The book presents a thoroughly elaborated logical theory of generalized truth-values understood as subsets of some established set of truth values. After elucidating the importance of the very notion of a truth value in logic and philosophy, we examine some possible ways of generalizing this notion. The useful four-valued logic of first-degree entailment by Nuel Belnap and the notion of a bilattice constitute the basis for further generalizations. By doing so we elaborate the idea of a multilattice, and most notably, (...) a trilattice of truth values – a specific algebraic structure with information ordering and two distinct logical orderings, one for truth and another for falsity. Each logical order not only induces its own logical vocabulary, but determines also its own entailment relation. We consider both semantic and syntactic ways of formalizing these relations and construct various logical calculi. (shrink)

This paper outlines an approach to the principle of bivalence based on very general, but still elementary, semantic considerations. The principle of bivalence states that “every sentence is either true or false”. Clearly, some logics are bivalent while others are not. A more general formulation of uses the concept of designated and non-designated logical values and is captured by “every sentence is either designated or non-designated”. Yet this formulation seems trivial, because the concept of non-designated value is negative. In order (...) to refine the analysis, the class of anti-designated values has been distinguished. The non-trivial version of the principle of bivalence is expressed by “every sentence is either designated or anti-designated”. The last part of the paper mentions some extralogical reasons for considering the principle of bivalence with truth being a designated value as intimately connected to human thinking and behavior. (shrink)

The paper argues that cognitive states of biological systems are inherently temporal. Three adequacy conditions for neuronal models of representation are vindicated: the compositionality of meaning, the compositionality of content, and the co-variation with content. Classicist and connectionist approaches are discussed and rejected. Based on recent neurobiological data, oscillatory networks are introduced as a third alternative. A mathematical description in a Hilbert space framework is developed. The states of this structure can be regarded as conceptual representations satisfying the three conditions.

The trilattice SIXTEEN₃ is a natural generalization of the wellknown bilattice FOUR₂. Cut-free, sound and complete sequent calculi for truth entailment and falsity entailment in SIXTEEN₃, are presented.

According to Suszko’s Thesis, there are but two logical values, true and false. In this paper, R. Suszko’s, G. Malinowski’s, and M. Tsuji’s analyses of logical twovaluedness are critically discussed. Another analysis is presented, which favors a notion of a logical system as encompassing possibly more than one consequence relation. [A] fundamental problem concerning many-valuedness is to know what it really is. [13, p. 281].

Imperatives cannot be true or false, so they are shunned by logicians. And yet imperatives can be combined by logical connectives: "kiss me and hug me" is the conjunction of "kiss me" with "hug me". This example may suggest that declarative and imperative logic are isomorphic: just as the conjunction of two declaratives is true exactly if both conjuncts are true, the conjunction of two imperatives is satisfied exactly if both conjuncts are satisfied—what more is there to say? Much more, (...) I argue. "If you love me, kiss me", a conditional imperative, mixes a declarative antecedent ("you love me") with an imperative consequent ("kiss me"); it is satisfied if you love and kiss me, violated if you love but don't kiss me, and avoided if you don't love me. So we need a logic of three -valued imperatives which mixes declaratives with imperatives. I develop such a logic. (shrink)

We define the paraconsistent supra-logic Pσ by a type-shift from the booleans o of propositional logic Po to the supra-booleans σ of the propositional type logic P obtained as the propositional fragment of the transfinite type theory Q defined by Peter Andrews (North-Holland Studies in Logic 1965) as a classical foundation of mathematics. The supra-logic is in a sense a propositional logic only, but since there is an infinite number of supra-booleans and arithmetical operations are available for this and other (...) types, virtually anything can be specified. The supra-logic is a generalization of Lukasiewicz's three-valued logic, with the intermediate value duplicated many times and ordered such that none of the copies of this value imply other ones, but it differs from Lukasiewicz's many-valued logics as well as from logics based on bilattices. There are several automated theorem provers for classical higher order logic (finite type theory) and it should be possible to modify these to our needs. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop a duality for the varieties of a Łukasiewicz n + 1-valued modal System. This duality is an extension of Stone duality for modal algebras. Some logical consequences (such as completeness results, correspondence theory...) are then derived and we propose some ideas for future research.

