This conceptual paper explores the role that wisdom plays in social work. In the literature, this topic is primarily discussed in terms of ‘Practice Wisdom’, a kind of implicit and intuitive-based body of knowledge that is acquired through practice experience. After reviewing some formulations of it, we argue that practice wisdom faces a number of difficulties and is a misguided approach. To replace it, we propose a novel framework called ‘Practitioner Wisdom’, which emphasises that the proper subject of wisdom is (...) not some sub-personal construct like a body of knowledge or a set of skills but the social work practitioner. Drawing from virtue theory in philosophy, we theorise that being a wise practitioner is a matter of acquiring and cultivating a character that is constituted by the relevant social work virtues and values. We conclude by discussing some benefits of practitioner wisdom, including how it can be taught to social work students and entrants, and suggest some future areas of research. (shrink)

This article discusses conceptions of modesty and humility and their key features. It gives a brief historical overview of debates about whether or not they’re really virtues at all. It also discusses theories of modesty and humility that root them in the presence or absence of particular beliefs, emotions, desires, and attention. it also discusses related phenomena in epistemology: rational limits on self-ascription of error, attitudes to disagreement, and openness to alternative views.

This paper gives a new and richer account of open-mindedness as a moral virtue. I argue that the main problem with existing accounts is that they derive the moral value of open-mindedness entirely from the epistemic role it plays in moral thought. This view is overly intellectualist. I argue that open-mindedness as a moral virtue promotes our flourishing alongside others in ways that are quite independent of its role in correcting our beliefs. I close my discussion by distinguishing open-mindedness from (...) what some might consider its equivalent: empathy and tolerance. (shrink)

William Hare has made fundamental contributions to philosophy of education. Among the most important of these contributions is his hugely important work on open-mindedness. In this paper I explore the several relationships that exist between Hare’s favored educational ideal (open-mindedness) and my own (critical thinking). I argue that while both are of central importance, it is the latter that is the more fundamental of the two.

Pearce's "African Philosophy and the Sociological Thesis" makes very interesting reading. Why it is interesting is not because it advances the frontiers of philosophical discourse in Africa or globally but because it shows that certain unwarranted dispositions die hard and that deliberate ignorance, if that is what is displayed, is hard to cure. In this article the author comments on the following contentions made by Pearce: (1) philosophy has no social relevance and/or responsibility; (2) philosophy is purely a linguistic activity (...) concerned with analysis of concepts and examination; (3) philosophy derives from religion; (4) because African philosophy cannot supplant world philosophy, it lacks locus and legitimacy; (5) African philosophy pursues intellectual apartheid through an ethnophilosophical agenda; and (6) African philosophy is vulnerable to the Sociological Thesis and is voided by it. The author's rebuttal consists of a critical and analytic examination of Pearce's views, counterfactual illustrations, and elicitation of enthymemic presuppositions. (shrink)

Despite reservations expressed in the literature, there is a strong case in the context of schooling for favouring the view that students should engage in an assessment of their teachers for intellectual trustworthiness if credulity on the part of students is to be avoided. J. S. Mill’s suggestion that the judgment of open-minded individuals can be trusted is explored and defended; and it is further argued that students are in a position to determine whether or not their teachers are open-minded (...) by asking certain questions about their approach and manner. (shrink)

This paper explores how open-mindedness and its exercise can be social in nature. In particular, it argues that an individual can be regarded as open-minded even though she does not conduct all of the intellectual tasks as required by open-mindedness _by herself;_ that is, she delegates some of these tasks to her epistemic peers. Thinking about open-mindedness in such social terms not only opens up the possibility that there are different and surprising ways for an individual to be open-minded, but (...) can also help offset some recent criticisms raised against open-mindedness and its status as an intellectual virtue. (shrink)

This paper proposes to examine Daniel Cohen’s recent attempt to apply virtues to argumentation theory, with special attention given to his explication of how open-mindedness can be regarded as an argumentational or critical virtue. It is argued that his analysis involves a contentious claim about open-mindedness as an epistemic virtue, which generates a tension for agents who are simultaneously both an arguer and a knower (or who strive to be both). I contend that this tension can be eased or resolved (...) by clarifying the nature of open-mindedness and by construing open-mindedness in terms of its function. Specifically, a willingness to take a novel viewpoint seriously is sufficient for making open-mindedness both an epistemic and a critical virtue. (shrink)

It has been a decade since the phrase virtue argumentation was introduced, and while it would be an exaggeration to say that it burst onto the scene, it would be just as much of an understatement to say that it has gone unnoticed. Trying to strike the virtuous mean between the extremes of hyperbole and litotes, then, we can fairly characterize it as a way of thinking about arguments and argumentation that has steadily attracted more and more attention from argumentation (...) theorists. We hope it is neither too late for an introduction to the field nor too soon for some retrospective assessment of where things stand. (shrink)

