- The real epistemic problem of cognitive penetration.Harmen Ghijsen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1457-1475.details
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Internalism and Entitlement to Rules and Methods.Joshua Schechter - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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A robust enough virtue epistemology.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).details
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Norman and truetemp revisited reliabilistically: A proper functionalist defeat account of clairvoyance.Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2015 - Episteme 13 (1):89-110.details
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Testimony as Speech Act, Testimony as Source.Peter J. Graham - 2015 - In Mi Chienkuo, Michael Slote & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue. New York: Routledge. pp. 121-144.details
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Against Inferential Reliabilism: Making Origins Matter More.Peter J. Graham - 2014 - Philosophical Analysis 15:87-122.details
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In Defense of Proper Functionalism: Cognitive Science Takes on Swampman.Kenny Boyce & Andrew Moon - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2987–3001.details
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Epistemological Problems of Perception.Jack Lyons - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Internalism in the Epistemology of Testimony Redux.B. J. C. Madison - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):741-755.details
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Epistemology and Radically Extended Cognition.Benjamin Jarvis - 2015 - Episteme 12 (4):459-478.details
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Debunking Rationalist Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology: An Empirical Approach.Robert Carry Osborne - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):197-221.details
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Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence defended: replies to McGrath, Pautz, and Neta.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):929-946.details
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Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.details
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What Entitlement Is.Brad Majors - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (4):363-387.details
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A Plea for Epistemic Excuses.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant Fabian Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.details
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Outsourced cognition.Mikkel Gerken - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):127-158.details
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The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.details
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Experiential evidence?Jack C. Lyons - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1053-1079.details
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The Problem of Massive Deception for Justification Norms of Action.Arturs Logins - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):457-468.details
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On what inferentially justifies what: the vices of reliabilism and proper functionalism.Chris Tucker - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3311-3328.details
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If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too.Chris Tucker - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):35-62.details
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Reactive Attitudes as Communicative Entities.Coleen Macnamara - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):546-569.details
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How to be a Normativist about the Nature of Belief.Kate Nolfi - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):181-204.details
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The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment.Mikkel Gerken - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):141-161.details
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The Function of Perception.Peter J. Graham - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Scientia: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Synthese Library. pp. 13-31.details
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Discursive justification and skepticism.Mikkel Gerken - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):373-394.details
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Does Justification Aim at Truth?Peter J. Graham - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):51-72.details
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Circularity, reliability, and the cognitive penetrability of perception.Jack Lyons - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.details
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Perceptual entitlement and basic beliefs.Peter J. Graham - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):467-475.details
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Rights.Leif Wenar - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Schroeder on reasons, experience, and evidence.Susanna Schellenberg & Juan Comesaña - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):607-616.details
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Trustworthy artificial intelligence.Mona Simion & Christoph Kelp - 2020 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-12.details
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Entitlement, calamities and content: an objection to Tyler Burge's perceptual epistemology.Tim Butzer - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Socio‐functional foundations in science: The case of measurement.Kareem Khalifa & Sanford C. Goldberg - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):382-397.details
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Schellenberg’s Capacitism about Phenomenal Evidence and the Alien Experience Problem.Zijian Zhu - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (2):1019-1040.details
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(1 other version)Reliabilist Epistemology.Alvin Goldman & Bob Beddor - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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System reliabilism and basic beliefs: defeasible, undefeated and likely to be true.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):6733-6759.details
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A priori perceptual entitlement, knowledge‐first.Mona Simion - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):311-323.details
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Moral Assertion.Christoph Kelp - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3-4):639-649.details
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Why is Warrant Normative?Peter J. Graham - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):110-128.details
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Knowledge‐first functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.details
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Assertion: The context shiftiness dilemma.Mona Simion - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (4):503-517.details
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Truth‐Sensitivity and Folk Epistemology.Mikkel Gerken - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):3-25.details
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Tracking Eudaimonia.Paul Bloomfield - 2018 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10 (2).details
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Epistemic normativity and the justification-excuse distinction.Cameron Boult - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):4065-4081.details
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(1 other version)Assertion: A Function First Account.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):411-442.details
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Perception, history and benefit.Mona Simion - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):61-76.details
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Basic beliefs and the perceptual learning problem: A substantial challenge for moderate foundationalism.Bram Vaassen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):133-149.details
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Against transglobal reliabilism.Peter J. Graham - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):525-535.details
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Frontloading and the Necessary A Posteriori.Mikkel Gerken - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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