According to quantum mechanics, statements about the future made by sentient beings like us are, in general, neither true nor false; they must satisfy a many-valued logic. I propose that the truth value of such a statement should be identified with the probability that the event it describes will occur. After reviewing the history of related ideas in logic, I argue that it gives an understanding of probability which is particularly satisfactory for use in quantum mechanics. I construct a lattice (...) of future-tense propositions, with truth values in the interval [0, 1], and derive logical properties of these truth values given by the usual quantum-mechanical formula for the probability of a history. (shrink)

I highlight the importance of the notion of falsity for a semantical consideration of intuitionistic logic. One can find two principal (and non-equivalent) versions of such a notion in the literature, namely, falsity as non-truth and falsity as truth of a negative proposition. I argue in favor of the first version as the genuine intuitionistic notion of falsity.

We introduce a general recipe for presenting non-classical logics in a modular and uniform way as labelled deduction systems. Our recipe is based on a labelling mechanism where labels are general entities that are present, in one way or another, in all logics, namely truth-values. More specifically, the main idea underlying our approach is the use of algebras of truth-values, whose operators reflect the semantics we have in mind, as the labelling algebras of our labelled deduction systems. The “truth-values as (...) labels” approach allows us to give generalized systems for multiple-valued logics within the same formalism: since we can take multiple-valued logics as meaning not only finitely or infinitely many-valued logics but also power-set logics, i.e. logics for which the denotation of a formula can be seen as a set of worlds, our recipe allows us to capture also logics such as modal, intuitionistic and relevance logics, thus providing a first step towards the fibring of these logics with many-valued ones. (shrink)

Fibring is recognized as one of the main mechanisms in combining logics, with great signicance in the theory and applications of mathematical logic. However, an open challenge to bring is posed by the collapsing problem: even when no symbols are shared, certain combinations of logics simply collapse to one of them, indicating that bring imposes unwanted interconnections between the given logics. Modulated bring allows a ner control of the combination, solving the collapsing problem both at the semantic and deductive levels. (...) Main properties like soundness and completeness are shown to be preserved, comparison with bring is discussed, and some important classes of examples are analyzed with respect to the collapsing problem. (shrink)

We consider the logics determined by the set of all natural implicative expansions of Kleene’s strong 3-valued matrix and select the class of all logics functionally equivalent to Łukasiewicz’s 3-valued logic Ł3. The concept of a “natural implicative matrix” is based upon the notion of a “natural conditional” defined in Tomova.

A method of constructing Hilbert-type axiom systems for standard many-valued propositional logics was offered by Rosser and Turquette. Although this method is considered to be a solution of the problem of axiomatisability of a wide class of many-valued logics, the article demonstrates that it fails to produce adequate axiom systems. The article concerns finitely many-valued propositional logics of Łukasiewicz. It proves that if standard propositional connectives of the Rosser–Turquette axiom systems are definable in terms of the propositional connectives of Łukasiewicz’s (...) logics, and thus, they are normal ones, then every Rosser–Turquette axiom system for a finite-valued Łukasiewicz’s logic is semantically incomplete. (shrink)

The article concerns two axiom systems of Słupecki for the functionally complete three-valued propositional logic: W1–W6 and A1–A9. The article proves that both of them are inadequate—W1–W6 is semantically incomplete, on the other hand, A1–A9 governs a functionally incomplete calculus, and thus, it cannot be a semantically complete axiom system for the functionally complete three-valued logic.