Open-mindedness is generally regarded as an intellectual virtue because its exercise reliably leads to truth. However, some theorists have argued that open-mindedness’s truth-conduciveness is highly contingent, pointing out that it is either not truth-conducive at all under certain scenarios or no better than dogmatism or credulity in others. Given such shaky ties to truth, it would appear that the status of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is in jeopardy. In this paper, I propose to defend open-mindedness against these challenges. In (...) particular, I show that the challenges are ill-founded because they misconstrue the nature of open-mindedness and fail to consider the requisite conditions of its application. With a proper understanding of open-mindedness and of its requirements, it is clear that recourse to it is indeed truth-conducive. (shrink)

Virtue argumentation theory provides the best framework for accommodating the notion of an argument that is “fully satisfying” in a robust and integrated sense. The process of explicating the notion of fully satisfying arguments requires expanding the concept of arguers to include all of an argument’s participants, including judges, juries, and interested spectators. And that, in turn, requires expanding the concept of an argument itself to include its entire context.

Educational practices which reinforce cultural diversity are often commended in the name of pluralism, though such practices may be condemned on the same grounds if they are seen as a threat to the fragile sense of political unity which holds a pluralistic society together. Therefore, the educational implications of pluralism as an ideal are often ambiguous, and the ambiguity cannot be resolved in the absence of a clear understanding of the particular civic virtues which a pluralistic society should engender. Two (...) influential conceptions of civic education which purport to affirm the ideal of pluralism are examined and both are found wanting. Liberal political theory proclaims the paramount importance of justice in public life, and justice can be construed in a way that accomodates diversity. However, the kind of civic education which liberalism entails does too little to restrain the centrifugal forces latent in cultural diversity. Communitarian political theory exalts civic friendship as the supreme public virtue, but the civic education it supports is compatible with only a highly attenuated cultural diversity. A third alternative is canvassed which combines the liberal stress on justice with a conception of patriotism distinct from civic friendship. The implications of this alternative for disputes about bias in public schools are briefly discussed. (shrink)

Is 'education' a thick epistemic concept? The answer depends, of course, on the viability of the 'thick/thin' distinction, as well as the degree to which education is an epistemic concept at all. I will concentrate mainly on the latter, and will argue that epistemological matters are central to education and our philosophical thinking about it; and that, insofar, education is indeed rightly thought of as an epistemic concept. In laying out education's epistemological dimensions, I hope to clarify the degree to (...) which it makes sense to regard the concept as 'thick'. I also discuss the relationship between philosophy of education and virtue epistemology and the sense in which being educated might itself be thought to be an epistemic virtue. Finally, I urge virtue epistemologists in particular and epistemologists generally to turn their attention to questions of education, to further both the philosophy of education and epistemology itself. (shrink)

En este trabajo adoptamos una postura crítica, en primer lugar, ante un planteamiento que desde la investigación empírica pretende explicar los fines propios de la educación. Frente a éste proponemos la metodología hermenéutico-crítica para desentrañar cuáles son los fines últimos de la educación. Descubrimos que desde la metodología hermenéutico-crítica es posible enfocar adecuadamente el fin de la educación así como aportar una justificación ética solvente. Profundizando en la dimensión crítica de la hermenéutica, pero sin desvincularla de su quicio experiencial, reparamos (...) en que no basta con interpretar los valores establecidos por la sociedad, sino que es necesario ahondar en el radical ético que justifica la educación como auténtico desarrollo humano de las capacidades morales. Esta experiencia primordial de la educación que hunde sus raíces en el radical humano es una experiencia genuinamente ética. A este respecto, destacamos once claves del enfoque éticohermenéutico y sus ventajas para la determinación del enclave de la educación. (shrink)

This special issue of Paideusis contains refereed papers from the Conference on Open-mindedness and the Virtues in Education held in honour of William Hare at Mount Saint Vincent University, October 2-4, 2008, on the occasion of Dr. Hare’s retirement from full-time teaching.

In this paper, I discuss the Ontario College of Teachers’ most recent versions of the Standards of Practice with William Hare’s counsel on being open-minded regarding open-mindedness in mind. Specifically, I insist that the use of the Standards of Practice as guidelines for working through cases of professional and ethical issues requires yet another rule to indicate when to deviate from this or that standard. In this way, open-mindedness consists of developing and following rules to indicate when and where specific (...) standards should be bypassed. These rules vary, however, one source of these can be found in what Barbara Herman has called, “Rules of Moral Salience”—rules that guide us in our day-to-day moral decision-making and that we draw on when called upon to make moral-ethical judgments. What this means for various ethics (ethics of care; Kantian-type ethics, psychological and/or developmental accounts of ethics) is also broached. (shrink)

This paper introduces the notion of open‐mindedness before proceeding to outline its value to the practical activity of nursing. An argument is constructed to point to the desirability of the development of a virtue of open‐mindedness in nurses in order to complement evidence‐based practice. Attention is drawn to two failures of open‐mindedness (the vices of closed‐mindedness and credulousness), which have the potential both to restrict autonomous practice and to cause harm.