It is often thought that tolerance must be painful; the absence of pain is taken as an indication of indifference, an indication that the agent does not really disapprove of the object of her professed tolerance. This article challenges that view by arguing that the association of tolerance and pain depends ultimately upon the contentious assumption that inner conflict is a form of dysfunction. By unsettling that assumption, it is possible to unsettle the idea that one?s tolerance of others must (...) be painful. More positively, coming to recognize the normality of inner conflict might actually serve to reinforce the disposition to tolerate, as the agent realizes that she must strive to contain and perpetuate the conflicts and tensions which form a necessary feature of her life. If this is right, then the emphasis often placed upon the etymological association of tolerance with patience and suffering could be unhelpful. It might be fruitful to devote more attention to the neglected notion of calmly abiding the behaviour of those of whom we disapprove. (shrink)

Abstract Many political theorists have argued that religious reasons should play a rather limited role in public or political settings. So, for example, according to the Doctrine of Religious Restraint, citizens and legislators ought not allow religious reasons to play a decisive role in justifying public policies. Many military professionals seem to believe that some version of that doctrine applies in military settings, that is, that military professionals should not allow their religious convictions to determine how they exercise command authority. (...) We explain why the Doctrine of Religious Restraint should not apply to military professionals and articulate an alternative understanding of the justificatory role legitimately played by religious considerations in military settings. This alternative understanding assumes that military professionals will exercise command authority with tact, wisdom, and due respect for both the spirit and letter of the law, even when they are guided by robust faith commitments. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore one way to bring bioethics and environmental ethics closer together. I focus on a question at the interface of health, sustainability, and justice: How well does a society promote health with the use of no more than a just share of environmental capacity? To address this question, I propose and discuss a mode of assessment that combines a measurement of population health, an estimate of environmental sustainability, and an assumption about what constitutes a fair or (...) just share. This mode of assessment provides an estimate of the just and sustainable life expectancy of a population. It could be used to monitor how well a particular society promotes health within just environmental limits. It could also serve as a source of information that stakeholders use when they deliberate about programs, policies, and technologies. The purpose of this work is to focus attention on an ethical task: the need to fashion institutions and forms of life that promote health in ways that recognize the claims of sustainability and justice. (shrink)

If elective abortion is publicly funded, then the government is obligated to take active measures designed to reduce its prevalence. I present two arguments for that conclusion. The first argument is directed at those pro-choice thinkers who hold that while some or all elective abortions are morally wrong, they still ought to be legally permitted and publicly subsidized. The second argument is directed at pro-choice thinkers who hold that there is nothing morally wrong with elective abortion and that it should (...) be both legally permitted and publicly subsidized. The second argument employs premises that generalize beyond the abortion debate and that may serve to shed light on broader questions concerning conscience and the requirements of political compromise in a democracy. (shrink)

Soft regulatory measures are often promoted as an alternative for existing regulatory regimes for nanotechnologies. The call for new regulatory approaches stems from several challenges that traditional approaches have difficulties dealing with. These challenges relate to general problems of governability, tensions between public interests, but also (and maybe particularly) to almost complete lack of certainty about the implications of nanotechnologies. At the same time, the field of nanotechnology can be characterized by a high level of diversity. In this paper, we (...) discuss and compare two models for framing public policy in relation to technology regulation: the first is a deliberative model based on foresight knowledge and the second the wide reflective equilibrium model, developed by political philosopher John Rawls. In both models, the aim is to find consensus on (a framework for) policy measures and regulation. On the basis of a critical discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of both models, some tentative conclusions are drawn for effective policy making and implementation based on soft law. (shrink)