The article demonstrates that to describe the property of atomicity of transactions in database systems, we need a three-valued logic with propositional connective characterized in the same way as Blamey’s interjunction. However, the article explains that since Blamey’s partial logic with interjunction is a logic without tautologies, it does not satisfy some salient conditions of being a logic of atomic transactions. The article introduces a logic of the considered kind, and provides an example of the formal exposition of the case (...) of an atomic transaction. Finally, the article explains the philosophical significance of the introduced logic. (shrink)

This paper explores relationships between many-valued logic and fuzzy topology from the viewpoint of duality theory. We first show a fuzzy topological duality for the algebras of Łukasiewicz n -valued logic with truth constants, which generalizes Stone duality for Boolean algebras to the n -valued case via fuzzy topology. Then, based on this duality, we show a fuzzy topological duality for the algebras of modal Łukasiewicz n -valued logic with truth constants, which generalizes Jónsson-Tarski duality for modal algebras to the (...) n -valued case via fuzzy topology. We emphasize that fuzzy topological spaces naturally arise as spectrums of algebras of many-valued logics. (shrink)

Some find it plausible that a sufficiently long duration of torture is worse than any duration of mild headaches. Similarly, it has been claimed that a million humans living great lives is better than any number of worm-like creatures feeling a few seconds of pleasure each. Some have related bad things to good things along the same lines. For example, one may hold that a future in which a sufficient number of beings experience a lifetime of torture is bad, regardless (...) of what else that future contains, while minor bad things, such as slight unpleasantness, can always be counterbalanced by enough good things. Among the most common objections to such ideas are sequence arguments. But sequence arguments are usually formulated in classical logic. One might therefore wonder if they work if we instead adopt many-valued logic. I show that, in a common many-valued logical framework, the answer depends on which versions of transitivity are used as premises. We get valid sequence arguments if we grant any of several strong forms of transitivity of 'is at least as bad as' and a notion of completeness. Other, weaker forms of transitivity lead to invalid sequence arguments. The plausibility of the premises is largely set aside here, but I tentatively note that almost all of the forms of transitivity that lead to valid sequence arguments seem intuitively problematic. Still, a few moderately strong forms of transitivity that might be acceptable lead to valid sequence arguments, although weaker statements of the initial value claims avoid these arguments at least to some extent. (shrink)

We recapitulate (Section 1) some basic details of the system of implicative BCSK logic, which has two primitive binary implicational connectives, and which can be viewed as a certain fragment of the modal logic S5. From this modal perspective we review (Section 2) some results according to which the pure sublogic in either of these connectives (i.e., each considered without the other) is an exact replica of the material implication fragment of classical propositional logic. In Sections 3 and 5 we (...) show that for the pure logic of one of these implicational connectives two – in general distinct – consequence relations (global and local) definable in the Kripke semantics for modal logic turn out to coincide, though this is not so for the pure logic of the other connective, and that there is an intimate relation between formulas constructed by means of the former connective and the local consequence relation. (Corollary 5.8. This, as we show in an Appendix, is connected to the fact that the ‘propositional operations’ associated with both of our implicational connectives are close to being what R. Quackenbush has called pattern functions.) Between these discussions Section 4 examines some of the replacement-of-equivalents properties of the two connectives, relative to these consequence relations, and Section 6 closes with some observations about the metaphor of identical twins as applied to such pairs of connectives. (shrink)

Łu logic plays a fundamental role among many-valued logics. However, the expressive power of this logic is restricted to piecewise linear functions. In this paper we enrich the language of Łu logic by adding a new connective which expresses multiplication. The resulting logic, PŁ, is defined, developed, and put into the context of other well-known many-valued logics. We also deal with several extensions of this propositional logic. A predicate version of PŁ logic is introduced and developed too.

In Part I of this paper, we identified and compared various schemes for trivalent truth conditions for indicative conditionals, most notably the proposals by de Finetti and Reichenbach on the one hand, and by Cooper and Cantwell on the other. Here we provide the proof theory for the resulting logics DF/TT and CC/TT, using tableau calculi and sequent calculi, and proving soundness and completeness results. Then we turn to the algebraic semantics, where both logics have substantive limitations: DF/TT allows for (...) algebraic completeness, but not for the construction of a canonical model, while CC/TT fails the construction of a Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra. With these results in mind, we draw up the balance and sketch future research projects. (shrink)

Normative theories can be useful in developing descriptive theories, as when normative subjective expected utility theory is used to develop descriptive rational choice theory and behavioral game theory. “Ought” questions are also the essence of theories of moral reasoning, a domain of higher mental processing that could not survive without normative considerations.

