714.details
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Reasoning, rationality, and representation.Wade Munroe - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8323-8345.details
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Assimilation and control: belief at the lowest levels.Eric Mandelbaum - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):441-447.details
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Belief’s minimal rationality.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3263-3282.details
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Guidance, epistemic filters, and non‐accidental ought‐doing.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):172-183.details
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Why is Warrant Normative?Peter J. Graham - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):110-128.details
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No, one should not believe all truths.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (9-10):1091-1103.details
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The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.details
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Consciousness, belief, and the group mind hypothesis.Søren Overgaard & Alessandro Salice - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1-25.details
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Does Semantics Need Normativity? Comments on Allan Gibbard, Meaning and Normativity.Åsa Wikforss - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (7):755-766.details
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Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3593-3609.details
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On the alleged normative significance of a platitude.Benoit Https://Orcidorg Gaultier - 2018 - Ratio 32 (1):42-52.details
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Disagreement and the Normativity of Truth beneath Cognitive Command.Filippo Ferrari - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Aberdeendetails
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(1 other version)Epistemic Worth.Daniel Whiting - forthcoming - In Baron Reed & A. K. Flowerree (eds.), Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere. Routledge.details
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If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - 2018 - Noûs 54 (3):501-526.details
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Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Norms.Patrizio Lo Presti - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (4):445-464.details
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Defeating looks.Kathrin Glüer - 2016 - Synthese 195 (7):2985-3012.details
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Anti-Normativism Evaluated.Ulf Hlobil - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):376-395.details
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Expressivism and the Normativity of Attitudes.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):233-255.details
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The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.details
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The normativity of meaning and content.Kathrin Glüer, Asa Wikforss & Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A Minimalist Threshold for Epistemically Irrational Beliefs.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), What is Belief? Oxford University Press.details
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What’s So Special About Reasoning? Rationality, Belief Updating, and Internalism.Wade Munroe - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.details
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Internalism and culpable irrationality.Karl Gustav Bergman - 2024 - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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Blind Rule-Following and the Regress of Motivations.Zachary Mitchell Swindlehurst - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):1170-1183.details
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Rules of Belief and the Normativity of Intentional Content.Derek Green - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):159-69.details
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Normative explanation : Disorders, violations and failures.Patrizio Lo Presti - unknowndetails
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The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1213-1227.details
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Should I believe all the truths?Alexander Greenberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3279-3303.details
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How Norms (Might) Guide Belief.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):396-409.details
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