'How should public debates be understood?' is the central question of this study. And it is answered by reconstructing a single public debate, namely the debate about the transgenic bull Herman. Herman the bull was created by Gene Pharming in 1989. An extra gene has been inserted in his genome as to induce the production of lactoferrin in the milk of his daughters. A debate started in the media about whether this should be allowed or not. This media debate has (...) lasted for nine years. In this study the debate is analysed and interpreted in order to make visible for others what has happened during this particular debate. It thus provides handles for disclosing other public debates and for better understanding public debates in general.Insight is provided in what has kept this debate going. This media debate, in which the public is involved as an audience, has needed a concrete cause to develop. This seems to be obvious, but in the Netherlands many debates are being organised without such a case. And one may witness that the media, and so the public, are hardly involved in these organised debates. But not only will a case be needed to induce a public debate. The urge of the debate has to be articulated as well. Virtually everybody can articulate problematic aspects of a case, but for a debate to have impact actors are needed that can provide continuity to the debate. In this particular debate this continuity has been provided by the Dierenbescherming. But, this still is not enough. If the media are not interested, the public will not know what is going on. So, for a vivid public debate, a case is needed to make the debate urgent, an organisation has to provide continuity, and the media have to publish about it.With respect to the content of the debate two discussions can be distinguished: a) the general controversy that has evoked the debate and b) the discussion about several specific applications of this technology.ad a) The general controversy. Four general principles are usually mentioned as integrating of the many norms that regulate interpersonal conduct. Two of these are generally reckoned to be applicable to animals as well, to wit 'do not harm' and 'do good'. With respect to the other two principles people do not agree about whether they apply to animals as well. It is obvious that these last principles cannot be applied directly to animals, as animals are not capable of being autonomous in the sense humans are. This implies for many people that the principle of justice does not apply to animals as well. At least a transformation of these principles is required, but this will alter their content substantially. Respect for autonomy can be transformed into respect for intrinsic value and bodily integrity, and justice can be transformed into equal and fair treatment. The debaters can now be divided into two groups: people that do and people that do not recognise these altered principles as applicable to animals. People that do not recognise these principles will argue in terms of 'do the benefits outweigh the harms' and they will be in favour of a 'yes, if the relevant conditions are met' policy. People that do recognise these principles will either be opponents of animal transgenesis or will be in favour of a 'no, unless there are good reasons to do so' policy. They will stress the search for alternatives and will ask for sufficient reasons before they enter a discussion about harms and benefits.ad b) Applications and contexts. With respect to the specific case at hand, it turned out that people have been arguing from different values and standards. These values and standards were connected with different practices of animal keeping and using. This has resulted, dependent on the specific applications of the lactoferrin obtained, in a discussion about what kind of animal Herman the bull is. Will his lactating daughters produce milk in the context of dairy cattle farming? Will they be better protected against mastitis, a cattle disease, which would mean that Herman the bull is functioning in a veterinary context? Will they produce medicines like many laboratory animals do, which would refer to a biomedical context? Or will his daughters produce food for patients in a specialised food production context? It turned out that these contexts, which are called practices, imply different standards for the treatment of animals.Neither the standards of veterinary practice, nor the standards of cattle farming practice do allow for the production of transgenic cattle. As the production of specialised food was mainly considered from the point of view of ordinary milk production practice, the standards of this practice were applied and so the production of transgenic cattle was rejected. In the case of the production of medicine by way of transgenic cattle, the standards for dealing with this case have not become clear at the end of the debate. People did not considered the standards of the biomedical practice adequate nor the standards of the dairy farming practice. Both perspectives remain open. It even may be the case that animal transgenesis develops as a practice of its own or that animal transgenesis will only be judged from the point of view of general standards and values instead of from contextual standards.The process of debating has been subject of the debate as well. The debaters have criticised each others inputs and have reacted to critique with respect to their conduct. These critiques provide insight in the implicit rules of debating in public.Public debates are debates in front of the public as an audience. If people are debating in public, they will not in it for understanding and convincing each other. Their main objective will be to influence public opinion and to gain public support for their views. They will reason as lucid as possible. And this has consequences for the evaluation of the conduct of the debaters. This does not mean that there are no rules, but it does mean that there will be specific rules for these kind of discussions. So, people will be criticised if they go too far, that is to say if they violate the rules of decent reasoning.Debating in public is more than reasoning only. There are all kinds of theatrical elements as well, like suggestive photo's or posters, or telling stories about other debaters, or suggestive reasoning. Here too, rules of decent conduct can be reconstructed from the critiques on several of these theatrical elements that were uttered during the debate at hand.This study ends with a reply to the people that have criticised this debate in general. From their critiques it can be derived that these critics have raised too high expectations of public debates. The fruitfulness and sense of a public debate should not be assessed on the basis of convergence of opinions or on the orientation at consent of the debaters, but on the quality and rationality of the reasoning of the debaters. One may witness that all debaters have developed their views and reasoning; they have listened to others and have reacted to these inputs by better articulating their own reasoning or by adapting their actions. It is evident that the participants have not always conducted according to the rules of decent debating. But, they have taken critique on their conduct seriously and have adapted their behaviour. (shrink)

Can compensation repair the moral harm of a previous wrongful act? On the one hand, some define the very function of compensation as one of restoring the moral balance. On the other hand, the dominant view on compensation is that it is insufficient to fully repair moral harm unless accompanied by an act of punishment or apology. In this paper, I seek to investigate the maximal potential of compensation. Central to my argument is a distinction between apologetic compensation and non-apologetic (...) compensation. Apologetic compensation, I argue, is an act that expresses regret and apology by means of some offer of money, goods, or services. Non-apologetic compensation is an act that seeks to restore loss or harm without expressing regret or apology. In the paper, I defend the view that acts of compensation can be apologetic and argue that such apologetic compensation is sufficient for moral repair. (shrink)