This paper introduces a logical analysis of convex combinations within the framework of Łukasiewicz real-valued logic. This provides a natural link between the fields of many-valued logics and decision theory under uncertainty, where the notion of convexity plays a central role. We set out to explore such a link by defining convex operators on MV-algebras, which are the equivalent algebraic semantics of Łukasiewicz logic. This gives us a formal language to reason about the expected value of bounded random variables. As (...) an illustration of the applicability of our framework we present a logical version of the Anscombe–Aumann representation result. (shrink)

Society Semantics, introduced by W. Carnielli and M. Lima-Marques, is a method for obtaining new logics from the combination of agents of a given logic. The goal of this paper is to present several generalizations of this method, as well as to show some applications to many-valued logics. After a reformulation of Society Semantics in a wider setting, we develop in detail two examples of application of the new formalism, characterizing a hierarchy of paraconsistent logics called Pn and a hierarchy (...) of paracomplete logics In. We also propose three further generalizations, obtaining Society Semantics for several many-valued logics, including a hierarchy of logics called In Pk which are both paraconsistent and paracomplete. (shrink)

We propose a critique of normativism, defined as the idea that human thinking reflects a normative system against which it should be measured and judged. We analyze the methodological problems associated with normativism, proposing that it invites the controversial “is-ought” inference, much contested in the philosophical literature. This problem is triggered when there are competing normative accounts (the arbitration problem), as empirical evidence can help arbitrate between descriptive theories, but not between normative systems. Drawing on linguistics as a model, we (...) propose that a clear distinction between normative systems and competence theories is essential, arguing that equating them invites an “is-ought” inference: to wit, supporting normative “ought” theories with empirical “is” evidence. We analyze in detail two research programmes with normativist features – Oaksford and Chater’s rational analysis and Stanovich and West’s individual differences approach – demonstrating how, in each case, equating norm and competence leads to an is-ought inference. Normativism triggers a host of research biases in the psychology of reasoning and decision making: focusing on untrained participants and novel problems, analyzing psychological processes in terms of their normative correlates, and neglecting philosophically significant paradigms when they do not supply clear standards for normative judgement. For example, in a dual-process framework, normativism can lead to a fallacious “ought-is” inference, in which normative responses are taken as diagnostic of analytic reasoning. We propose that little can be gained from normativism that cannot be achieved by descriptivist computational-level analysis, illustrating our position with Hypothetical Thinking Theory and the theory of the suppositional conditional. We conclude that descriptivism is a viable option, and that theories of higher mental processing would be better off freed from normative considerations. (shrink)

Formal approaches that aim at representing human reasoning should be evaluated based on how humans actually reason. One way of doing so is to investigate whether psychological findings of human reasoning patterns are represented in the theoretical model. The computational logic approach discussed here is the so-called weak completion semantics which is based on the three-valued ᴌukasiewicz logic. We explain how this approach adequately models Byrne’s suppression task, a psychological study where the experimental results show that participants’ conclusions systematically deviate (...) from the classical logically correct answers. As weak completion semantics is a novel technique in the field of computational logic, it is important to examine how it corresponds to other already established non-monotonic approaches. For this purpose we investigate the relation of weak completion with respect to completion and three-valued stable model semantics. In particular, we show that well-founded semantics, a widely accepted approach in the field of non-monotonic reasoning, corresponds to weak completion semantics for a specific class of modified programs. (shrink)

