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  1. Meaning Relativism and Subjective Idealism.Andrea Guardo - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    An objection put forward by, among others, John McDowell to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s relativist view of semantic discourse goes roughly as follows: relativism about semantic discourse entails global relativism, which in turn entails subjective idealism, which we can reasonably assume to be false. I show that even though relativism about semantic discourse does entail a form of global relativism, the relativism in question does not entail anything like subjective idealism. This particular kind of relativism holds that which character, in Kaplan’s sense, (...)
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  • Yet Another Skeptical Solution.Andrea Guardo - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):117-129.
    After a brief discussion of the rule-following paradox and of Kripkenstein’s skeptical solution, I put forward my own skeptical solution to the paradox, which revolves around the idea that communication does not require meaning.
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  • Rule-Following and Charity : Wittgenstein and Davidson on Meaning Determination.Kathrin Glüer-Pagin - 2017 - In Claudine Verheggen (ed.), Wittgenstein and Davidson on Thought, Language, and Action. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press. pp. 69-96.
    The project of this chapter is to explore some relations between the rule-following considerations and radical interpretation. I spell out the sense in which the rule-following considerations are about meaning determination, and investigate whether the principle of meaning determination used in the early Davidson's account of meaning determination - the principle of charity - provides an answer to what I shall call "Wittgenstein's paradox". More precisely, I am interested in one aspect of the paradox: the "problem of objectivity". My question (...)
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  • Rule-Following, Ideal Conditions and Finkish Dispositions.Andrea Guardo - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):195-209.
    I maintain that some outcomes, for the most part due to David Lewis, of the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of dispositions can be used to show that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional analyses identify the state of meaning addition by “+” do not exist. And since, of course, sometimes speakers do mean addition by “+”, this entails that ideal-condition dispositional analyses of meaning cannot work.
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  • Semantic Dispositionalism and Non-Inferential Knowledge.Andrea Guardo - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):749-759.
    I discuss Saul Kripke’s Normativity Argument against semantic dispositionalism: I criticize the orthodox interpretation of the argument, defend an alternative reading and argue that, contrary to what Kripke himself seems to have been thinking, the real point of the Normativity Argument is not that meaning is normative.
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