Over the last 30 years the Indian philosopher-economist Amartya Sen has developed an original normative approach to the evaluation of individual and social well-being. The foundational concern of this ‘capability approach’ is the real freedom of individuals to achieve the kind of lives they have reason to value. This freedom is analysed in terms of an individual’s ‘capability’ to achieve combinations of such intrinsically valuable ‘beings and doings’ (‘functionings’) as being sufficiently nourished and freely expressing one’s political views. In this (...) account, ‘development’ is conceived as the expansion of individuals’ capability, and thus as a concept that goes beyond the economic growth of third world countries. My thesis is a philosophical examination of Sen’s capability approach. In the first part (chapters 1-3) I present and defend my interpretation of Sen’s work. (shrink)

Inclusive design prescribes addressing the needs of the widest possible audience in order to consider human differences. Taking differences seriously, however, may imply severely restricting “the widest possible audience”. In confronting this paradox, we investigate to what extent Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness applies to design. By converting the paradox into the question of how design can be fair, we show that the demand for equitability shifts from the design output to the design process. We conclude that the two (...) main questions about justice find application in design: the question about the standards of justice and the question about its metrics. We endorse a Rawlsian approach to the former, while some revision may be due regarding the latter. (shrink)

Institutions have often been characterized as responses to conflict, and assumptions about the nature of conflict have frequently determined the structure and scope of political activity. Two prevalent interpretations of conflict portray it as either a conflict of interest or a competition for resources. Yet there is another view of conflict that regards it in terms of a contest of values, something that raises a different set of questions and issues. These issues involve concerns about the incommensurability and incompatibility of (...) values, and challenge contemporary arguments that rely upon the ordering of preferences or that urge the pursuit of a normative consensus. As I argue, both preference based theories and theories of deliberative democracy prove to deal inadequately with the challenges of moral pluralism and value conflict. (shrink)

La democracia deliberativa establece el acuerdo racional como el fin de los procesos deliberativos. Sin embargo, estudios actuales muestran que en ciertas ocasiones la deliberación, lejos de producir el acuerdo, genera procesos de polarización. Una aproximación a este problema de la polarización de los procesos deliberativos ha sido desarrollada desde la neuroética por autores como Lakoff, Haidt o Hugo Mercier. Así, en este artículo pretendo, en primer lugar, abordar el enfoque de estos autores sobre la polarización. Esto permitirá extraer los (...) errores que pueda haber en sus planteamientos. Finalmente, desarrollaré una propuesta para corregir la polarización de los procesos deliberativos. (shrink)

Artículo centrado en el significado, medida y promoción de las competencias o capacidades democráticas. Tal como lo demuestran muchas Constituciones, declaraciones internacionales y encuestas, la mayoría de la población mundial valora los ideales morales democráticos. Sin embargo, en la vida cotidiana, rara vez nos comportamos a la altura de esos ideales. Para superar esa brecha, necesitamos cultivar las competencias democráticas a través de la educación, enseñando a los estudiantes a expresarse y escuchar a otros ―sobre todo a aquellos con puntos (...) de vista opuestos―. Pero en la mayoría de las escuelas, la educación para la democracia se limita a transmitir el conocimiento declarativo de los libros de texto, en vez de promover el conocimiento tácito o procedimental necesario para resolver conflictos sociales a través de la deliberación no-violenta. Así, el artículo: a) presenta un modelo conceptual del comportamiento democrático; b) explica brevemente las características metodológicas de un instrumento para la medición de una competencia democrática fundamental, el Test del Juicio Moral; y c) discute los principios pedagógicos del Método Konstanz de Discusión de Dilemas, un método que según se ha comprobado representa una mejora respecto al método pionero de Blatt y Kohlberg. (shrink)

The relationship between the necessity to ensure that information is shared in the stages of deliberation and the overcoming of what Dryzek (2001) called constriction of deliberative economy is directly related to the proponents and opponents’ propensity to submit and add information differently, in a plural manner. This article describes the salient features of the deliberative turn in order to defend that this propensity is not individual. The evolution of the public space in science and in politics are both paradigmatic (...) examples to appreciate that individual deliberation, and even mere aggregation of opinions, are consistently interpreted only if they are part of social practices and collective institutions aimed at defending tolerance towards positions, beliefs and interpretations that are different or even confronted. This paper argues that the so called model of contestatory deliberative democracy contributes to the acquisition of knowledge precisely because it fosters a plurality of epistemic states associated with practices as consensus and dissent. (shrink)

Theoreticians of deliberative democracy have sometimes found it hard to relate to the seemingly contradictory experimental results produced by psychologists and political scientists. We suggest that this problem may be alleviated by inserting a layer of psychological theory between the empirical results and the normative political theory. In particular, we expose the argumentative theory of reasoning that makes the observed pattern of findings more coherent. According to this theory, individual reasoning mechanisms work best when used to produce and evaluate arguments (...) during a public deliberation. It predicts that when diverse opinions are discussed, group reasoning will outperform individual reasoning. It also predicts that individuals have a strong confirmation bias. When people reason either alone or with like-minded peers, this confirmation bias leads them to reinforce their initial attitudes, explaining individual and group polarization. We suggest that the failures of reasoning are most likely to be remedied at the collective than at the individual level. (shrink)