There are several three-valued logical systems that form a scattered landscape, even if all reasonable connectives in three-valued logics can be derived from a few of them. Most papers on this subject neglect the issue of the relevance of such logics in relation with the intended meaning of the third truth-value. Here, we focus on the case where the third truth-value means unknown, as suggested by Kleene. Under such an understanding, we show that any truth-qualified formula in a large range (...) of three-valued logics can be translated into KD as a modal formula of depth 1, with modalities in front of literals only, while preserving all tautologies and inference rules of the original three-valued logic. This simple information logic is a two-tiered classical propositional logic with simple semantics in terms of epistemic states understood as subsets of classical interpretations. We study in particular the translations of Kleene, Gödel, ᴌukasiewicz and Nelson logics. We show that Priest’s logic of paradox, closely connected to Kleene’s, can also be translated into our modal setting, simply by exchanging the modalities possible and necessary. Our work enables the precise expressive power of three-valued logics to be laid bare for the purpose of uncertainty management. (shrink)

In the literature on vagueness one finds two very different kinds of degree theory. The dominant kind of account of gradable adjectives in formal semantics and linguistics is built on an underlying framework involving bivalence and classical logic: its degrees are not degrees of truth. On the other hand, fuzzy logic based theories of vagueness—largely absent from the formal semantics literature but playing a significant role in both the philosophical literature on vagueness and in the contemporary logic literature—are logically nonclassical (...) and give a central role to the idea of degrees of truth. Each kind of degree theory has a strength: the classical kind allows for rich and subtle analyses of the comparative form of gradable adjectives and of various types of gradable precise adjectives, while the fuzzy kind yields a compelling solution to the sorites paradox. This paper argues that the fuzzy kind of theory can match the benefits of the classical kind and hence that the burden is on the latter to match the advantages of the former. In particular, we develop a new version of the fuzzy logic approach that—unlike existing fuzzy theories—yields a compelling analysis of the comparative as well as an adequate account of gradable precise predicates, while still retaining the advantage of genuinely solving the sorites paradox. (shrink)

The traditional analysis of the basic version of the double-slit experiment leads to the conclusion that wave-particle duality is a fundamental fact of nature. However, such a conclusion means to imply that we are not only required to have two contradictory pictures of reality but also compelled to abandon the objectiveness of the truth values, “true” and “false”. Yet, even if we could accept wave-like behavior of quantum particles as the best explanation for the build-up of an interference pattern in (...) the double-slit experiment, without the objectivity of the truth values we would never have certainty regarding any statement about the world. The present paper discusses ways to reconcile the correct description of the double-slit experiment with the objectiveness of “true” and “false”. (shrink)

In 1987, Crispin Wright argued that degree-theoretic (fuzzy) solutions to the Sorites paradox fail because the solutions do not work when the paradox is restated using a conjunctive major premise. I show that Wright is incorrect: degree-theoretic solutions also work when the paradox is stated with a conjunctive major premise.

A proof is presented showing that there is no paraconsistent logics with a standard implication which have a three-valued characteristic matrix, and in which the replacement principle holds.

Maximality is a desirable property of paraconsistent logics, motivated by the aspiration to tolerate inconsistencies, but at the same time retain from classical logic as much as possible. In this paper we introduce the strongest possible notion of maximal paraconsistency, and investigate it in the context of logics that are based on deterministic or non-deterministic three-valued matrices. We show that all reasonable paraconsistent logics based on three-valued deterministic matrices are maximal in our strong sense. This applies to practically all three-valued (...) paraconsistent logics that have been considered in the literature, including a large family of logics which were developed by da Costa's school. Then we show that in contrast, paraconsistent logics based on three-valued properly nondeterministic matrices are not maximal, except for a few special cases (which are fully characterized). However, these non-deterministic matrices are useful for representing in a clear and concise way the vast variety of the (deterministic) three-valued maximally paraconsistent matrices. The corresponding weaker notion of maximality, called premaximal paraconsistency, captures the "core" of maximal paraconsistency of all possible paraconsistent determinizations of a non-deterministic matrix, thus representing what is really essential for their maximal paraconsistency. (shrink)

We define in precise terms the basic properties that an ‘ideal propositional paraconsistent logic’ is expected to have, and investigate the relations between them. This leads to a precise characterization of ideal propositional paraconsistent logics. We show that every three-valued paraconsistent logic which is contained in classical logic, and has a proper implication connective, is ideal. Then we show that for every n > 2 there exists an extensive family of ideal n -valued logics, each one of which is not (...) equivalent to any k -valued logic with k < n. (shrink)

This paper deals with the axiomatizability problem for the matrix-based logics RMQ − and RMQ *. We present a Hilbert-style axiom system for RMQ −, and a quasi-axiomatization based on it for RMQ *. We further compare these logics to different well-known modal logics, and assess its status as relevance logics.

A many-valued (aka multiple- or multi-valued) semantics, in the strict sense, is one which employs more than two truth values; in the loose sense it is one which countenances more than two truth statuses. So if, for example, we say that there are only two truth values—True and False—but allow that as well as possessing the value True and possessing the value False, propositions may also have a third truth status—possessing neither truth value—then we have a many-valued semantics in the (...) loose but not the strict sense. A many-valued logic is one which arises from a many-valued semantics and does not also arise from any two-valued semantics [Malinowski, 1993, 30]. By a ‘logic’ here we mean either a set of tautologies, or a consequence relation. We can best explain these ideas by considering the case of classical propositional logic. The language contains the usual basic symbols (propositional constants p, q, r, . . .; connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔; and parentheses) and well-formed formulas are defined in the standard way. With the language thus specified—as a set of well-formed formulas—its semantics is then given in three parts. (i) A model of a logical language consists in a free assignment of semantic values to basic items of the non-logical vocabulary. Here the basic items of the non-logical vocabulary are the propositional constants. The appropriate kind of semantic value for a proposition is a truth value, and so a model of the language consists in a free assignment of truth values to basic propositions. Two truth values are countenanced: 1 (representing truth) and 0 (representing falsity). (ii) Rules are presented which determine a truth value for every proposition of the language, given a model. The most common way of presenting these rules is via truth tables (Figure 1). Another way of stating such rules—which will be useful below—is first to introduce functions on the truth values themselves: a unary function ¬ and four binary functions ∧, ∨, → and ↔ (Figure 2).. (shrink)

We recapitulate (Section 1) some basic details of the system of implicative BCSK logic, which has two primitive binary implicational connectives, and which can be viewed as a certain fragment of the modal logic S5. From this modal perspective we review (Section 2) some results according to which the pure sublogic in either of these connectives (i.e., each considered without the other) is an exact replica of the material implication fragment of classical propositional logic. In Sections 3 and 5 we (...) show that for the pure logic of one of these implicational connectives two-in general distinct-consequence relations (global and local) definable in the Kripke semantics for modal logic turn out to coincide, though this is not so for the pure logic of the other connective, and that there is an intimate relation between formulas constructed by means of the former connective and the local consequence relation. (Corollary 5.8. This, as we show in an Appendix, is connected to the fact that the 'propositional operations' associated with both of our implicational connectives are close to being what R. Quackenbush has called pattern functions.) Between these discussions Section 4 examines some of the replacement-of-equivalents properties of the two connectives, relative to these consequence relations, and Section 6 closes with some observations about the metaphor of identical twins as applied to such pairs of connectives. (shrink)

The dissertation has two parts, each dealing with a problem, namely: 1) What is the most adequate account of fuzziness -the so-called phenomenon of vagueness?, and 2) what is the most plausible solution to the sorites, or heap paradox? I will try to show that fuzzy properties are those which are gradual, amenable to be possessed in a greater or smaller extent. Acknowledgement of degrees in the instantiation of a property allows for a gradual transition from one opposite to the (...) other, each intermediate stage constituting an overlap in certain proportion of both contraries. Hence, degrees in the possession of a property give rise to simple contradictions. The reason why I have chosen those two questions is that they provide the main philosophical motivation for a particular brand of an infinite valued and paraconsistent logic. I will claim that Classical logic (CL) is not adequate to handle fuzzy situations, and, being deficient, is in need of being expanded to make room for degrees of truth and weak contradictions. One can hardly deny the importance of the debate, since what is ultimately at stake is what the limits of truth, rationality, intelligibility and possibility are. The main disciplines within which the research moves are the philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and ontology. (shrink)

In the philosophical debate on lying, there has generally been agreement that either the speaker believes that his statement is false, or he believes that his statement is true. This article challenges this assumption, and argues that lying is a scalar phenomenon that allows for a number of intermediate cases – the most obvious being cases of uncertainty. The first section shows that lying can involve beliefs about graded truth values (fuzzy lies) and graded beliefs (graded-belief lies). It puts forward (...) a new definition to deal with these scalar parameters, that requires that the speaker asserts what he believes more likely to be false than true. The second section shows that statements are scalar in the same way beliefs are, and accounts for a further element of scalarity, illocutionary force. (shrink)

This thesis addresses philosophical problems concerning improper assertions. The first part considers the issue of defining lying: here, against a standard view, I argue that a lie need not intend to deceive the hearer. I define lying as an insincere assertion, and then resort to speech act theory to develop a detailed account of what an assertion is, and what can make it insincere. Even a sincere assertion, however, can be improper (e.g., it can be false, or unwarranted): in the (...) second part of the thesis, I consider these kinds of impropriety. An influential hypothesis maintains that proper assertions must meet a precise epistemic standard, and several philosophers have tried to identify this standard. After reviewing some difficulties for this approach, I provide an innovative solution to some known puzzles concerning the permissibility of false assertions. In my view, assertions purport to aim at truth, but they are not subject to a norm that requires speakers to assert a proposition only if it is true. (shrink)

In this thesis, I will defend a new kind of compatibilist account of free action, indirect conscious control compatibilism (or indirect compatibilism for short), and argue that some of our actions are free according to it. My argument has three components, and involves the development of a brand new tool for experimental philosophy, and the use of cognitive neuroscience. The first component of the argument shows that compatibilism (of some kind) is a conceptual truth. Contrary to the current orthodoxy in (...) the free will literature, which is that our concept of free will is an incompatibilist concept - a concept according to which we have free will only if determinism is false - I will show that our concept of free will is in fact a compatibilist concept - a concept according to which we can have free will even if determinism is true - and I do so using a new experimental philosophy methodology inspired by two-dimensional semantics. -/- Of course, even if our concept of free will is a compatibilist concept, this does not mean that there are any free actions in the world: the current empirical evidence from the brain sciences appears to show that there might be no, or very few, free actions in the world, even on many compatibilist understandings of what it would take for there to be free will. The second component of the argument addresses this concern by extending our understanding of compatibilism. Agents act freely either when their actions are caused by compatibilistically acceptable psychological processes, or are indirectly caused by those same processes. Hence the name of my account: indirect compatibilism. -/- The final component of the argument defends my new account against some interesting objections and provides evidence from cognitive neuroscience that some of our actions count as free by the lights of indirect compatibilism. (shrink)

Kniha, jako je tato, nemůže být tak docela dílem jediného člověka. Dovést ji do podoby koherentního celku bych nedokázal bez pomoci svých kolegů, kteří po mně text četli a upozornili mě na spoustu chyb a nedůsledností, které se v něm vyskytovaly. Můj dík v tomto směru patří zejména Vojtěchu Kolmanovi, Liboru Běhounkovi a Martě Bílkové. Za připomínky k různým částem rukopisu jsem vděčen i Pavlu Maternovi, Milanu Matouškovi, Prokopu Sousedíkovi, Vladimíru Svobodovi, Petru Hájkovi a Grahamu Priestovi. Kniha vznikla v rámci (...) projektu podpořeného grantem AV ČR číslo A0009001/00. (shrink)